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ABSTRACTS

The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System

By R. B. ELROD

This essay examines the Concert of Europe as an international system and offers some general reflections and tentative conclusions about the meaning, the nature, and the operation of concert diplomacy between 1815 and 1854. It focuses upon the assumptions and procedures engendered by the Concert which restrained and moderated the policies of the European great powers by peaceful means. It concludes that the European Concert was a conscious and reasonably successful attempt to devise a stable and peaceful system of interstate relations.

On Thinking About Future World Order

By R. W. COX

Three types of thought approach the question of future world order: the natural-rational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. The normative criterion in the natural-rational approach has, in recent times, most commonly been bound up with the view that liberal pluralism in polities is the condition for a just world order. This view has, however, succumbed both under the critique of positivist-evolutionary political science which argues that authoritarianism is characteristic of early stages of political development, and to the manipulation of "pluralism" in poor countries by powerful external forces (investment, trade union, and intelligence). The positivist-evolutionary approach has two main currents. One is functionalism, of which the transnational and transgovernmental relations versions are currently fashionable. The other is the notion of a global ecological system. Both versions take existing structures of power and social relations as implicit givens from which future trends are extrapolated; they provide no basis for considering the possibility of changes in these structures. The historicist-dialectical approach offers the possibility of understanding change in these basic structures of power and social relations by searching out points of emerging conflict and the alternative conceptions of order which the forces in conflict express.

Organizing Collective Security: The UN Charter's Chapter VIII in Practice

By R. L. BUTTERWORTH

What leverage does international organization offer on problems of interdependence? At what system level can actors cooperate to what effect? And is their cooperation more the product of the "objective facts" of interdependence or of "subjective" political considerations? Insights into these problems are obtained by examining the operational network of relationships that developed between the UN and selected regional organizations in the field of collective security. The organizations' operational jurisdictions and capabilities are examined in light of 146 cases of interstate security conflicts that were submitted to them. The operational network that developed is found to be in accordance with the prescriptions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, suggesting that short-term bargaining considerations are the primary determinants of the effectiveness of international organization. But although such considerations have made these organizations quite useful, they have also produced a movement away from organizational conflict management during the past decade.

Beyond Rational Deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions

By J. STEINBRUNER

Throughout the nuclear era, United States strategic defense policy has been conceptualized in terms of the rational theory of decision. Though this has been on balance a happy arrangement for the primary policy of deterrence, there are anomalies in the theory which make its extension to problems of arms control problematic and which lead to well-known doubts about crisis stability. Given the seriousness of the latter issues, it is well to consider the implications of alternative theories of the decision process.

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A competitive theory of the decision process can be found; that theory, labeled here the cybernetic theory, leads to distinctly different conclusions concerning major matters of defense policy such as force sizing, force targeting, and arms-negotiation strategy. It is very unlikely that such an unfamiliar and underdeveloped theory could either quickly or completely replace established rational conceptions of defense policy, but some plausible marginal adjustments are suggested.

Soldiers as Traditionalizers: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa

By A. A. MAZRUI

On the basis of evidence mainly from West Africa, many scholars in the 1960's made predictions about likely trends in Africa as a whole on such issues as one-party states. On the basis of data from Eastern Africa, can we now risk predictions about likely performance of military regimes in Africa as a whole?

There is evidence from Eastern Africa that African soldiers may be agents of retraditionalization. The bulk of the army in most countries is recruited from some of the most rural and least acculturated sectors of society. Contemporary African soldiers may be traditionalists in charge of modern armies with modern technology. What happens when a modern organization is manned mainly by rural recruits?

It may be that both modernization and retraditionalization are taking place under military leadership in Africa. The cultural revivalist role of sub-westernized or non-westernized African soldiers is beginning to manifest itself in places like Uganda under Idi Amin and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko. The political decline of westernized intellectuals and the rise of soldiers may herald a partial re-Africanization of Africa, but with some painful costs.

Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto

By H. N. KIM

The phenomenal growth of the Japanese Communist Party's electoral strength during a period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity (1961-1974) clearly deviates from Benjamin's and Kautsky's "curvilinear theory" of the economic development and strength of Communist parties. Nor does it conform to Lipset's hypothesis that there exists an inverse correlation between the economic growth and the strength of Communist parties. It is my basic contention that the recent growth in the JCP's organizational strength and electoral successes should be ascribed to the overall deradicalization of the party which has taken place since 1961. The findings of this study as a whole substantiate theories on deradicalization of the Marxist movement advanced earlier by Robert Michels and more recently by Robert C. Tucker, who hypothesized that there exists an inverse correlation between the deradicalization of a revolutionary party and its "worldly success." His findings also confirm Triska's and Finley's hypothesis that deradicalized Communist parties in the developed countries would become not significantly different from other non-Communist parties either in structure or functions.

Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures

By C. S. GRAY

Few people in any NATO country are satisfied with the existing theater nuclear posture and doctrine—yet radical revision is politically impossible. There is a marked absence of consensus within NATO on the proper functions of theater nuclear weapons: to Europeans they are, above all, a near-guarantee of a wider war and symbolic of American commitment (thereby enhancing deterrence), while to Americans they are, essentially, a means for reversing a deteriorating battlefield situation. A guide to the debate of recent years is organized around the systematic discussion of four alternative theater nuclear postures: *Current NATO, Revised NATO, The Covering Force*, and *Battlefield Use*. The ideas inherent in, and the means for the accomplishment of each, are presented, as are the claimed advantages and disadvantages. The debate occasioned by the Nunn Amendment has focused attention on the question of the relationship between defensive utility and deterrent value.

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THE CONCERT OF EUROPE:
A Fresh Look at an International System

By RICHARD B. ELROD

RELATIONS between states differ from all other forms of social interaction. As Raymond Aron reminds us, interstate relations "involve, in essence, the alternatives of peace and war."[1] Moreover, the sources of international dissension and discord generally seem to overbalance the forces for harmony. The study of international politics must proceed from certain inescapable assumptions: the inevitable clash of national interests and prestige; the perceptions and misperceptions of statesmen and would-be statesmen; the operation of impersonal technological and social forces that imprison both leaders and led; the irrepressible friction between change and inertia. All these factors—and others—constitute the dynamics of interstate relations that make peace a precious, precarious matter.

History reveals, however, that statesmen were more successful in some periods in the past than during others in managing and controlling these unavoidable tensions. Certain constraining and moderating forces operated that compelled or induced sovereign states to refrain from adventurous and aggressive foreign policies. From 1815 to 1854 European interstate relations clearly conformed to that pattern. No wars occurred between the great powers; a large measure of security and stability characterized the international system. Statesmen exercised self-restraint and cooperated in regulating several diplomatic crises that could easily have degenerated into catastrophe. The explanation for this uncommon willingness on the part of great powers to act with patience and self-abnegation is not simple. Some scholars credit the diplomats of that era with extraordinary skill and perception. In the aftermath of the long and costly wars against revolutionary France, European leaders were understandably appreciative of the need for peace, and they displayed impressive versatility in its preservation. Adherents of the now fashionable premise of the primacy of domestic politics tend to seek the answer in the relative quiescence of internal affairs in the postwar period. Most observers, perhaps, continue to attribute peace to the restoration and operation of the European balance of power.[2]

[1] *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books 1973), 6.

[2] See, for example, A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1954), xix-xx.

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These explanations are plausible and no doubt partially correct; peace, no less than war, issues from a multiplicity of causes. Yet one important element is often overlooked: the Concert of Europe, the international system within which European governments formulated and conducted policy. The Concert seldom receives much credit for the long period of peace after 1815; some would dispute its peace-keeping function entirely, others would deny its very existence.[3] In this essay, I will consider the Concert of Europe as a conscious and generally effective attempt by European statesmen to maintain peaceful relations between sovereign states. I will also offer some general reflections and tentative conclusions about the meaning, the nature, and the operation of concert diplomacy.[4] For the European Concert—the machinery it developed, the rationale that lay behind it, the rules and procedures it engendered—constituted an essential ingredient of European peace and stability between the Congress of Vienna and the Crimean War. It was a functioning and promising system of international relations,

[3] W. N. Medlicott concludes that "it was the peace which maintained the Concert and not the Concert that maintained peace." *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe* (London: Athlone Press 1956), 18. Another common view is that the Concert was just the old balance-of-power system perpetuated in another guise: Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton 1955), 88n., 156-59. Concert diplomacy admittedly accepted and incorporated the principle of the balance of power. But I believe that a distinction must be drawn (and in fact was drawn) between the balance of power, seen simply as a distribution of power among essential members of the states system, and balance-of-power politics, which featured confrontation as the first premise, and which had a natural tendency to seek preponderance rather than balance. See Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown 1963), for some perceptive comments on this subject.

[4] I make no pretense here of presenting an essay based on original research; nor do I wish to quarrel with those scholars who subscribe to alternative interpretations. In justification of the approach I am taking, I wish to offer one additional comment, however. The current emphasis among historians upon the primacy of domestic politics and among international relations theorists upon methodological experimentation and general systems analysis has produced in many cases a disdainful view of "traditional" diplomatic history and of mere "praxeology" (the term is Aron's). While admitting the justice of these critiques to a point, I feel that theory could often be more concretely grounded in actual historical situations and developments, and that such international systems as the Concert of Europe may yet retain instructional value. Moreover, the proponents of the *Primat der Innenpolitik*, while they broaden our understanding of the motivations and formulation of foreign policy, are much less satisfactory in explaining the multifaceted interaction, and the results, of foreign policies once they are introduced into the international arena. Here, it seems to me, the nature and structure of the existing international system becomes crucially important. The Concert of Europe is a good example.

The literature incorporating the approach of the primacy of domestic politics is generally familiar. I refer only to the works of Fritz Fischer, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Helmut Böhme, and Wolfgang Mommsen in Germany, and Arno J. Mayer in the United States. For some recent trends in international relations research, see Richard B. Finnegan, "International Relations: The Disputed Search for Methods," *Review of Politics*, XXXIV (January 1972), 40-66; and Warren R. Phillips, "Where Have All the Theories Gone?" *World Politics*, XXVI (January 1974), 155-88.

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one that differed quite radically from the balance-of-power politics of the eighteenth century and the total wars of the first half of the twentieth. It is worthy of a brief re-examination.[5]

ORIGINS OF THE CONCERT

The concept of concert diplomacy hardly emerged fully defined or completely thought-out. Certain assumptions and procedures became customary and prescriptive through application. In the first instance, the Concert derived from the common realization of European statesmen of the Napoleonic era that something new and different must be devised to mitigate the increasingly chaotic and warlike balance-of-power system of the previous century. Both critics and defenders of the balance-of-power idea, even during its apogee, recognized that it was unsatisfactory.[6] By the end of the eighteenth century the satirical observation of Alexander Pope, issued as early as 1711, had become ominously prophetic:

> Now Europe's balanc'd, neither Side prevails,
> For Nothing's left in either of the Scales.[7]

Balance-of-power politics—the politics of confrontation—generated intolerable international tensions, produced increasingly serious armed conflicts, and inspired progressively extravagant plans of aggression. It neither maintained peace nor preserved the independence of sovereign

[5] I am particularly indebted to the recent work of Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1972), which contains a trenchant analysis of concert diplomacy in the concluding chapter. The following studies were also of special assistance: Charles K. Webster, *The Art and Practice of Diplomacy* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1962), esp. 55-69; Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory, 1815–1914* (London: Longmans, Green 1970); Rene Albrecht-Carrie, ed., *The Concert of Europe, 1815–1914* (New York: Harper 1968); F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1957); Hinsley, "Reflections on the History of International Relations," in Martin Gilbert, ed., *A Century of Conflict, 1850–1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor* (New York: Atheneum 1967), 19-34; Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations* (New York: Praeger 1965); Aron (fn. 1); and Rosecrance (fn. 3).

[6] The critiques by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre at the beginning of the eighteenth century and by Kant at the end are familiar. Yet even Edmund Burke, a defender of equilibrium politics, conceded during the Seven Years' War that "The balance of power, the pride of modern policy, and originally invented to preserve the general peace as well as the freedom of Europe, has only preserved its liberty. It has been the origin of innumerable and fruitless wars." Quoted in Herbert Butterfield, "The Balance of Power," in H. Butterfield and Martin Wright, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966), 144.

[7] *Minor Poems*, Norman Ault and John Butt, eds., Twickenham edn., VI (London: Methuen 1954), 82.

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states; by the time of the French Revolution, the international system had broken down altogether.[8]

Friedrich von Gentz, writing in 1818, applauded the progress made by European statesmen in transcending the balance-of-power idea, "the principle which has governed, and has also too often troubled and bloodied Europe for three centuries."[9] John Capodistrias, the advisor of Alexander I of Russia, similarly deplored a return to "the terrible empire of anarchy and revolutionary despotism with all the horrors of the *divide et impera* of the old diplomacy."[10] This common determination to surmount the malignant system of the past represented, as one writer remarks, "a revolution in diplomatic history."[11] The Concert of Europe was born, and with it a genuine sense of solidarity and responsibility for Europe, a spirit of "national self-restraint, respect for the public law as defined in treaties, and willingness to enforce its observance by concerted action. . . ."[12]

The Concert connoted, first of all, a new method of diplomacy—diplomacy by congress or conference (or, as Gentz once called it, "the diplomacy of the highway"). In this connection the Concert may be defined as the great powers meeting together at times of international crisis to maintain peace and to develop European solutions to European problems. Statesmen who had finally recognized the necessity of co-operation in the last coalition against Napoleon continued to believe in the advantages of collaboration to maintain the postwar settlement.

[8] These judgments contradict the conclusion of many theorists that balance-of-power politics in the eighteenth century permitted only limited wars (the "stylized wars of position that only rarely affected the civilian populations") and was a system of basic moderation. Hoffmann (fn. 5), 101; Hinsley, *Power* . . . (fn. 5), 179. For ample evidence to the contrary, one need only turn to Albert Sorel, *Europe and the French Revolution*, trans. by Alfred Cobban and J. W. Hunt (New York: Anchor Books 1971), esp. 64-85. In comparison to the present century, the warfare of the era of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great may indeed appear mild. Even so, it is most difficult to conceive of the wars of the Sun King as conflicts which did not involve civilian populations; or of the Seven Years' War as a limited war of position; or of the partitions of Poland as an example of the preservation of independent states; or, finally, of the various plans for the destruction of Prussia, Austria, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey as evidences of moderation. Yet all characterized balance-of-power politics in the period. Cf. also Schroeder (fn. 5), 403.

[9] *Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valachie*, ed. Anton von Prokesch-Osten (Paris: Plon 1876–1877), I, 344-45. An English translation of this essay ("Considerations on the Political System Now Existing in Europe") is available in Mack Walker, ed., *Metternich's Europe, 1813–1848* (New York: Harper 1968), 71-83.

[10] Patricia K. Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1970), 239.

[11] H. G. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: The Concert of Europe—An Experiment* (New York: Oxford University Press 1947), 27.

[12] Gordon A. Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance of Power," in the *New Cambridge Modern History*, X (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1960), 267.

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Lord Castlereagh of Great Britain, who frequently called the congresses "reunions," especially emphasized this function: "I am quite convinced that past habits, common glory and those occasional meetings, displays and repledges are among the best securities Europe now has for a durable peace."[13]

But the Concert of Europe was more than an innovation in diplomatic technique. It cannot be confined simply to the era of the great European congresses between 1815 and 1823.[14] The essential precepts of concert diplomacy survived the congress era and assisted materially in the maintenance of peace until 1854. For the European Concert was also a conceptual norm among the great powers of the proper and permissible aims and methods of international politics. It gradually came to embody a code of conduct for international behavior, one that transcended the ideological division between the three conservative Eastern powers and the more liberal Western states. Each side naturally aspired to use concert diplomacy as an instrument of its own political creed and was sometimes tempted to seek alternative methods to the Concert.[15] Yet for over three decades European statesmen generally shared the assumptions which predicated concert diplomacy, and in most cases were willing to abide by its rules.

RULES OF CONCERT DIPLOMACY

What, then, were the underlying assumptions and the unwritten rules of concert diplomacy? First of all, the Concert of Europe meant great-power tutelage over the rest of Europe. It consisted only of the great powers; lesser states were occasionally consulted when their interests were involved, but they possessed few rights and certainly not that of equality. In the context of the post-Napoleonic period this development was natural and probably necessary. On the surface, moreover, it hardly represented a significant deviation from actual practice in the past. But the idea of the great powers acting in unity was in itself somewhat novel and clearly rested upon a fresh postulate. The recognition of a

[13] Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh: Britain and the European Alliance, 1815–1822* (2d ed., London: G. Bell 1934), 144.

[14] Several scholars distinguish between the "era of the congresses" and "the Concert of Europe" after 1823. See Irby C. Nichols Jr., *The European Pentarchy and the Congress of Verona, 1822* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1971), 325.

[15] Metternich's efforts to convert the Paris ambassadorial conference into a headquarters for antirevolutionary surveillance and action, and Palmerston's ambitions to create a league of liberal states are well known. For the former, see Guillaume Bertier de Sauvigny, *Metternich et la France après le congres de Vienne*, I: *De Napoleon à Decazes* (Paris: Hachette 1968), 116; and Webster (fn. 13), 73. Palmerston's desire for a "western confederacy of free states" is discussed in Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841* (2 vols., London: G. Bell 1951); quote from I, 347.

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European community of interests, and commitment to its defense, required of the great European states a new posture and a special accountability. Great-power tutelage was obligatory, for only the great powers possessed the resources, the prestige, and the vision to contend with the transcendent concerns of peace or war, of stability or disorder. As Castlereagh observed in 1818, "the Great Powers feel that they have not only a common interest, but a common duty to attend to."[16] Gentz concluded in the same year that "the five powers at the head of the federation are the only ones who could destroy the general system by changing their policies. Squabbles and changes among the others could never have that effect."[17] Implicit in this judgment was the cynical but accurate assessment that so long as the great powers were in agreement, the lesser states could cause little trouble.

The smaller states were thus shunted aside because the great powers had the responsibility of preserving the peace of Europe and of protecting a European society menaced by revolutionary principles. Equally important was that the emphasis upon great-power unity constituted a barrier against unilateral action by any state; it served to constrain even the great powers. No one power could attempt to settle a European question by an independent and self-regulated initiative. European problems must receive European answers; the policies of each were subject to the scrutiny and sanction of all. Prince Metternich verbalized this concept in 1820 when he remarked that the most essential basis of European repose was "the most absolute solidarity . . . in all questions of a general interest" and the assurance that none of the great powers would ever "proceed alone on such matters."[18] This explains the natural and virtually imperative tendency in concert diplomacy to internationalize diplomatic questions, to replace individual claims and prerogatives by European ones. Aversion to unilateral action or aggrandizement gave birth to the first of the unwritten rules of concert diplomacy: that the proper way of dealing with international crises was through conference diplomacy. Acceptance of this precept was general

[16] Webster (fn. 13), 160.

[17] Gentz (fn. 9), 477; Walker (fn. 9), 73. Castlereagh wrote in September 1815 that "There is not a Power, however feeble, that borders France from the Channel to the Mediterranean that is not pushing some acquisition under the plea of security and rectification of frontier. They . . . are foolish enough to suppose that the Great Powers of Europe are to be in readiness to protect them in the enjoyment of these petty spoils. In truth, their whole conception is so unstatesmanlike that they look not beyond their own sop; compared with this, the keeping together of a European force has little importance in their eyes." W. Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe* (2d ed., London: Longmans, Green 1920), 138.

[18] G. Bertier de Sauvigny, "Sainte-Alliance et Alliance dans les conceptions de Metternich," *Revue Historique*, Vol. 223 (April-June 1960), 263.

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throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. Admittedly, statesmen sometimes explored other possibilities first and often became exasperated with the cumbersome and time-consuming procedure of diplomacy by conference.[19] Great-power conferences, furthermore, could not resolve all the problems that they considered. Even so, realistic diplomats had to acknowledge the basic efficacy of joint consultation and action. The conference method clearly tended to moderate more extreme positions and to reinforce the conception of the European great powers as a special group, with special responsibilities as well as special privileges.

A second and closely related rule followed logically: that territorial changes in Europe were subject to the sanction of the great powers. Though sometimes an imperfect and unharmonious method of acknowledging necessary alterations, this procedure was the only means of legitimizing new arrangements. The great powers acting in concert determined the acceptable and appropriate limits of change. They revised settlements considered too drastic, and substituted European action and guarantees for unilateral claims. The insistence of the great powers upon reviewing modifications in the international order represented another significant deterrence against immoderate international conduct. By the simple process of submitting questions to "collective deliberation" the actions of revisionist powers were circumscribed.[20]

The two rules of diplomacy by conference and of great-power sanction of change enjoyed a remarkable longevity in European diplomatic practice. They were appealed to, and many times utilized, throughout the nineteenth century. These first two canons, however, pertained only to the general objectives and machinery of concert diplomacy. Among the other ingredients that accounted for the willingness of the great powers to participate in the Concert and to accept its decisions there are two additional prescriptions which were crucial to the successful operation of concert diplomacy. The third dictum was that essential members of the states system must be protected and defended. Obviously this pertained first to the five great powers. But certain areas in which the great powers were in contention could be just as important to the system as the great powers themselves. Excessive weakness as well as superabundant strength of an essential member posed a serious

[19] The hassle between Metternich and Palmerston over a conference on the Eastern Question in 1833 (and the resulting delay) is a typical example. See Webster (fn. 15); and M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (New York: St. Martin's 1966), 79-87.

[20] Phillip E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Straits Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1934), 73.

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menace to the system. The Ottoman Empire, for example, was necessary to the European system simply because its demise would raise problems so dangerous that general European war and upheaval could not be avoided. European cabinets thus relied upon concert diplomacy to sustain the Turkish Sultan—to replace unilateral pretensions by a European guardianship, to avoid as long as possible the inevitable scramble over the spoils, and to insure that no one power acquired exclusive preponderance in an area affecting the interests of all.

The final rule of concert diplomacy was that great powers must not be humiliated. They must not be challenged either in their vital interests or in their prestige and honor. Concert diplomacy assigned itself the delicate task of restraining revisionist or aggressive states as well as of regulating European difficulties by peaceful means—replacing the confrontation and inherent brinkmanship of balance-of-power politics. Perhaps the oldest and thorniest problem of international systems again challenged diplomatists: how to reach decisions, and how to enforce them, when the disputants were great powers. Inevitably, concert diplomacy proved most vulnerable to the criticism that the Concert functioned well in handling trivial matters concerning the small and weak states, but performed miserably when really important questions were at stake. This charge is both untrue and unfair. Responsible statesmen must approach international affairs, in the apt phrase of George Kennan, as "gardeners and not mechanics."[21] The purpose of concert diplomacy was to maintain peace among the great powers, to prevent unavoidable conflicts of interest from degenerating into actual hostilities. Concert diplomatists realized that no surer method of provoking conflicts existed than openly to confront a great power—to menace its vital concerns or to impugn its honor and prestige.[22] So long as the European Concert functioned, the five great powers had the assurance that both their legitimate rights and their self-esteem would be respected.

That consideration accounts for the evolution of a rather elaborate cumulation of semi-formal procedural safeguards against offending the

[21] *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1954), 92.

[22] This function of concert diplomacy was recognized even by twentieth-century diplomats. Friedrich von Holstein, in defending the call for a European conference on the first Moroccan crisis, advised the German foreign minister that "this idea has the advantage that while it affects French interests, it does not affect French pride." Holstein to Bülow, April 5, 1905, in Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher, eds., *The Holstein Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1961), IV, 328-29. Cf. Rich, *Friedrich von Holstein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965), II, 700, 708.

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sensitivities of the great powers. Inattention even to the slightest detail in such matters could seriously debilitate or preclude the operation of the Concert entirely.[23] Consequently, concert diplomacy actively cultivated the conception of the great powers as a unique and special peer group. While lesser states might possibly attend an international gathering, they did not break the magic circle of the elite and powerful. The great powers retained the exclusive prerogative of decision making. Under no circumstances did one invite, in any capacity, a state of the second or third rank which was an enemy of a great power.[24] Furthermore, since decisions had to be voluntary, unanimity rather than majority rule prevailed in European meetings.[25] A legitimate settlement of any question was impossible if even one of the great powers declined to accept it. Such considerations predetermined the agenda of conferences. Questions that entailed a possible challenge to the interests or an affront to the prestige of a great power could not be feasibly discussed or resolved; issues that were embarrassing to any participant had to be excluded. As a result, many important and urgent problems did not receive treatment—simply because concert statesmen preferred to avoid questions that might produce confrontation and possibly war. Concert diplomacy manifestly sought not the best, but the least objectionable, solutions.

THE CONCERT IN OPERATION

The protections against great-power humiliation were necessary and they help greatly to explain the success of conference diplomacy in this period. For one thing, while the conferences met on an *ad hoc* basis, they were definitely not meetings summoned on the spur of the moment, or in which anyone expected mere personal contact between responsible statesmen to surmount all disputes and conflicts of interest. Diplomacy by conference required elaborate and often lengthy preparations.[26] Some delay was necessary to allow passions to cool, to give diplomats time to consult their colleagues and to work out their posi-

[23] The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 provides several examples of the special care taken not to slight the standing and reputation of great powers. See Bertier de Sauvigny (fn. 15), 189-209; and Webster (fn. 13), 123, 153.

[24] The French and British invitation of Cavour to the Paris Congress of 1856 and their repeated efforts in the following decade to include Italy in great-power consultations was a direct violation of this rule and an open insult to the Austrian Empire.

[25] Cf. the dispatch of Metternich quoted in Bertier de Sauvigny (fn. 18), 263.

[26] Abundant evidence of this facet of concert diplomacy is furnished in the memoranda prepared by Castlereagh and by Baron Humboldt of Prussia prior to the opening of the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle; they are printed as appendices in Charles K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815* (New York: Barnes and Noble 1966), 168-93.

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tions, and above all, to discover what would and what would not be palatable to the other powers in conference. The requisite order included extensive *pourparlers*, perhaps a conference, and then a congress.[27] This procedure insured that only those issues that were amenable to diplomatic treatment were introduced, and constituted a necessary precondition for successful summit diplomacy.

The procedure of concert diplomacy reveals also its primary technique of restraining and moderating intemperate policies on the part of the great powers. In the language of the time, the purpose was "to group" the offending state.[28] Instead of direct military confrontation, the principal means was moral suasion—an appeal to the collective responsibility of the great powers for European peace and stability, to the norm of what the other powers considered appropriate and legitimate behavior. In a sense, the Concert idea became the collective conscience of the European great powers, reminding each of its responsibilities and obligations in international politics. As Metternich observed in 1837 during a conversation on the Eastern Question with the British Ambassador, "Europe is now advanced to the rank of a spectator and a judge and that is what precludes a continuation of the system under which the encroachments of Russia were heretofore conducted."[29] The Tsar, aware that he was now under the observation of his peers, would modify his policy according to their standards. On the whole, concert diplomacy proved remarkably efficacious in rekindling and reinforcing the spirit of self-restraint among the great European powers. Nineteenth-century diplomatic history furnishes several examples of states foregoing gains which they could probably have gotten, mainly because they would otherwise have placed themselves outside the European community and damaged their moral position.[30] Few similar instances can be cited either in the eighteenth or the twentieth centuries.

[27] As Metternich wrote Gentz in 1823: "Before talking about congresses, it is necessary to come to an accord on many matters, and the way to do this is through simple conferences." Paul R. Sweet, *Friedrich von Gentz* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1941), 239.

[28] Castlereagh frequently used the term in regard to Alexander I. His meaning did not differ substantially from Metternich's in the latter's emphasis upon a "point of moral contact" and "une pentarchie morale."

[29] Webster (fn. 15), I, 505.

[30] This was Metternich's meaning in attributing the Russian retreat in Turkey in 1834 (withdrawal from the Danubian Principalities and reduction of the Turkish war indemnity) to the Tsar's "good will." *Ibid.*, I, 341. Austria herself abjured possible additional gains in Italy for much the same reason: *ibid.*, I, 210. See also Paul W. Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820–1823* (Austin: University of Texas Press 1962); and Alan Reinerman, "Metternich, Italy, and the Congress of Verona, 1821–1822," *The Historical Journal*, XIV (June 1971), 263-87.

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The Concert perhaps never achieved its potential, but neither were its accomplishments insignificant or purely transitory.

Assuredly, nostalgia should not blind us to the obvious imperfections of concert diplomacy. The European Concert was always an unwieldy and often an ineffectual instrument. It depended perhaps too much upon the "good will" of its members, upon the personal dispositions of individual leaders. It did nothing, in short, to challenge directly the doctrine of the ultimate sovereignty of states. Invariably the Concert dealt with the symptoms rather than the causes of international conflict; it was always a negative concept, called into operation by events. Even so, to admit these shortcomings does not vitiate the achievements or refute the promise of concert diplomacy. It was, after all, primarily a vehicle (and a fairly successful one) for the peaceful management of great-power rivalries. Above all, the Concert idea was realistic in the best sense of the word—attuned to, but not narrowly bound by reality.[31] At its worst, the Concert was an impotent assembly, merely adhering to the formalities, unable to resolve important and pressing issues. At its best, it represented a reasonably satisfactory solution to the most difficult problem of international systems: how to accommodate the forces of change and yet preserve peace and stability. Concert diplomacy allowed the great powers to sanction necessary alterations of the existing order; it provided the means of legitimizing change without endangering the general system.

[31] Something that neither Napoleon III nor Gladstone ever understood was that the Concert could not be used to impose their version of reform upon Europe; that it could not simultaneously seek to avoid armed conflicts between the great powers and promote changes which would probably occasion them. The French Emperor's proclivity for conferences and congresses cannot, I think, be taken very seriously, despite his frequent calls for them (but cf. William Eckhard, "Conference Diplomacy in the German Policy of Napoleon III, 1868–1869," *French Historical Studies*, IV [Spring 1966], 239-64). W. H. C. Smith's conclusion is accurate: "The pattern of Napoleon III's diplomacy rarely varied: when bilateral or unilateral action became too risky, the danger could be lifted by multilateral action." *Napoleon III* (London: Wayland Publications 1972), 159. It is incredible that Napoleon actually believed his various schemes for the reconstruction of Europe could be achieved through congresses or by peaceful means. His proposals included the cession of Venetia to Italy by Austria; the creation of an independent Poland; the destruction of Turkey; and the partition of Austria. See Victor Tapie, "Le traité secret de 1859 entre la France et la Russie," *Études d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, V (December 1953), 116-47; and Elrod, "Austria and the Venetian Question, 1860–1866," *Central European History*, IV (June 1971), 149-70.

In a similar vein, Gladstone's efforts in the 1880's to resurrect the European Concert so that the great powers could cooperate in imposing British-type reforms upon the Ottoman Empire manifested an alarming misconception of what concert diplomacy was about. The only effect of his attempts was to frighten the continental powers and to solidify their opposition to his overtures. Gladstone then had to choose between the Concert and his ideology (he chose the latter). Medlicott (fn. 3).

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One more thing is clear. European relations during the era of concert diplomacy were characterized by a sense of security, a respect for the public law of Europe, a recognition of a commonly accepted standard of conduct, and a willingness to keep one's own conduct within those limits, that was unknown both to earlier and to later periods.[32] An effective system of restraints existed against unilateral action in concerns that affected the interests of more than one power; so too did a method and a rationale for averting or moderating conflicts between the great powers. Through concert diplomacy the great powers were reminded of what constituted responsible international conduct. The Concert possessed a surprising capability to persuade sovereign states to observe those limits.

THE CONCERT AS AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A number of provisional conclusions about concert diplomacy may be advanced. One is that certain practices, procedures, and beliefs can, with time and usage, become fairly well-established rules of international behavior. Perhaps the central emphasis placed upon international organizations is misdirected. Concert diplomacy suggests that something practicable is possible between the extremes of an absolute consensus upon right and wrong in international relations (which makes institutional structures for adjudication and enforcement unnecessary), and of elaborate international governmental and judicial organs (which are rendered sterile by the lack of an agreed-upon charter for interpretation and administration).[33] To repeat, the Concert was realistic in trying to manage rather than to eradicate international dissension. Yet it simultaneously advanced a standard for responsible statesmanship and developed an instrumentality that periodically reminded even the most powerful nations of their obligation to conform to that standard.

A second point implied by concert diplomacy, and an important one for operative international systems in general, is that some distribution and equalization of both responsibilities and opportunities is essential among the states considered necessary to the system. No state should be

[32] Certainly the rights of neutral states were less secure after the breakdown of the Concert. See Horst Lademacher, *Die belgische Neutralität als Problem der europäischen Politik, 1830–1914* (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag 1971), esp. 196-200, 477; and Ann G. Imlah, *Britain and Switzerland, 1845–1860* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon 1966).

[33] Austen Chamberlain's comment on the League of Nations seems to fit here: "I am firmly convinced that the true line of progress is to proceed from the particular to the general, and not, as has hitherto been embodied in Covenant and Protocol, to reverse the process and attempt to eliminate the particular by the general." G. P. Gooch, *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft* (London: Longmans, Green 1942), 180.

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asked to take the lead in maintaining the system, and to bear all the necessary burdens, while another reaps all the benefits. The recognition of some collective responsibility for order demands more than lip service, though historically some states have enjoyed the luxury of being able sporadically to ignore the general international system of which they are a part. States are thus separate, individual, and identifiably different actors; they cannot merely be labeled *A, B,* and *C,* and their posture and probable behavior within a system mathematically calculated. Because of disparities in resources, geographic position, composition, history, and a plethora of other factors, the European states of the nineteenth century had different domestic and foreign situations with which to contend, and different roles to play in the European community. Furthermore, the nature and structure of the international system itself affected each state differently. As long as member states accepted the existing system, they had to recognize these differences and structure their policy accordingly. Nineteenth-century diplomatic history indicates that when a power, or a group of powers, is demonstrably bearing the essential burden of maintaining the order, it should be supported and not be taken advantage of by other states simply because the special position and circumstances of the latter allow them to do so.[34]

Finally, the history of concert diplomacy implies something about the role of ideology in international systems. In the years immediately after the defeat of Napoleon, there was a conservative, antirevolutionary consensus among the great powers (Alexander of Russia was for a time the most liberal member). Moreover, the subsequent division of Europe into two competing ideological camps has been exaggerated. The controversies over both the Holy Alliance and the principle of nonintervention were, at bottom, false issues. Neither had much impact upon actual diplomatic practice.[35] Undeniably, an ideological rift

[34] A case in point was Britain's treatment of the Austrian Empire in the second half of the century. The British expected Austria to restrain Russia in the east and insisted that a strong Austria was a European necessity. Yet simultaneously they advised reforms and concessions that would have made Austria incapable of performing the requested tasks—or, later in the century, simply ignored her. The retort of the Austrian Ambassador to England in the 1860's was fully justified: "You pretend always to be interested in our prosperity and power; and, in spite of that, you advise us first to cede Venetia, then Galicia. By dint of your interest and friendship, you will finish by reducing us by half." Apponyi to Rechberg, May 18, 1863: *Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv* (Vienna) (*Politisches Archiv VIII: England*), carton 60.

[35] As Metternich noted in 1824, "The Holy Alliance has never played a role in any issue . . . for the simple reason that what is in reality nothing can only produce nothing." Bertier de Sauvigny (fn. 18), 256. Similarly, the definition of nonintervention (attrib-

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did develop between East and West from the 1820's onward, and the Holy Alliance and nonintervention became convenient symbols and slogans in the resulting debate. Yet concert diplomacy continued to function. It did so because a great-power consensus persisted that transcended political ideology. Efforts to base the Concert upon ideology served only to enfeeble it and to limit its functions. Despite ideological divergences, the European powers still agreed upon the necessity of peace among themselves and accepted concert diplomacy as the means to manage crises that might jeopardize that peace.

But the temptation to play fast and loose with the rules of the game became more and more irresistible.[36] The revolutions of 1848 further eroded the presuppositions of concert diplomacy and produced new leaders and new expectations. The culmination came in the Crimean War, another international crisis over the Eastern Question and one that was, in fact, no more serious than others previously managed successfully by the Concert. It was, moreover, the type of crisis in which concert diplomacy had always been at its best: the avoidance of great-power confrontations over matters of prestige. This time, however, statesmen in key positions failed to exercise self-restraint and refused to honor the rules of the Concert. The sea powers, in particular, were determined to inflict a humiliating defeat upon Russia and to conduct the war as a liberal crusade against autocracy.[37] The Concert of Europe was the victim. To be sure, remnants of the techniques and assumptions of concert diplomacy endured, but the Concert system itself had

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uted to Talleyrand) as a metaphysical and political phrase meaning almost the same thing as intervention was fundamentally accurate. It did not prevent repeated unilateral British interventions (in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and elsewhere) whenever London deemed it necessary. (A recent reassertion that the ideological gulf between East and West was "unbridgeable," however, is Ivan Scott, "Counter-Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Demise of Anglo-Austrian Cooperation, 1820–1823," *The Historian*, XXXIV [May 1972], 465-84.)

[36] The change in British policy, which began even before Castlereagh's suicide, was greatly accelerated by his successors, Canning and Palmerston. See Webster (fn. 13), 488-89; and Harold W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World* (2d ed., London: Thomas Nelson 1925), 449, 470-71. Palmerston, though he often participated effectively in concert diplomacy, was increasingly disposed to adopt the promotion of liberalism and a policy of confrontation with Russia, to prefer British to European diplomatic victories, and to enjoy the "salutary moral humiliation" of other great powers: Webster (fn. 15), I, 406; II, 532, 736. The emergence of Russophobia in Britain was another ominous development: "Great Britain's policy was, in the main, more provocative than Russia's." John H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1950), 2-3.

[37] Conclusive arguments are presented in Schroeder (fn. 5); and Winfried Baumgart, *Der Friede von Paris, 1856* (Munich: Oldenburg Verlag 1972).

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been destroyed. Nothing emerged to replace it until the 1870's; and then stability was achieved on another, less cooperative and conciliatory basis. To this degree, then, the destruction of the European Concert was willful, if rather lighthearted and frivolous. The other side of the argument is that the forces of change and progress simply bypassed the concept of concert diplomacy. Perhaps so; no one would deny that the European Concert was the product of a specific political, social, and intellectual milieu. Industrialization with all its social and political ramifications surely helped to undermine the essential foundations of concert diplomacy. A variety of developments increased the enticement to use foreign policy to divert domestic disharmony.[38] Perhaps the Concert could not accommodate the age of national states. Most simply, however, concert diplomacy broke down because statesmen refused to abide by its rules—and did not give much thought to what rules of international politics they would prefer as a substitute. They knew only that they had grown weary of its restrictions. The destruction of the European Concert was thus at least in part a generational problem. The remark of Theodore Fontaine, in reference to the 1848 revolutions, applies equally well to the demise of the Concert: "One was tired of the old approach to things. Not that one had suffered particularly under it; no, it was not that. It was rather, that one was ashamed of it."[39]

European statesmen, however, had made more progress than they realized. The Concert of Europe was certainly not the only factor making for peace in the first half of the century; nor could it contend successfully with all the political, social, and economic developments that these decades produced. It could only abate and not remove the causes of interstate rivalry. But in the real world of international relations it performed amazingly well. In a certain sense the evolution of concert diplomacy displays some rather striking parallels to "the growth of political stability" in domestic politics.[40] The European system in the era of the Concert approached the fulfillment of the three conditions posited by Stanley Hoffmann—of "security, satisfaction, and flexibil-

[38] Perhaps the classic example of a foreign venture undertaken to distract domestic unrest in this period was the French expedition to Algiers in 1830. "Only in patriotism and in activity could the French forget their internal disagreements and act as one nation." Douglas Johnson, *Guizot* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1963), 265.

[39] Joachim Remak, *The Gentle Critic: Theodore Fontaine and German Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1964), 13.

[40] J. H. Plumb, *The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1625–1725* (London: Macmillan 1967).

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ity"—to which all political orders must aspire.[41] The subject merits fresh examination and more interdisciplinary analysis.[42]

[41] Hoffmann (fn. 5), 20.

[42] There are some encouraging efforts in this direction on other subjects. Brian Healey and Arthur Stein, applying quantitative methods to a catalogue of events identified by diplomatic historians, examine a number of well-worn clichés about the balance-of-power system and conclude that many of the interpretations are simply invalid: "The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and Reality," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XVII (March 1973), 33-61. Paul W. Schroeder's seminal article, "World War I as Galloping Gertie," written from the viewpoint of an historian, emphasizes the systemic dynamics that led to the breakdown of the European system prior to the First World War, *Journal of Modern History*, XLIV (September 1972), 319-45. Gabriel Almond and Scott C. Flanagan, though dealing with political modernization rather than international relations, offer some suggestive insights in discussing "system functionalism" and "political systems and systemic crisis" that could be applied to international systems as well: Almond, Flanagan, and Mundt, *Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1973), 5-8, 46-57.

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ON THINKING ABOUT FUTURE WORLD ORDER

By ROBERT W. COX

DANIEL HALÉVY used the term "acceleration of history" in the title of an essay which he conceived at the onset of World War II and revised for republication in its aftermath.[1] Oswald Spengler's diagnosis of a cyclical rise and fall of cultures and civilizations was then well known to Halévy and his contemporaries among the European intelligentsia.[2] Arnold Toynbee had also already published a substantial part of his enquiry into the loss of creativity in civilizations, and the conditions for rebirth.[3] All three were concerned with the problem of world order. They were deeply affected by a pessimistic view of the prospects for Western societies. Perhaps their pessimism arose from apprehension that an agreeable and civilized way of life had been irremediably disturbed. Whatever particular sentiments may have sparked their efforts, in order to understand the nature of the crisis they each turned naturally to a reflection upon history. The fact that so many professional historians proclaimed agnosticism concerning the meaning of history was provocation and incentive to take up what these skeptics had eschewed.[4] Indeed, the agnosticism of the professionals appeared as a thin veil covering a declaration of bankruptcy in the linear progressive view of history that had optimistically envisaged the universal triumph of liberal parliamentary polities—a bankruptcy consequent upon the political and economic defaults of liberalism in the Europe of the 1930's.

Following World War II, professional historians have been readier to take up the challenge of broad reinterpretation. Geoffrey Barraclough, for instance, has left aside the comparative civilizations approach of Spengler and Toynbee in favor of a view of contemporary

[1] *Essai sur l'accélération de l'histoire* (2d ed.; Paris: Plon 1949).

[2] *The Decline of the West*, trans. by C. F. Atkinson (New York: Knopf, I, 1926; II, 1928). The original two-volume edition, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, was published in Munich in 1918 and 1922.

[3] *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1933-1961). This work was published in twelve volumes between 1933 (first three volumes) and 1961 (XII, *Reconsiderations*).

[4] Recall particularly the preface, dated January 1936, to H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1936), in which history is seen as "only one emergency following upon another." Fisher is unwilling to abandon the notion of progress, but warns that progress is not a law of nature and the "ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next."

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history that is comprehensive both in the way he conceives the world as a structural totality and in his manner of linking together the different aspects of social life.[5] Like his predecessors, however, Barraclough seems to find a perception of the structures and processes of history a useful point of departure for thinking about the shaping of the future.

A newer current of literature, also concerned about future world order but renouncing the historical approach, fits into the general rubric of "futurology." (Bertrand de Jouvenel, seeking to avoid the deterministic implications of "futurology," offers the term—derived from the French—*futuribles*: possible futures, or perhaps better, alternative futures.) The literature of futurology may be seen as reflecting an impatience with the failure of the behavioral sciences (despite massive injections of foundation money), to come up with a scientific basis for predicting the social future. As a practical matter, businessmen and policy-makers have to make some assumptions about the future as a basis for their own planning. Futurology tries to compensate for the inadequacy or diffidence of overly cautious behavioral scientists by offering some explicit assumptions to meet the demand. In general, futurology relies heavily upon forecasting new developments in technology,[6] and tends to consider social organization as a dependent variable that must adapt to new technology. It takes account of those aspects of social life which can be most easily measured, such as demography and production. And it is concerned with the problems of individual psychology that occur when individuals are under pressure to make rapid adjustments to continually novel environments. But futurology, as a literary genre, has shown no interest in enquiries into the structure and processes of history. It seems firmly committed to the notion that the past can be no guide to the future.

There is, of course, nothing very new about a concern for the human future, although this concern may be perceived as more acute at some times than at others. Such a perception, occurring at a time when intellectual pursuits are specialized and compartmentalized, has, in futurology, spun off a new "discipline." But the modes of thought that can be applied to the problem of reasoning about the future have long roots in the past. The sense of urgency which currently surrounds this exercise inclines its practitioners to stress their conclusions rather

[5] *An Introduction to Contemporary History* (London: Penguin Books 1967); first published by C. A. Watts, 1964.

[6] Using sometimes a form of expert opinion survey genially named the Delphi method.

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than the logical basis from which these conclusions are derived. This essay, which has nothing new to say about the mental processes for speculating about the future, attempts to sort out distinctively different approaches and to discuss some of the implications of each.

Approaches to Thinking about the Future

We shall discuss three types of approaches to thinking about the future of world order: the natural-rational, the positivist-evolutionary, and the historicist-dialectical. Each conceives the future in terms of some combination of constraints and purposive action. Each has a distinctive theory of knowledge and method, leading to different techniques of enquiry. And each has, implicitly or explicitly, a distinctive model of historical process through which the future may be conceived.

I. THE NATURAL-RATIONAL APPROACH

This approach is founded in the concept of a duality distinguishing the inward nature from the outward appearance of human institutions and events. The inward nature is knowable by reason, which is our avenue toward understanding the real essence of man and the polity. The standard given by reason derives from a conviction of the universality of essential human nature, and by this standard the observable differences in human institutions and behavior, which constitute the historical record of various attempts to realize the human potential, may be appraised.

Corresponding to this inwardness and outwardness are two conflicting principles of politics: the subjective principle, which is the creative ability of individuals and peoples, the intelligence, energy, and degree of concord they manifest in building and preserving the polity; and the objective principle, which is the concatenation of conditions and events or circumstances against which the subjective principle has to work.[7]

The problem of how this duality is resolved on the historical plane has been given different emphases. When the objective principle appears predominant, and the potentiality of political action appears limited or futile, a doctrine of Providence offers the explanation that the objective circumstances may be intelligible by a suprahuman extension of reason (St. Augustine, Tolstoy). When, on the other hand,

[7] C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Toronto: Oxford University Press 1944) deals with the duality of "virtue" and "fortune," and the subjective and objective in classical political thought. See esp. pp. 99ff. and 122ff.

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there is a strong will to master the objective principle, attention focuses upon the means of arousing and enhancing creative ability in politics, so that through it objective circumstances may be understood and manipulated (cf. Machiavelli's concept of *necessità*).

Two lines of enquiry which derive from the natural-rational approach are, first, the normative task of designing polities consistent with the rational nature of man (utopianism), and second, the analysis of politics so as better to understand the conditions that must be taken into account in the effort to construct the ideal polity. Political science, in this conception, is not opposed to normative theory, but is a complement to it. Normative theory gives the goals of politics, and political science the conditions under which these goals can be attained.

A cyclical model of the historical process corresponds to this approach. Polities strive toward the ideal when invested with creative energy or *virtù*; such hopeful periods are followed by phases of progressive corruption of political structures as this vital energy is superseded by a subordination of civic spirit to the pursuit of particular interests. The positive content of the ideal is often constructed with elements from the remote past. Dante's *De Monarchia* and Machiavelli's *Discorsi* refer to a golden age some thirteen or fifteen hundred years earlier.

2. THE POSITIVIST-EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Positivism denies the relevancy, for an understanding of the social world, of the inward and outward duality of human institutions and events. Scientific method for the study of society is conceived as analogous to that evolved for the study of the world of nature. Human agents and actions are to be reduced to their outward phenomenal aspects, and science is thought of as a rationality to be discovered in the form of regularities in the relationships among externally observed phenomena. The progress of social science is equated to the cumulative discovery of laws in the form of consequences that are predictable under prescribed conditions.

In order to pursue this approach, historical events have to be converted into objects. Even mental states can be reduced to object form as measurable, comparable units—e.g., by the use of opinion surveys (which extract a statement of opinion from the total context of an individual mind and then consider this as an object similar to many others). Positivism requires *data*—i.e., externally observed "givens"—whereas other approaches to understanding the social world deal with

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facts—i.e., events or institutions which are intelligible to people because they have been made by people.[8]

From the subjective standpoint, actions are explainable in terms of a total context of conscious and unconscious influences. The positivist approach, seeking objective data, fragments this subjective totality into a number of distinct observations that can be classified as variables. In the simplest case, changes in one variable are observed to be associated with changes in another; causal inferences can be drawn from this observation if it is assumed that other factors are either irrelevant or constant. Generally, however, social life is too complex to be reducible to two variables. It is therefore necessary to devise a linkage among a number of supposedly relevant variables, all thought of as interacting with each other: hence the device of a system. In considering the problems of thinking about the future, it is important to make clear how the assumptions that are built into the notion of a system can shape our ideas of social change.

Two variants of systems models may be compared. The first is a structural-functionalist variant, in which social roles are conceived as being linked together through the performance of functions that complement each other in the achievement of equilibrium at the level of the system. The system, from being simply a nominalist framework for organizing data, implicitly becomes a real entity with a finality of its own—i.e., the maintenance of its own equilibrium. Homeostatic mechanisms reassert equilibrium against the destabilizing consequences of dysfunctional activity. The normative consensual content of the system is an important regulating mechanism that socializes the actors to their roles and controls deviant behavior.

The latent status quo bias which the equilibrium concept gives to the functionalist model is modified by its particular manner of conceiving development of the system, namely, in terms of the system's progressive "integration." This notion of social change derives from nineteenth-century sociology, particularly Tönnies and Durkheim, in which social evolution was conceived as a movement away from a traditional, rural, organic community toward a more complex urban and industrial

[8] Giambattista Vico, in his criticism of Descartes, distinguished understanding from perception. R. G. Collingwood summarizes his argument thus: "[T]he condition of being able to know anything truly, to understand it as opposed to merely perceiving it, is that the knower himself should have made it. . . . It follows from the *verum-factum* principle that history, which is emphatically something made by the human mind, is especially adapted to be an object of human knowledge." *The Idea of History* (London: Oxford University Press 1946), 64-65.

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division of labor. Integration, in that framework, is seen as the emergence of structures capable of ensuring a harmonious complementarity among functionally specific roles in a society characterized by a high degree of interdependence of its parts.[9]

Integration is a teleological concept that specifies the final state toward which the system is drawn. By deductive reasoning, various problems to be overcome en route toward this final state can be defined, and their solutions planned with a view to facilitating its attainment. Functionalism lends itself to problem solving—diagnosing technical obstacles and engineering appropriate adjustments—where the end goal is taken as given by the system itself.

But how did the end goal get into the system in the first place? We can only answer in historical terms: from the system's own ideological origin. In functionalist models, the future is meant to achieve the maximum of productive efficiency with a minimum of social conflict in industrial societies of the Western type.[10]

The second variant of systems models abandons the equilibrium bias of functionalism by giving pride of place to the notion of a "feedback loop." The interactions of the system are thereby seen as producing certain outputs or consequences which "feed back" by modifying the inputs for the next round of outputs. This use of the feedback loop justifies the appellation "system dynamics," and lends itself to quantitative applications with apparent potential for simulating the future. The Club of Rome group has used such a model in preparing the study on *The Limits to Growth*.[11] The method extrapolates a series of

[9] For a criticism of the logical foundations of functionalism, see W. C. Runciman, *Social Science and Political Theory* (London: Cambridge University Press 1963), chap. 6.

[10] Two illustrations of the manner in which the dominant ideology of a contemporary society has been imported into a functionalist model of historical process are provided by Talcott Parsons, and by Clark Kerr and his co-authors.

Parsons, in his article, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX, No. 3 (June 1964), includes among the "evolutionary universals" which provide societies with adaptive advantages over those that do not possess them, both "money and markets" (which could be roughly equated with free enterprise) and democratic association with elective leadership and fully enfranchised membership. He adds: "I realize that to take this position I must maintain that communist totalitarian organization will probably not fully match 'democracy' in political and integrative capacity in the long run" (p. 356).

Kerr and his co-authors project an ultimate convergence of all societies, which begin from different points of departure under different industrializing elites, toward a single ultimate type called "pluralistic industrialism"—that which is best able to solve the functional problems of industrialism. Not surprisingly, the type looks familiar. ("The elites all wear grey flannel suits.") Clark Kerr, J. T. Dunlop, F. H. Harbison, and C. A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960).

[11] Donella H. Meadows and others, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe

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outputs—population growth, production, resource depletion, pollution—taking account of the feedback effects of these outputs on each other. What the method in a way conceals, or at least does not make explicit, is that these outputs and the rates of change in them depend upon specific forms of social organization and social relations. Extrapolation of recent rates of growth in these outputs assumes implicitly that existing social relations (and the distribution of social power that they express) will remain unchanged.

The model of historical process common to both variants of the positivist-evolutionary approach is based upon a projection of the observed tendencies of contemporary society. The existing distributions of power, existing forms of social relations, and currently dominant norms are considered as given, and the future is thought of as the fulfillment of their inherent tendencies. The bias of the approach is in favor of the status quo, by contrast with the critical potential of the natural-rational approach which holds up the ideal as a challenge to the status quo.

3. THE HISTORICIST-DIALECTICAL APPROACH

Historicism reverts to the dualism of subjectivity and objectivity, taking its perspective in subjectivity. The social world is intelligible as the creation of the human mind. Historicism deals with facts, not data. Whereas the natural-rational method contrasts a subjectively conceived universal ideal with the objective conditions of social existence, historicism looks for the idea within the actual: its aim is not critical appraisal of the actual, but understanding and explanation.[12] Histori-

Books 1972). The system-dynamics model was devised by Jay W. Forrester and described in *World Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Wright-Allen Press 1971).

[12] "The most a historian can do is to take the particular processes of the historical world which he is supposed to elucidate, and let these events be seen in the light of higher and more general forces which are present behind and develop these events; his task is to show the concrete *sub specie aeterni*. But he is not in a position to determine the essence of this higher and eternal force itself, or to determine the relationship it bears to concrete reality. Thus he can only say that in historical life he beholds a world which, though unified, is bipolar: a world which needs both poles to be as it appears to us. Physical nature and intellect, causality according to law and creative spontaneity, are these two poles, which stand in such sharp and apparently irreconcilable opposition. But historical life, as it unfolds between them, is always influenced simultaneously by both, even if not always by both to the same degree." Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism. The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. by Douglas Scott (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1957), 8. The original German, *Die Idee der Staatsräson*, was published in Munich in 1924. For Meinecke, the implications of moral relativism were a torturing problem (pp. 9, 424ff.). Collingwood states the matter in somewhat simpler terms: "The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the event I mean everything

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cism is a method for understanding historical process in terms of the workings of the human mind in its inward aspect, while the positivist-evolutionary approach looks for trends or predictable regularities in objective data.[13]

The historicist is a "holist" who considers individual events as intelligible only within the larger totality of contemporaneous thought and action. Each individual mind has a partial, more or less comprehensive view of the totality of which any event is a part. The historicist approach attempts to achieve a certain level of generality with reference to particular historical periods and places through the use of concepts like feudalism, capitalism, liberalism, fascism, and so forth.[14] These suggest a coherent structural arrangement of ideas, behavior patterns, and institutions. Such concepts do not represent the thought of any historical actors in particular (although they may best be derived from an examination of the thought of the most perceptive minds of a period), but may be taken as ideal types expressive of the dominant orientations to actions of a whole period.

The dialectical element in this approach arises when historical change is seen as the result of conflict between two such contrasting conceptions. The model of historical process is, then, a conflict model. Ralf Dahrendorf has expressed this simply: "(T)he idea of a society

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belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of his blood on the floor of the senate-house at another. By the inside of the event, I mean that in which it can only be described in terms of thought: Caesar's defiance of Republican law, or the clash of constitutional policy between himself and his assassins. The historian is never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the other. He is investigating not mere events (where by a mere event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside of an event . . . his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the thought of its agent." This re-enactment of past thought, Collingwood continues, "is not a passive surrender to the spell of another's mind; it is a labour of active and therefore critical thinking. . . . This criticism of the thought whose history he traces is not something secondary to tracing the history of it. It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge itself." Collingwood (fn. 8) 213-15.

[13] Karl R. Popper, in his well-known critique, *The Poverty of Historicism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1957), includes under the rubric of "historicism" attempts at a positivist sociology of history as well as the approach characteristic of Meinecke and Collingwood discussed here. Popper's criticism would have fallen on the efforts of Parsons and Kerr mentioned in fn. 10. On this point, see John H. Goldthorpe, "Theories of Industrial Society: Reflections on the Recrudescence of Historicism and the Future of Futurology," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, XII (November 1971), 263-88.

[14] Reinhard Bendix calls them "limited applicability concepts" and "contrast concepts." See his essay, "The Comparative Analysis of Historical Change," in Michael Argyle and others, *Social Theory and Economic Change* (London: Tavistock Publications 1967).

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which produces in its structure the antagonisms that lead to its modification appears as an appropriate model for the analysis of change in general."[15]

This is not to say that conflict always originates in ideas. There is always tension between a widely held conception of the world and the realities of existence for particular groups of historical people. Gaps develop between changing material conditions and old intellectual schemata. Such gaps suggest latent conflict, the actualizing of which depends upon a change of consciousness on the part of the potential challengers and their adoption of a contrast image of society. The historical-dialectical analyst's role is thus as much to arouse consciousness and the will to act, as to diagnose the condition of the world.[16]

Some Ideas about Future World Order

What follows is a discussion of some applications of the three intellectual orientations just outlined. The ideas considered in this connection are images of the future which can be found in the words of politicians and analysts (mainly contemporary social scientists), rather than the more explicit anticipations of utopian literature.

A NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE: LIBERAL PLURALISM AS A CONDITION FOR WORLD PEACE

The idea that a normative view of the good polity can be a condition of world order seems to have become distinctly unfashionable.[17] It does,

[15] *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1965), 125. Original German edition published in 1957.

[16] That is, of course, especially true of Marxists in the Hegelian and historicist tradition, most notably Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. by Rodney Livingston (Cambridge: MIT Press 1971). Meinecke's conservative enquiry into the history of the doctrine of raison d'état (fn. 12) concludes also with a consideration of the problems of consciousness and action: in this case the moral dilemma between a sterile idealism which is totally ineffective as a limitation on state action, and a relativism which sees some merit or justification in every action. Positivist writers do not bother themselves with such problems.

[17] For instance, at a conference on conditions of world order held in 1965 at the Villa Serbelloni—a site which certifies the intellectual respectability of the event—Raymond Aron introduced the discussions by considering various meanings of the term world order. Two were purely descriptive: order as any arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts. Two were part descriptive, part normative: order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the minimum conditions for coexistence. A further meaning was purely normative: order as the conditions for the good life. This last meaning was ruled "out of order" at the start as likely to lead discussion in too many divergent directions. The conference agreed to concentrate on the issue of coexistence, thereby implicitly accepting that existing polities were "givens," and ruling out the idea that the internal aspects of a polity might have to be adjusted to a desirable world order. See Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Conditions of World Order* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1968).

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however, have a distinguished genealogy in the history of ideas and was readily accepted as recently as the early postwar years. Even if the idea is now in intellectual eclipse, residues of it remain, and revival may be anticipated.

The major premise of this normative view is that the whole—the world political order—cannot be inconsistent with its parts, i.e., with the nature of the polities of which it is composed. Justice at the global level would depend upon justice in the polities. Injustice or disorder in the parts would threaten the maintenance of order and justice at the global level; therefore it is held that the global order—insofar as power and influence can be mobilized on its behalf—may legitimately act to ensure justice and order in deviant polities. The minor premise is that liberal pluralism is the political arrangement most conducive to the good life. Liberal pluralism in the component polities thus becomes the normative condition for world order.

First, we must note the antiquity and prestige of the major premise in normative political theory. Dante wrote: "Whatever relation a part bears to its whole, the structure of that part must bear to the total structure." And he continued, "if the form of this structure is found among the partial associations of men, much more should it be found in the society of men as a totality. . . ."[18] Some two centuries later, Machiavelli confronted the same general problem with the different political perspectives of his time. His practical vision of order was limited geographically to the unification of Italy, whereas Dante's extended in principle to the larger concept of Christendom. But on the major premise of the necessity for conformity between the nature of order in the parts with order in the whole, Machiavelli and Dante were in agreement. Machiavelli thought the republican to be the highest form of polity, but considered his contemporaries too corrupt to sustain a republic. His appeal to the Prince was the creation of a social myth, through which he hoped for a regeneration of the civic spirit.[19] The same assumption—that there are internal conditions of polities required to sustain the larger world order—is found in Kant's reflections, *Eternal Peace*. Kant considered this essential condition to be the existence of a republican form of government in each state, by which he meant

[18] *De Monarchia*, trans. by Herbert W. Schneider (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 9-10.

[19] In this interpretation of Machiavelli, I lean upon the writings of Federico Chabod and Antonio Gramsci. See Chabod, *Machiavelli and the Renaissance*, trans. by David Moore, with an introduction by A. P. d'Entreves (London: Bowes and Bowes 1958); Gramsci, *Quaderni del carcere* (Torino: Guilio Einaudi 1975).

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constitutional government, representative and respectful of law and right.[20]

The basic idea was common enough in the rhetoric of political leaders after World War II, and was reinforced among Western spokesmen with the onset of the cold war. As applied particularly to the emerging nations, it could be reduced to a series of linked propositions: technical and economic aid is conducive to economic development; development creates conditions conducive to democracy; democratic polities provide the condition for world peace. Each of these linked propositions has been demolished by critics,[21] and sometime during the 1960's the argument dropped out of Western justifications for development assistance.[22]

This change even at the level of rhetoric calls for some explanation. International relations theorists never did give much credence to the idea that the internal characteristics of a polity might influence its international behavior. In their international relations, states pursued national interests which had little to do with their forms of government. When international relations analysts began to look within states for an explanation of conduct, it was bureaucratic processes that claimed their attention rather more than the broader internal structure and processes of power.

Among politicians, a necessary respect for the postwar structure of world power inclined toward a historicist relativism. President Wilson had sought to make the world safe for democracy; President Lyndon Johnson offered the goal of making the world safe for diversity.[23] Meanwhile, among those nations of the Third World toward which development assistance from the liberal pluralist polities of the West was directed, authoritarian regimes became increasingly common.[24]

[20] C. J. Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1948), includes a new translation of Kant's essay. See also F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (London: Cambridge University Press 1963), chap. 4.

[21] For example, Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Economic Development Aid and International Political Stability," in R. W. Cox, ed., *The Politics of International Organization* (New York: Praeger 1970); also, Edward C. Banfield, in Robert A. Goldwin, ed., *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1963).

[22] The point that political development doctrines were always more rhetoric than substance in the administration of U.S. aid programs was made by Robert A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," *World Politics*, XVII (October 1964), 108-20.

[23] President Johnson in his first State of the Union message to Congress, January 1964. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, I (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1965), 116.

[24] Harold Jacobson and I went through the exercise of classifying 154 countries in the world political system as to their economic level and type of polity—using three

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And the United States, which had been most ready to export its national ideology and which represented its world power in terms of leadership of democratic forces, found itself by the late 1960's the chief external support for many of these authoritarian regimes. All of this required a revision of the thesis that world peace could be built on the foundations of economic development and democratic pluralism.

The theorists of comparative politics and political modernization undertook that revision by an attack on the minor premise—at least to the extent of discouraging belief in the feasibility of liberal pluralism in poor countries. The vehicle for this ideological revision was the application of one of the methods derived from the positivist-evolutionary approach: functionalism. The overload of demands upon underdeveloped political structures inclined them toward authoritarian solutions. Authoritarianism was accordingly to be expected, save for some exceptional situations, as a characteristic of early stages of modernization. David E. Apter, whose analysis is one of the most sophisticated in comparative politics theory, considers authoritarian types optimal for long-term modernization, adding that this "may well result in a rebirth of fascism, stripped of its more atavistic qualities."[25] (Possibly, in a future revision of his text, more recent events will suggest to him the deletion of the qualifying clause.)

Functionalist theories seemed to sweep aside the normative inconsistency in which the Western countries, and especially the United States, found themselves by asserting a doctrine of long-term convergence toward what Apter called "reconciliation systems," and what Clark Kerr and others named "pluralistic industrialism."[26] Normatively congenial outcomes were thus assured, without any purposive action in support of these norms being required. Historical inevitability or the functional logic of systemic development would do the work of morality. The liberal conscience need not be troubled by active support of fascism abroad.

Other, less theoretically sophisticated interests continued to support the implantation abroad of those elements of the pluralist polity most

types: competitive, mobilizing, and authoritarian—at five-year intervals between 1950 and 1970. The trend toward authoritarianism in the Third World countries was marked in the 1960's. It came from two sources: (1) most newly independent countries came into the system with authoritarian regimes, and (2) of those independent countries that experienced changes of regime, the largest number moved in the direction of authoritarian polities, usually as a consequence of military coups. Both sources of change were concentrated in countries at the lower economic levels.

[25] *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1965), 416.

[26] Kerr (fn. 10).

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dear to them: business in its concern for freedom from politically imposed constraints on economic activity, and trade unions in support of autonomy for labor organizations.[27] Even in the absence of well-developed competing political parties, the pluralist polity might be founded upon an independent organization of interests. The practical consequences of such externally induced pluralism in poor countries are now fairly well known: the creation of enclaves of relative power and privilege subject to external control, a lopsided minority pluralism that has been no obstacle to repressive authoritarianism.[28]

Advocates of liberal pluralism as a condition for world order are now in serious trouble: their claims are rejected in fashionable theory, and their programs perverted in practical applications. Tentatively, it is suggested that formalism has been the root of the weakness of the normative position. The institutions of pluralism presuppose a diffusion of power, but where power is very unevenly distributed—because of a social structure based upon concentrated land ownership, for example, or because foreigners hold powerful economic levers which they manipulate with the connivance of strategically placed domestic groups—institutions with a formal appearance of pluralism will be but a facade for tyranny. This inference does not invalidate the major premise of the natural-rational approach—that justice in the parts is a condition for justice in the whole—but it does imply that there has been an inadequacy in understanding how justice may be promoted in the parts. The Machiavellian analysis of *necessità*, of the material constraints that must be taken into account in shaping action toward the normative goal, has been deficient. At least part of the responsibility for that deficiency lies with the dominant positivist tendency in political science, which in renouncing the subjective aspect of politics has unwittingly become a justifier of the status quo.

[27] International action in support of autonomous labor unions has been carried out through international trade union organizations and by the International Labour Organisation. Issues within the I.L.O. concerning the goal of promoting pluralism were analyzed in N.M., "International Labor in Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, XLIX (April 1971). The far-flung activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency using "autonomous" labor organizations as cover for political penetration in other countries, long a well-known story to people active in international trade union affairs, are described in some detail in Philip Agee, *Inside the Company, CIA Diary* (London: Penguin Books 1975).

[28] A detailed study of the consequences of trade union penetration from a developed to a less developed country is in Jeffrey Harrod, *Trade Union Foreign Policy* (New York: Doubleday 1972). A pessimistic evaluation of the consequences in Latin America of promoting cooperative organizations on the autonomous models evolved in European countries was made by Orlando Fals Borda in *International Institute for Labour Studies Bulletin*, No. 7 (Geneva 1970).

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TOWARD GLOBAL INTEGRATION: VISIONS DERIVED FROM POSITIVIST SOCIAL SCIENCE

Functionalist theories elaborated during the past two decades have held forth visions of a more centralized international system, which will be brought about through a continuing process of integration, part regional, part global. The origin of this development of functionalism is traceable to an essentially normative theory evolved through the League of Nations period and propounded, toward the end of World War II, by David Mitrany in his pamphlet, "A Working Peace System."[29] Mitrany regarded the nation-state, with its representatives who thought in terms of "national interest," as the major obstacle to world order. The nation-state was too firmly anchored in public mores to succumb to a frontal attack through the route of world federalism. But it might possibly be outflanked by removing certain practical problems from its effective control and organizing the solution of these problems on an international basis. As the internationally linked areas expanded, the role of the nation-state would diminish, and the prospects of world government become more real. What could not be achieved by the direct approach might come about indirectly, by stealth. Mitrany, in his overriding concern with the problem of world peace, undoubtedly underestimated the extent to which the nation-state had become the guarantor of welfare. The state was unlikely to abandon its welfare role willingly in favor of international authorities;[30] and the expectations of the public would not allow the state to devolve its responsibility for welfare to any international body.

Mitrany's normatively inspired prescriptions achieved a more scientific appearance during the 1950's in a revised form which political scientists termed "neofunctionalism."[31] Neofunctionalism was concerned primarily with analysis of the political processes which would transform a less integrated into a more integrated international system. Whereas Mitrany had envisaged a mere addition of problem-solving tasks, neofunctionalism introduced as a key concept the notion of "spillover." In practice, the tasks of administration are linked, so that if the performance of some particular function becomes organized internationally, this will create the opportunity to raise the question of similarly organizing the performance of related tasks. Perceptive

[29] London: Royal Institute of International Affairs 1943.

[30] This argument was cogently presented in Gunnar Myrdal, *Beyond the Welfare State* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1960).

[31] The most systematic statement is in Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1964).

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leaders in the internationally integrated sectors could use these linkages among related functions so as to precipitate or take advantage of crises to bring about a step-by-step expansion of internationally performed tasks. As this happened, the various client groups within countries would increasingly focus their interests upon the international agencies carrying out these tasks, thereby expanding the authority of the international institutions at the expense of national institutions.

The model from which this image was derived was the *relance européenne* of the late 1950's. The common market for coal and steel spilled over into a general common market. After the Suez crisis, a policy for coal, one source of energy, spilled over into a joint policy for atomic energy through Euratom. Around 1958, neofunctionalist theory seemed to have pointed to an historical trend. What was manifestly happening in Western Europe might, more remotely, be anticipated on a global scale.

As the continuing progress of European integration faltered during the 1960's, theory was revised. The concept of "spill-back" had to be introduced when member countries of the EEC resorted to national measures to deal with recession in the coal industry.[32] And when General de Gaulle intervened to obstruct the interbureaucratic processes envisaged in the neofunctionalist model, a new category, the "dramatic-political actor," was brought into the picture—a *deus ex machina* who burst into the system to alter its rules. By this time, neofunctionalism had lost the clear (but now clearly wrong) ability to predict which it appeared to have in its original formulation. It had become largely a checklist of concepts drawn up in relation to the question as to whether the international system was becoming more centralized.

Currently, two derivatives of functionalism present alternative visions of the future. They correspond broadly to the two ways in which, according to the earlier functionalists, the nation-state could be outflanked: one was by the transnational action of nongovernmental organizations, the other by a splitting away of specialized agencies of government from central political control. The first is called the *transnational* approach to integration, the second the *transgovernmental* (or multibureaucratic) approach.

The current hero of the transnational approach is the multinational corporation. The MNC has been hailed as the emergent structure of efficient management operating on a global scale and capable both of

[32] A significant revision within the neofunctionalist school was in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970).

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organizing global economic development and of submerging the ideological conflict of the cold war by demonstrating a transideological harmony of interests. These structures, potentially (if not altogether actually) "geocentric" in the attitudes and loyalties of their management, correspond to the functional requirements of the increasingly interdependent global system. The more peaceful and abundant future they herald is being held back (in the minds of their supporters) only by the nationalistic reflexes of an obsolescent structure of nation-states. The practical issue is therefore how to ease the inevitable transition toward a world organized by several hundred large corporations, whose rivalries can be thought of as creative of welfare and as involving competition within a homogeneous set of values.[33] The global economic integration to be brought about by MNC's will require steps toward political integration which would supersede the nation-state system.

This vision is an extrapolation from some economic trends of the late 1960's, particularly the expansion of international production with the substantial increases of foreign and especially American investment in Europe and some of the less developed areas. It takes little account of the response to that same tendency: an increased determination by states in both host and home countries to reassert more effectively their control over national economies, which seemed to be slipping from states as MNC's enhanced their ability to maximize their advantages among different national jurisdictions. Now, by the mid-1970's, as governments pressed by powerful domestic interest groups engage in what Helmut Schmidt has called the "struggle for the world product,"[34] the political emancipation of the MNC seems a less likely prospect than it did a decade ago. This appears to be an apposite illustration of the dialectical quality of historical change and consequential error of extrapolating observed trends. Widespread consciousness of a trend may indeed be a signal that the trend is about to be reversed.

The transgovernmental approach is an extension of the bureaucratic-politics analysis of national foreign policy. It takes account of the increase in transnational economic activity by MNC's and of the growing

[33] Among the abundant literature hailing the MNC as the wave of the world's future, the following are particularly interesting in defining aspects of an ideology which this paragraph tries to summarize: George W. Ball, "Multinational Corporations and Nation States," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, v (Summer 1967), and "Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, vi (Summer 1968); Frank Tannenbaum, "The Survival of the Fittest," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, iii (March-April 1968); Howard Perlmutter, "The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, iv (January-February 1969).

[34] "The Struggle for the World Product," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52 (April 1974).

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propensity of states to control this activity. It envisages not a demise of the nation-state as such, but a growing disaggregation of governmental activity and merging of policy making among states—in which process international organizations will play important roles. Stated simply, the argument runs: control of transnational activity increases the range of action of a large number of agencies of government; the increasing sensitivity of national economies to each other means that foreign governments are concerned about the effects of national policies and these become matters for intergovernmental negotiations; the national agencies of government concerned with specific kinds of policy enter into direct contact with each other in preference to communicating through foreign offices; transgovernmental policy making leads to the formation of transgovernmental coalitions, through which specialized agencies of national governments advance their preferred policies with the support of their opposite numbers abroad; intergovernmental organizations are convenient forums for the formation of transgovernmental coalitions, and provide agencies of national governments with potential external support for their policy goals. The older neofunctionalism envisaged that international organizations would become autonomous actors in the international system, with increasing authority as interests and loyalties of subnational groups became more and more focused upon them, until they outclassed nation-states. The transgovernmental revision of neofunctionalism withdraws the claim for the autonomy of intergovernmental organizations—they are seen more as forums for mobilizing national policy makers than as distinct entities—but puts more stress upon a fragmentation of national government or weakening of the effective control by the central authorities over the proliferating roles of government.[35] The integration that will be

[35] The transgovernmental approach was foreshadowed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in the introductory section of their edited book, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1972), and presented more explicitly by them in a paper prepared for the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, subsequently published as "Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations," *World Politics*, XXVII (October 1974), 39-62. I do not wish to imply that these authors have presented the transgovernmental approach as a contribution to futurology. They offer it primarily as a framework for analysis of current affairs. Nor do they assume that transgovernmental relations are all-determining. They take account of the possibility that the lower-level bureaucrats who are the object of their attention may at times be brought under control by top political leadership. The criticisms of the transgovernmental relations approach in the following paragraphs are not directed at the careful formulation of the concept by Keohane and Nye (which has the merit of delineating a relatively neglected area of political activity), but are directed rather at the consequences this formulation may have for research priorities from the standpoint of the usefulness of research as an aid to thinking about the future.

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achieved is less clearly identifiable with concrete institutions; it will be the product of more anonymous multinational networks of bureaucrats.

The limitation of the transgovernmental approach as a vision of the future is similar to that of the preceding transnational approach: it perceives the future in terms of the magnification of one currently observable tendency. The approach usefully focuses upon one sector of political activity which has been neglected in the past and which, for some of the reasons mentioned, has come to have particular importance at the present time. By concentrating upon the interactions of bureaucrats, however, the approach takes as given the parameters of bureaucratic action. It can have little or nothing to say about changes in these parameters, which may come from outside the multibureaucratic system. Notable among such exogenous changes affecting the parameters of bureaucracy are changes in the nature of the state, which are traceable to social movements or disturbances, that is, to changes in the balance of social forces within the state. The New Deal can be seen in retrospect as a comprehensive change in the personnel and structure of government administration which came from such a social disturbance. Movements toward secession or regional autonomy in various countries today could also change the structure of governments and the conditions in which bureaucracies operate.

The larger questions concern the basis of power in societies. Do we envisage a concentration of organized economic interests, business and labor, in the management of modern economies through a new corporatism? Or a populist or revolutionary reversal of these tendencies? Will Third-World countries be increasingly or decreasingly controlled by authoritarian coalitions of the military and externally oriented economic interests? Answers to such questions would determine the conditions in which the multibureaucratic politics envisaged by the transgovernmental-relations approach will take place.

Furthermore, the approach must consider a contradiction implicit in its own premise. The progress of transgovernmental relations comes from a losing struggle by the central political authorities to ensure a coherence in its control of national policies, and a shift of power toward segmented bureaucratic networks. Is not a growing consciousness of this tendency likely to strengthen public support behind political leaders in their determination to regain control, and to lead to public pressures for more effective accountability of bureaucratic policymakers?

Geoffrey Barraclough, in delineating the salient features of contemporary history, directs attention first to what he calls structural

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changes—among which he includes changes in the nature of industrialism and imperialism, shifts in the demographic balance of the world's regions, changes in the nature of the state, and movements of ideologies and attitudes—since these "fix the skeleton or framework within which political action takes place."[36] Thinking about the future should give precedence to speculation about such structural changes over a focus on a subset of political actors and their interactions.

The systems-dynamics variant of the positivist-evolutionary approach gives us a different kind of view of future world order, cast in the more openly pessimistic terms of "limits to growth" or "endangered planet." The world is an ecological system whose material components and processes determine its finite limits. For all of history up to the very recent past, the system has contained a good deal of slack for human activity. The consequences of man-made disasters as well as of natural disasters have been remedied over time through the natural cycle of the system. That is no longer the case, as the consequences of human activity begin to press against the limits of the system. The human population is approaching the limit of life-sustaining resources. Production is depleting mineral resources faster than they are being replenished. Pollutants being produced exceed the absorptive and recycling capacity of the system. If present rates of growth in population, production, resource depletion, and pollution continue, the system will break down at some foreseeable and not too distant date. The form of breakdown will be a sudden drop in population and production.

Political and social variables form no part of the model from which these predictions are derived. But the implication of the model is clearly political: population and production must be brought under collective control and reduced to a zero rate of growth if the anticipated disaster is to be averted. Only the attainment of a stable state will allow survival. On this analysis, a new justification for international organization can be constructed, and a more urgent one than those of the past. Global monitoring and management will be required in order to achieve and maintain the optimum state of the global system.[37]

[36] Barraclough (fn. 5), 16.

[37] This new concept of the role of international organization is presented in Philippe de Seynes, "Prospects for a Future Whole World," *International Organization*, XXVI (Winter 1972). Maurice F. Strong, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51 (July 1973), 702-7, wrote of "the need to develop at the national and international levels the kinds of structures and institutions required for societal management." He added that "the environment cannot be sectoralized. It is a system of interacting relationships that extend through all sectors of activity, and to manage these relationships requires an integrative approach for which present institutional structures were not designed." Not surprisingly, he

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The proposed remedies raise as many grave problems at the political level as they purport to solve at the ecological level. Poor people and poor countries can point to the lopsided distribution of the key variables, with the rich having consumed most of the nonreplaceable resources and contributed most of the nonabsorbable pollution, and the poor having contributed most of the population increase. The policy prescriptions seem to affect the poor most of all: they are to have fewer children and they are not to get richer through industrializing in the way some of them had hoped. If zero growth is necessary for the future, the poor may well argue, justice requires a critical look at the distribution of costs and benefits. The clear political implication of zero growth is conflict over redistribution, both among and within nations. Growth attenuated such conflict in the past by making possible a sharing of increments, thus avoiding the more intractable issues of the basic redistribution of wealth and power.

The rich, by contrast, are naturally inclined to take their own privileged position as an unstated point of departure. From that perspective, the performance of the poor is to be judged by how far they adjust to the changes required by the total system. Jay W. Forrester's thesis of the "counterintuitive nature of social systems"[38] comes in here. He maintains that in complex systems with a number of feedback loops, purposive action directed to the solution of specific ills may have the unintended effect of making those ills worse. (For instance, housing renewal in the urban centers, he argues, will extend the urban blight by encouraging further crowding into these areas.) So, it may be inferred, economic assistance by rich countries to the poorest countries may merely encourage a continuance of the "dysfunctional" behavior that leads to population increase and inefficient agriculture. It would be more in accordance with the interests of the global system to aid only those among the poor who demonstrate that they are reforming their behavior in accordance with the requirements of the system. The argument already commends itself in the affluent suburbs.[39]

The systems-dynamics variant shares a common defect with the

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foresaw the central role in this concept of global management for the United Nations and the Environment Program that he heads.

[38] "Counterintuitive Nature of Social Systems," *Technology Review*, Vol. 73 (1971), 53.

[39] See Wade Green, "Triage: Who Shall Be Fed? Who Shall Starve?" *New York Times Magazine* (January 5, 1975). A counter-model to that used by the MIT-Club of Rome group is reported on by Alexander King, "The Club of Rome—Setting the Record Straight," *The Center Magazine*, VII (September-October 1974), 15-24. Constructed by Latin American social scientists, it has different distributionist assumptions, and its predictions do not bear out the contention that population growth is catastrophic.

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other approaches to thinking about future world order that are derived from positivism: the power relations of the status quo are taken as given, and the process models on which reasoning about future prospects can be based do not include anything relevant to a consideration of how these power relations may change, or even how they may be maintained. Power is just left out of account. Yet order refers, in the first instance, to the distribution and mechanism of power.

CONFLICT AND HISTORICAL CHANGE

The question of power relations suggests a remedy for the defects of the normative approach as well as an alternative to the models derived from positivism. The historicist-dialectical mode of thought places power at the center of its attention. It sees historical change as the result of conflicts, in which the emergence of a new form of consciousness leads to a shift in power relations which makes this new form of consciousness supreme over the erstwhile dominant form of consciousness. Power represents a conjunction of the outward and inward, of material capabilities and consciousness leading to purposive action.

This mode of thought looks backward in order to explain the present by the structural changes (in Barraclough's usage of the term) which, from the standpoint of the present, can be seen as arising from the past. Since each major period, and thus each successive pattern of "world" order,[40] is to be explained by a specific set of structural changes, there is no general model that can account for past, present, and future. The structural changes that explain one order are not the same as those that explain another; even though some common dimensions recur—technology, production relations, ideologies, and so forth—their precise form differs from case to case.

The future, therefore, necessarily—and perhaps reassuringly—appears indeterminate. We cannot be sure, following the historicist-dialectical mode of thought, which of the structural changes we perceive as going on at present will, in the perspective of the future order, appear as the significant explanatory ones. Some relief from total indeterminism is offered by the idea of conflict as the origin of change. We can follow a method of identifying the crises in which conflict is actual or potential. The kinds of crises we should focus upon are not crises in international relations *per se*—i.e., conflicts arising among the actors of

[40] The quotation marks are required on "world" because it can well be argued that only the present system, emerging sometime after World War II, is truly global. Previous historical systems referred to more limited areas, more or less sealed off from external influences, which were the relevant "worlds" for the people in them, e.g., Roman, Chinese, Indian, and European systems.

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a particular system—but conflicts affecting the parameters of the system—i.e., those that might lead to a change of the system rather than merely changes within the system.

Posing the matter in this way connects with the normative approach and gives it greater realism. These crises in the parameters arise within societies and extend their effects into the international system. Changes in the principles by which societies are organized into polities can thereby be related to changes in the international system. But these changes within societies are now seen in terms of power relations rather than merely formally in terms of institutions, hitherto suggested as the weakness of the normative approach.

Identifying crises is a first step. The next is to consider possible outcomes—alternative directions of historical change which would be conditioned by differences in power relations among the social forces involved.[41] The form of thought within which these steps are taken has both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. In the synchronic dimension, the structural elements that link national societies into a particular historical world order are identified. These are the elements that, as Barraclough says, constitute the framework within which political action takes place. The diachronic dimension shows those points of critical change in the social and political landscape where power is moving from one configuration to another—points from which a nascent order may extend over the broader landscape of a future time.[42] To identify such points and then to consider what paths of change are imaginable in the light of the power relations bearing upon these crises would be a valid method of thinking toward the future.

[41] An impressive effort to discover the conditions for change in the societal parameters of polity is Barrington Moore, Jr., *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (London: Penguin Press 1967). Although his work is confined to the national level, it is illustrative of the approach I attempt to outline here.

[42] A masterly historical work incorporating the synchronic and diachronic dimensions is Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme* (Paris: Armand Colin 1967). Although it is much more narrowly "political," R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press; Vol. I: 1959, Vol. II: 1964), also adopts the synchronic-diachronic approach.

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ORGANIZING COLLECTIVE SECURITY: The UN Charter's Chapter VIII in Practice

By ROBERT LYLE BUTTERWORTH*

INTERNATIONAL organization (IO) offers an attractive solution to problems of global interdependence. As a general prescription, it seems immediate and obvious, since the basic difficulties plaguing interdependent actors stem from their experiencing "interlocking fates"—"the consequences of their behavior are such that in order for one to achieve his goal some action by the other is required."[1] Analytically, interdependence—whatever its empirical substance—exists internationally to the extent that "events occurring in any given part or within any given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the system." As interdependence increases, therefore, "the level of effective autonomy of the units" of the system decreases;[2] satisfying national values thus increasingly demands international cooperation, and therefore international organization. As Hinsley notes, "even if it was an immense intellectual achievement to conceive of the wheel . . . the same cannot be said of the notion of an organization between states once separate states existed."[3]

But complications mount rapidly as one tries to make the prescription specific to particular problems in particular systemic contexts; the links among interdependence, organization, and system change are not yet understood well enough. Although studies of international integration have made considerable progress toward middle-range theory about these links, theorizing about general-purpose IO's is much less satisfactory. Particularly vexing issues have stemmed from the relationship between the scale and scope of an organization and the problems it is intended to remedy. At what system level can actors cooperate to what effect?

Collective security is a case in point. The doctrine prescribes a general

* I am grateful to Hayward Alker, Paul Beck, Cheryl Christensen, and Robert Walters for their criticisms and suggestions. Material support was provided by Carl Beck and the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

[1] Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, *Structure and Process in International Politics* (New York: Harper and Row 1973), 100.

[2] Oran R. Young, "Interdependencies in World Politics," *International Journal*, XXIV (Autumn 1969), 726.

[3] F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1967), 13.

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IO to coordinate and embody the community's response to aggression. Ideally, the fact of the organization's existence will deter international violence; more realistically, the organization provides a means for the community to manage violence when it does occur. To achieve even the more modest aims, however, the organization must be able to act; and yet, an organization constructed at the global level may not be able to do so. At the global level there is considerable disagreement over the substance and application of norms, and self-interest cannot be relied upon for the desired collective response. As the experiences of the League of Nations showed clearly, not all disputes have been equally threatening everywhere.[4]

Still, concerted action at a subsystemic level might be able to manage many cases. The United Nations Conference on International Organization set out to achieve this possibility by making provision for both global and regional collective security organizations. But the problem of the level at which actors could be expected to cooperate effectively was not resolved thereby; rather, it was translated into issues of interorganizational relationships. Which principle should be followed, regionalism or globalism? Specifically, what are the appropriate roles, for the UN and regional organizations respectively, in managing interstate security disputes? In 1945 the argument was resolved by a compromise embodied in Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) of the United Nations Charter. Although somewhat ambiguous, these Charter provisions appear to have been predicated on expectations that there would be differences between global and regional organizations in conflict management capabilities, and that these differences could be structured into a multiorganizational system that would be more effective than organizations operating exclusively on either level. In particular, as Claude concludes, "the framers of the Charter intended to assign to regional agencies a primary role in the solution of local problems, while retaining the principle that the Security Council should have overarching responsibility and unrestricted competence to intervene in any case at any time."[5]

The debates in San Francisco, however, were not motivated exclu-

[4] See the discussion in Inis L. Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares* (4th ed.; New York: Random House 1971), 250-56.

[5] Inis L. Claude, "The OAS, the UN, and the United States," *International Conciliation*, No. 547 (March 1964), 11. On the Chapter VIII arrangements see also Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington: Brookings Institution 1958); and Leland M. Goodrich, Edward Hambro, and Anne P. Simons, *Charter of the United Nations* (3rd rev. ed.; New York: Columbia University Press 1969), esp. 354-69.

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sively by doctrinal considerations of regionalism versus globalism. Specific security interests, of a more or less immediate nature, supplied their momentum: the problems of relations with former enemy states, the small powers' fears of great-power domination, and the great powers' fears of other great powers intruding into their own zones of influence, all played an important role. Furthermore, the debates seemed to be informed by contradictory lessons drawn from the League experience. Some, predominantly the Europeans, argued the Churchillian position that the interwar years had proved that only regions could be relied upon for effective action; this position clashed with the American view that only truly global action could preserve the peace.[6] Because perceptions of security problems and interests have changed so rapidly since 1945, and because Chapter VIII does not definitively formulate interorganizational relations, the question of how these arrangements developed has been of continuing interest to students of international relations.[7] The question is also quite relevant to foreign policy considerations; given burgeoning interdependence and superpower retrenchment, it may be important to decide whether to devote resources to regional organization or to the UN, and how to structure relationships among them.[8]

As yet, however, there has been no full-scale examination of this aspect of the UN's "operational Charter"[9]—the relationships that ac-

[6] See the discussion in Claude (fn. 4), 115-17. The Churchill-U.S. differences are detailed in Russell (fn. 5), 105 ff.

[7] Studies directly concerned with the management of interstate security disputes on a comparative organizational basis include: Claude (fns. 4 and 5); Minerva Etzioni, *The Majority of One* (Beverly Hills: Sage 1970); Ernst B. Haas, *Collective Security and the Future International System* (University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, Monograph Series in World Affairs, 1967–1968, V); Ernst B. Haas, "The United Nations and Regionalism," *International Relations*, III (November 1970); E. B. Haas, R. L. Butterworth, and J. S. Nye, *Conflict Management by International Organizations* [hereafter referred to as *Conflict Management*] (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press 1972); selections (esp. by Lynn Miller) in Richard A. Falk and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *Regional Politics and World Order* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman 1973); Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown 1971); and publications of the UNITAR project on the relationship between the UN and regional intergovernmental organizations, esp. A. H. Robertson, *The Relations Between the Council of Europe and the United Nations* (New York: UNITAR Regional Study No. 1, 1972); Berhanykun Andemicael, *Peaceful Settlement Among African States: Roles of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity* (New York: UNITAR PS No. 5, 1972); and Vratislav Pechota, *The Quiet Approach: A Study of the Good Offices Exercised by the United Nations Secretary-General in the Cause of Peace* (New York: UNITAR PS No. 6, 1972).

[8] See, for example, Kissinger's claim that the UN is "uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men" a "comprehensive, institutionalized peace encompassing all nations" (text of speech delivered to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1973, as reported in the *New York Times*, September 25, 1973, p. 18).

[9] This term is from Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and William J. Greenberg, "The UN

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tually developed between the UN and regional organizations with respect to managing inter-state security disputes. In this paper I will examine how they have developed in terms of the 146 interstate security disputes that involved collective security organizations between 1946 and March 1971. Four alternative conceptual models of interorganizational relationships are outlined; data on the operational jurisdictions and capabilities of the UN and regional organizations are then used to identify which model is closest to the operational Charter. Finally, I will assess the performance of that model and draw some general conclusions about organizations and interdependence.

I. Models of Organizational Systems

Relationships between the UN and regional organizations could have developed along a number of lines. They might have become conflictual, so that, in operation, Chapter VIII weakened rather than strengthened conflict management. A study by Haas, however, shows that such conflictual instances have not been frequent.[10]

But even when attention is confined to systems in which the combination of regional with global organizations acts to strengthen overall collective security, a number of possibilities remain. Systems in which the UN continually defers to regional activity (or vice versa) might be compatible in this sense, just as complete independence or limited competition might be.[11] Yet each of these systems would suggest something different about the interdependence-organization problem than the others would. To inquire into that problem, "compatibility" is not enough; we need to know how the compatibility worked—what level of organization was effective, to what degree, in managing what sorts of conflicts. We need, that is, to ascertain and compare the operational jurisdictions and capabilities of the UN and regional organizations. Let us define "operational jurisdictions" as the kinds of cases that have come

Charter: Alternate Pasts and Alternate Futures," in E. H. Fedder, ed., *The United Nations: Problems and Prospects* (St. Louis: University of Missouri, Center for International Studies, 1971).

[10] Haas, "The United Nations . . ." (fn. 7). Haas's figures are higher than those presented in part IV of the present study because he includes collective defense organizations like NATO and SEATO in his survey.

[11] "By *compatibility* we mean that the relationship between two organizations is such that the activities of one do not undermine those of the other and vice versa. . . . The extent of compatibility of regional organizations with a universal body should be judged according to the conflicts between the two and the degree to which such conflicts are minimized. Universal organizations and compatible regional organizations complement each other; there is an interest in maintaining harmonious relations in the sharing of international tasks." Etzioni (fn. 7), 18.

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before an organization; "operational capabilities" as the kinds of cases that an organization has been successful in handling.

The four models outlined sample the range of compatible UN-regional systems that we may find; they represent different structural blends of organizational capabilities and jurisdictions. Variations on each of them are possible, but these have been selected as the model types because (a) they represent the two polar positions (no differences and great differences in both capabilities and jurisdictions) and two intermediate positions, and (b) they represent models commonly found in the IO literature. They are offered here to suggest the implications of each for the question of how voluntary IO's can help manage problems of interdependence, and to provide a conceptual structure for the data analysis. The differences among them are illustrated in Figure 1.



FIGURE 1. DIFFERENCES AMONG MODELS

None of these models speaks directly to the questions of organizing interdependence. To do so would require data on the political process that generated foreign policy decisions about where to send what cases. Not only is such information difficult to obtain, but it can be exceedingly tricky to analyze. Precisely because such decisions are political processes, they can all, to some extent, appear to be "subjectively" determined. On the other hand, since most foreign policy decisions are

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taken in response to some perceived imperative or opportunity in the political environment, they all could appear to be "objectively" dictated. The problems of aggregating such information across diverse national systems and strategic contexts are staggering.

Consequently, this analysis looks to the structure that has been created by these ongoing processes. I have attempted to read in capabilities and jurisdictions the basic conditioning factors of the processes that generated them. I cannot therefore assert that if Model 1 is found to be accurate, then the "objective facts" of interdependence are unimportant to decisions about conflict management. But I *can* assert that the overall pattern of events suggests that short-run political considerations have been more important than long-run imperatives in the overall organization of interdependence in this respect.

1. *Redundancy.* The model of redundancy provides one polar case; in this system, there are no differences in capabilities or jurisdictions between the UN and regional organizations. Such a model could lead to more conflict management than a UN- or regional-only system, because we know from organization theory that a viable system can enhance its chances of managing its environment by having many alternative capabilities for handling the same tasks.[12] If this model best represented the relationships between the UN and regional organizations that have developed, we would expect to find that they have been equally effective in handling all kinds of conflicts. There would be no regular pattern of UN impotence in the face of regional puissance or vice versa. We would also observe considerable overlap in jurisdictions; conflicts within a regional organization's purview would be as likely to be handled by the UN as by the local agency.

The redundancy model is a polar position also with respect to the questions of the scale and scope of organization and interdependence. UN-regional relationships of this pattern would suggest that actors can cooperate effectively at either level, regardless of the specific occasion. They might not always do so, of course; but in any event, this model suggests that in general the question of cooperation is mainly one of other political factors; the "objective facts" of interdependence, the scale

[12] Note that this point refers to broader systems characteristics than simply "back-up" capabilities. It encompasses a major element of what Landau refers to as an "energy-transfer model"; in particular, the characteristic of a living system "that it is 'self-regulating,' acting always to keep both its internal state and external environment stable (its regulatory processes are manifold, complex, and *redundant*, and serve to protect against threat)." Martin Landau, "Linkage, Coding, and Intermediacy: A Strategy for Institution-Building," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, II (February 1971), 403.

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and scope of a problem, are not important determinants of cooperative behavior.

2. *Complementary Capabilities.* In the model based on complementary capabilities, directly opposed to that of redundancy, the UN and regional organizations have very different capabilities, and their operational jurisdictions are correspondingly specialized. Such a system is consistent with the strong regionalist claims described by Claude[13] and Nye,[14] which have been advanced on a variety of grounds. Whatever the causal factors at work, if this model best described the operational Charter, we would expect to find major differences between the organizations, both in their task loads and in the types of conflicts managed by them. In particular, we would observe a "regionally manageable" type of conflict, and find that the UN has been impotent in dealing with it even when no regional organization was involved. Similarly, regional organizations would fail to manage "UN-manageable" cases even if the UN was not involved.

This model differs from the preceding one on the organization-interdependence question. It suggests that the level at which actors can cooperate to any effect depends mostly upon the scale and scope of the problem at hand. Such a position is consistent with views of the UN and regional organizations that perceive their actions as being triggered by different thresholds of intensity. Perhaps if a dispute is not threatening to many areas of the world, the UN cannot act on it; similarly, if a dispute is too serious, regional action may be insufficient. Politics, in this model, may have some influence on the question of cooperation, but not very much; the "objective facts" dictate closely what can and cannot be done.

3. *Context Specialization.* The foregoing opposing models leave two others that compromise between the extreme positions. The logic of the context-specialization model is drawn from Claude's rebuttal of doctrinaire regionalism. He notes that "the suitability of regionalism depends in the first place upon the nature of the problem to be dealt with"; whether regional organizations are appropriate agencies for managing a conflict, for example, would depend mostly upon considerations of the scale of impact of the conflict, the resources available

[13] See Claude (fn. 4), 102-17.

[14] See Nye (fn. 7), esp. 129-30. Nye quotes Nyerere as an example: "Certain regional and ideological associations have an advantage over the UN. As a means of preventing or settling disputes, talking is more productive and certainly easier, the greater the general feeling of sympathy and friendship among the participants."

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to handle it, and the degree to which it is linked with global norms.[15] (This model draws upon only a small part of Claude's analysis of UN-regional relationships; his overall position is much more like that described in the following model.) If interorganizational relationships developed according to this logic, we would expect to find that conflicts were submitted to and managed by organizations at the "appropriate" level. There would be no great differences in capabilities between the UN and regional organizations, but there should be a fairly high degree of specialization in operational jurisdictions. An aggregate assessment of the task loads of both sets of organizations might show them to be fairly similar, because the UN would be involved in "regional-type" cases in which no regional agency had purview. But very few "regional-type" conflicts among members of a common regional organization would find their way to the UN, and those that do would either have gotten there at the instigation of a regional agency or have been quite serious in their global ramifications. Organizational jurisdictions, that is, would be governed by a clear division of labor, with regional organizations acting as filters through which cases are passed before being submitted to the UN; if the UN became involved in a regional case, it would be because the regional organization prodded the UN to action. In practice, the Security Council would not act to operationalize its "inherent right" to intervene in conflicts and to supervise regional operations.

This model does not impute the exclusive causal import to the "objective facts" of interdependence that the complementary-capabilities model does. By emphasizing that the "suitability" of alternative organizations depends largely upon the scale and scope of the problem, however, it is more closely related to that model than to the first one. Although it admits of an interaction between essentially "political" considerations and environmental constraints, it suggests that the latter are more important.

4. *Comparative Advantage.* The second intermediate model also compromises on the interdependence-organization question, but inclines in the other direction: it envisages the more "subjective" aspects of interdependence as determining the level at which cooperation is obtained. The comparative-advantage model extends Haas's view of intra-UN decision making as a bargaining process[16] to interorganizational relationships. In such a system, actors choose the organization to which a conflict is submitted, and in which they will cooperate, ac-

[15] Claude (fn. 4), 103.

[16] Haas, "Collective Security . . ." (fn. 7).

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cording to their immediate bargaining interests, rather than according to the objective dimensions of the problem or a general value of conflict management. The operational jurisdictions and capabilities of these organizations will reflect the consensuses that have been reached among actors making pragmatic decisions about their interests in an immediate political context.

The comparative-advantage model is consistent with the Charter provisions of Chapter VIII; it presumes that the UN's capabilities differ from those of regional organizations not so much in the objective resources which each can command, but in the ease with which a meaningful consensus can be reached for multilateral action. If interorganizational relationships developed into this type of system, we would expect to find that the Security Council exercised its "inherent right" and was not stymied by regional action. (A veto in the Security Council, of course, is still consistent with this model.) We would observe that the UN has most often done its own "filtering" of cases, exercising supervision (even if passive) of regional organizations, making its own choices about jurisdictions, and occasionally prodding regional forums into action. This does not suggest that there would be no general differences observable between UN and regional caseloads; Churchill's contention, that there is a positive relationship between the geographical immediacy of a problem and a willingness to cooperate, may be right in most cases. Hence we would expect that some conflicts—"local" ones—would usually be handled at the regional level. Not all such cases should be, however; since jurisdictions are seen as depending upon actors' perceptions of their bargaining advantages, even some of the least serious local conflicts might go directly to the UN. Finally, even in such local cases, we would observe no great differences between the management capabilities of the UN and the regional organizations; like jurisdictions, capabilities depend more on the subjective aspects of interdependence that enter into bargaining than on the objective requirements of the problem and resources at hand.

II. Data

The data for the present inquiry were originally coded for the study by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye.[17] They comprise 146 cases of security disputes between states, which were submitted to the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of

[17] See the appendix to *Conflict Management* (fn. 7), for the complete codebook that was used.

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African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, and the Council of Europe between 1946 and March 1971. We will examine the variables for each case which describe the characteristics of the conflict (in order to distinguish operational jurisdictions) and the effectiveness of the organization in managing the case (in order to distinguish management capabilities).

Jurisdictions can be distinguished by describing each conflict in terms of eleven variables, most of which portray various aspects of intensity. Five are ordinal scales containing "hard" information about the number of fatalities involved, the duration, the power ranking of the strongest protagonist,[18] the degree to which the conflict had spread when an organization became involved in it, and the degree of formal warfare. Four are judgmental variables that scale a conflict according to how likely it seemed that, without organizational intervention, it would abate, would disappear within different time spans, would escalate to different levels, or would lead to war between the superpowers.[19] The remaining two variables have nominal categories describing the type of issue involved and the cold-war alignments of the parties. For multivariate analysis, the categories of these variables were scored in accord with the MAC logic of the Guttman-Lingoes nonmetric program series.[20]

An organization's capabilities can be discerned in its management impact on a case. The degree of management attributable to an orga-

[18] This power ranking was obtained from the Cox-Jacobson scale, reported in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1973), 437-43.

[19] The coding procedures are described fully in *Conflict Management* (fn. 7). For those variables requiring judgmental scoring, panels of experts were set up for each organization, and each panel (except two) included at least one scholar who had published studies on the topic and one practicing diplomat from the organization in question. Two members of the panel were able to work face-to-face, while the others responded by mail. This constituted the first round of coding, during which disagreements were resolved (not compromised) by further research and appeal back to the panel members. The second round of coding involved intensive independent studies of each organization and further research into each case, with coding being done on a face-to-face basis. The cases during the second round were slightly different from those during the first round; during the first, however, inter-coder agreement was greater than 85%, and judgmental scores from the first round were changed during the second only if documentary evidence showed them to be incorrect.

[20] See James C. Lingoes, "The Multivariate Analysis of Qualitative Data," *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, III (January 1968), 61-94, and *The Guttman-Lingoes Nonmetric Program Series* (Ann Arbor: Mathesis Press 1973), esp. chap. 19. The "alignment" variable categories were ordered as follows: 1 = members of opposing cold-war blocs; 2 = both parties unaligned; 3 = one party aligned, one not; 4 = members of same cold-war bloc. The "type of issue" variable categories were ordered as follows: 1 = interstate cold war; 2 = internal cold war; 3 = internal "other"; 4 = interstate "other"; 5 = colonial. See *Conflict Management* (fn. 7), for a fuller explication of the variables and categories.

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nization's efforts was coded initially allowing for three possible scores (none, some, or great) on each of four dimensions: stopping hostilities, abating the conflict, isolating the conflict, and settling the conflict. These scores and dimensions were then found to comprise a Guttman-type scale, permitting the use of a single ordinal variable with four categories: none; helped control/contain; helped settle; settled.[21]

III. Patterns of Jurisdiction and Capabilities

A. Operational Jurisdictions

The first step in deciding which model best characterizes recent experience is to compare the operational jurisdictions of the UN and the regional organizations. Initially, we need to examine the characteristics of the cases submitted to regional organizations as against those of the cases submitted to the United Nations. The UN's task load should be quite different from that of the regional organizations if the model of complementary capabilities is accurate; a high degree of similarity between the two would be predicted by the model of redundancy; partial similarity would be consistent with the models of context specialization and comparative advantage.

It would be quite easy to discriminate among these models if the cases could be grouped along a single "local/global" dimension. But there was no single variable that adequately captured the degree of regionalism that inhered in a conflict. Nor did repeated efforts using cluster analysis, factor analysis of variables, Q-factor analysis of cases, and discriminate function techniques reveal any such simple grouping. A factor scaling procedure was finally chosen as the simplest technique that produced results with a high face validity. A varimax solution to a factor analysis of the eleven "conflict characteristics" variables yielded the three factors shown in Table 1. Each case was scored on each factor according to a composite estimate technique.[22] This procedure grouped

[21] The coefficient of reproducibility for this scale was 97.3%. This scale of management impact was computed differently from the "success" scale reported in *Conflict Management* (fn. 7). The differences between the two, however, are irrelevant for present purposes; a few cases are shifted from one category to the next, but cases that scored as "failures" on the "success" scale are, of course, scored as "none" on the impact scale.

[22] The factor loadings were squared (preserving the original signs), multiplied by the standardized variables, and summed for each case. This technique was used in a recent article by Paul Allen Beck, "Environment and Party: The Impact of Political Demographic County Characteristics on Party Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68 (September 1974), 1229-44. For basic considerations important in composite estimates techniques, see R. J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970), 441-42. In some respects the procedure employed here could be considered to reify factor loadings by treating different weightings with

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TABLE 1

VARIMAX SOLUTION TO FACTOR ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES

	*Factor**		
Variable	*I*	*II*	*III*
Fatalities	.83	—.01	.26
Duration	.12	.10	.44
Likelihood of abatement	.50	—.15	.54
Likely time of disappearance	.13	—.20	.87
Likely degree of isolation	.51	—.31	.12
Likelihood of superpower war	.16	—.64	.09
Degree of warfare	.79	—.04	.13
Type of issue	—.02	.78	.17
Strongest party	—.06	.45	—.05
Alignment of parties	—.18	.68	—.05
Degree of spread	.47	—.31	.05

* Factor I: Degree of massive violence.
Factor II: Distance from great-power conflicts.
Factor III: Intractability.
These three factors had eigenvalues of 3.63, 2.04, and 1.23 respectively, and together they accounted for 62.7% of the variance. Underlined loadings are greater than .5 in absolute value.

conflicts according to their relative degree of massive violence, distance from great-power conflicts, and intractability (Factors I, II, and III respectively).

The differences between the regional and UN caseloads are of the same pattern for all three scales. In general, the two groupings do not diverge in many respects; the UN did not face a task very different from that of the regional organizations. Indeed, most of the UN's cases are indistinguishable from regional ones; a few others are included in the UN caseload. The difference between the two, that is, seems to be more one of comprehensiveness and diversity than of partition: most of the UN and regional cases have the same scores on these scales, but of the cases with high values on the violence and intractability scales and low values on the distance from great-power conflicts scale, all but a few have gone to the UN.

spurious precision. Consequently three other scales, corresponding to those reported in the text, were calculated by taking only the variables that loaded strongly on a factor and simply summing their values to score each case. The correlations between the original and alternative scales were .97, .91, .92 for the massive violence, great-power conflict, and intractability scales respectively.

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Table 2 reveals this pattern plainly, and it provides enough information to discard two of the four models. The model of complementary capabilities clearly does not apply; the operational jurisdictions of the

TABLE 2

OPERATIONAL JURISDICTIONS

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY DEGREE OF MASSIVE VIOLENCE (PERCENTAGES)[a]

Organization	*None and none threatened* →				*Extremely high*			*Total cases*
	— 2	*—1*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*(N)*
UN	16.3	27.6	12.2	20.4	9.2	11.2	3.1	98
Regional	37.5	12.5	25.0	14.6	6.3	4.2	0.0	48
								146

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY DISTANCE FROM GREAT-POWER CONFLICTS (PERCENTAGES)[b]

Organization	*Serious cold-war confrontations among superpowers* →				*Low-level colonial and other disputes involving smallest powers*			*Total cases*
	— 3	*— 2*	*— 1*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*(N)*
UN	1.0	1.0	9.2	12.2	5.1	18.4	44.9	8.2	98
Regional	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.1	22.9	54.2	18.8	48
									146

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY DEGREE OF INTRACTABILITY (PERCENTAGES)[c]

Organization	*Short-term disputes, easy to abate, unlikely to be protracted* →				*Long-lasting conflicts, difficult to abate, likely to be protracted*		*Total cases*
	— 2	*— 1*	*0*	*1*	*2*	*3*	*(N)*
UN	10.2	11.2	35.7	16.3	19.4	7.1	98
Regional	29.2	41.7	18.8	10.4	0.0	0.0	48
							146

[a] *gamma* = —.29, $p <$ .01 [b] *gamma* = .43 [c] *gamma* = —.66, $p <$ .001

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UN and regional organizations are not highly specialized but quite similar, at least with respect to the descriptors used here. But they are not completely similar; some UN cases have no counterparts in the regional caseload (those with high scores on violence and intractability and low scores on distance from great-power conflicts, for example). Hence the model of redundancy also looks inappropriate. It fails further because the organizational distribution of cases is not statistically significant for the great-power conflicts scale only. (If the three extreme low values were collapsed into one category—in many respects a defensible procedure—the distribution would be significant at the .025 level, with *gamma* = —.43.)[23]

More information is required to decide between the models of context specialization and comparative advantage. The similarity in case characteristics is not enough to rule out the former; it may be that, within the area of overlap on each scale, regional organizations did handle all the conflicts within their purview. The similarity in task characteristics could simply be due to the fact that, in the context of many of the disputes, there were no regional organizations. If so, the model of context specialization is a more accurate description than the model of comparative advantage.

For deciding between these models, then, the question is: within the area of overlap on the three scales, are there many cases submitted to the UN that could have been handled at the regional level? The answer is yes; a fair number of conflicts submitted to the UN involved disputes among members of a common regional organization. This observation holds even when we confine attention to the areas of heaviest overlap on the scales—that is, to "mainstream" regional cases. If we take such cases to be those that scored less than 2 on violence, higher than 1 on distance from great-power conflicts, and lower than 2 on intractability, we are talking about 41 (85%) of the regional cases and 43 (44%) of the UN cases.[24] Of the latter, 12 (28%) were between

[23] If the redundancy model were accurate, there would be only a random relationship between a conflict's characteristics and the organization to which it is submitted. It should be recalled that we are talking in terms of revealed capabilities; an artificial intelligence model like the Alker-Greenberg-Christensen one might be able to decide whether regional organizations have greater potentials, but the present analysis can deal only with the jurisdictional capabilities that have been demonstrated. Cf. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Cheryl Christensen, "From Causal Modeling to Artificial Intelligence: The Evolution of a UN Peace-Making Simulation," in Paul Smoker and Jean Laponce, eds., *Experimentation and Simulation in Political Science* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1972); and Alker and Greenberg (fn. 9).

[24] The seven regional cases that are excluded as being perhaps atypical are the following: the Nigerian civil war, the Congo civil war, the Yemen civil war, the Tutsi-Hutu conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, and the 1965 Dominican Intervention, all of which scored too high on massive violence; the 1954 Guatemala coup and the 1960–62

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actors who belonged to a common regional organization. These cases are listed in Table 3, together with the regional organization that had or could have had jurisdiction. The last column of the table indicates the action the regional organization was taking, if any, when the UN considered the dispute. This information makes clear the nature of

TABLE 3

"MAINSTREAM" REGIONAL CASES CONSIDERED BY THE UN[a]

Case	*Action of Appropriate Regional Organization*[b]
Future Status of Cyprus, 1954–58	COUNCIL OF EUROPE: Commission on Human Rights active on issue of British practices, not independence.
Egypt-Sudan (Wadi Halfa), 1958	ARAB LEAGUE: Secretary-General Hasunah tries but fails to intervene.
Lebanon/Jordan civil disturbances, 1958	ARAB LEAGUE: upon Lebanon's appeal to UN, meetings are held, but fail.
Austria-Italy (South Tyrol), 1960–61	COUNCIL OF EUROPE: Commission on Human Rights active on different issue.
Morocco-Mauritania, 1960–61	ARAB LEAGUE: defends Moroccan claims. OAU: no evidence of formal involvement.
Kuwait, 1961	ARAB LEAGUE: Secretary-General Hasunah's efforts, before Kuwait's appeal to UN, fail.
Haiti-Dominican Republic, U.S., 1963	OAS: Investigating mission established; ineffective.
Panama-U.S., 1964	OAS: Inter-American Peace Commission involved by time of Security Council meeting.
Greece-Turkey, 1964	COUNCIL OF EUROPE: no evidence of formal involvement.
Ivory Coast-Guinea, 1967	OAU: no evidence of formal involvement.
Haiti-U.S., 1968	OAS: no evidence of formal involvement.

[a] Cases that were in the area of task overlap and that were conflicts among members of a common regional organization.
[b] At time of UN consideration of the case.

problems of Cuba-OAS relations, in both of which the scores were too close to superpower cold-war confrontations.

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the comparative advantage the plaintiffs sought in appealing to the UN: in every case, the regional organization was either ineffective or hostile to the appealing party.

B. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Thus far, then, the evidence weighs in favor of the model of comparative advantage and against the model of context specialization. Of the 43 UN cases that resembled the "mainstream" regional cases, slightly more than 1 in 4 look as though they should have been candidates for regional action alone. But perhaps that pattern reflects only occasional disturbances that have prevented interorganizational relationships from clearly representing the pattern of context specialization. It could be that the heart of that model (and of the complementary-capabilities model) is correct—that regional organizations do possess certain advantages over the UN for managing certain conflicts. That strength may not be perfectly reflected in the submission patterns for a number of reasons. Perhaps the difference in capabilities has not been clear or salient enough for all states to learn about it, for example; or perhaps the difference is clear, but management interests have often been subordinated to other considerations of *Realpolitik*.

This argument, however, also seems incorrect. As shown in Table 4, regional organizations have not significantly surpassed the UN in their common task area. They have not exercised a substantially higher rate or degree of conflict management. There is some difference, to be sure; regional organizations have completely failed less often than the UN, and the UN has exerted a stronger impact somewhat more frequently.

TABLE 4

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ON CASES IN AREA OF TASK OVERLAP*
(PERCENTAGES)

	Management Impact				
Organization	*None*	*Helped control/ contain*	*Helped settle*	*Settled*	*Total cases (N)*
UN	46.5	18.6	18.6	16.3	43
Regional	34.1	41.5	12.2	12.2	41
					84

* Cases that scored less than 2 on massive violence, greater than 1 on distance from great-power conflicts, and less than 2 on intractability.

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These differences, however, are far from being marked, and they are too weak to support the premises of the context-specialization and complementary-capabilities models.

IV. Assessing the Comparative-Advantage System

The patterns of IO jurisdictions and capabilities suggest that the models of redundancy, context specialization, and complementary capabilities are not descriptively accurate. A large number of the UN's cases have been very similar to regional ones, and neither level of organization has evidenced a decided advantage in managing those common tasks. A fair percentage of UN cases in the common task area, moreover, were conflicts among members of a common regional organization; they *could* have been handled at the regional level. This evidence suggests that the model of comparative advantage best represents the system of collective security that has evolved since 1945. That, indeed, is the model embodied in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; and so the operational Charter has confirmed the normative one.

But how well has this model worked? How effective has the principle of comparative advantage been, and how much compatibility between the organizations has it produced? Has it helped or hindered conflict management by IO's? Such an assessment involves determining how adequately the UN has provided an alternative to regional forums, and whether cases that were considered by both were managed or not.

The principle would not be very effective if regional organizations were able to prevent the UN from intervening in a dispute. Have they been able to do so? Among all of the 48 regional cases we find none in which a regional organization prevented the UN from considering a conflict.[25] It could be, of course, that regional organizations have been able to limit UN intervention to merely formal discussion. Table 5 lists those cases which were considered simultaneously by the UN and a regional organization, and in which it appears that UN efforts may have been limited somewhat in favor of regional activities. Here, again, there is no evidence that regional organizations have been able to vacate the principle of comparative advantage. In several of these cases, competition between regional and UN organizations was functional;

[25] The Biafran case might at first appear to have been an exception, but Andemicael reports: "The United Nations Secretary-General had initially explored possibilities for exercising his good offices, and then decided to encourage the OAU to assist in the quest for a peaceful solution of the problems" (fn. 7), 35. Pechota presents essentially the same analysis, distinguishing between the political and humanitarian considerations in the conflict (fn. 7), 38-39.

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TABLE 5

CASES THAT COULD HAVE INVOLVED COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UN AND REGIONAL ACTION

Case	*Regional organization*	*Did the UN help manage it?*	*Did the regional organization help manage it?*
Guatemala, 1954	OAS	no	yes
Lebanon/Jordan, 1958	Arab League	yes	yes
Cuba-U.S., 1960–61	OAS	no	no
Bay of Pigs, 1961	OAS	no	no
Kuwait, 1961	Arab League	yes	yes
Haiti-Dominican Republic, U.S., 1963	OAS	no	yes
Panama-U.S., 1964	OAS	yes	yes
Somali Borders, 1964–	OAU	no	yes
Intervention in Dominican Republic, 1965	OAS	no	yes

in the process of forestalling more active UN intervention, regional activities exerted a managing impact on the conflict. (The cases of Guatemala, Lebanon/Jordan, Kuwait, Haiti-Dominican Republic, Panama, Somalia, and the Dominican Republic fall in this category.) In the cases of the Somali Republic and Kuwait, the UN actively sought to prod regional organizations into accepting primary operational responsibility for conflict management. The UN in these seven cases provided an implicit or explicit goad to regional conflict management by providing an alternative to regional organizations. It seems, then, that the principle of comparative advantage has been fully operative.

But there were two cases in which it seemed that regional action limited UN effort, and in which the conflicts were not managed: Cuba-U.S. tensions between summer 1960 and winter 1961, and the Bay of Pigs invasion which they prefaced. The regional organization involved was, of course, the OAS; there are no examples of such preclusive activity in other regional contexts. But since the United States was a party to these conflicts, the cases do not suggest that a regional organization can preclude UN effort; American opposition to active UN involvement would have precluded it in any event. References in the UN to the OAS seem mainly to have been efforts to find a fig leaf for U.S. policy.[26]

[26] On the "fig leaf" role, see Nye (fn. 7), 135.

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Regional action, then, has not served to prevent UN involvement, and what competition there has been between the global and regional organizations has promoted conflict management. There are, however, several cases in which the UN failed to provide an alternative to regional action even though there were no regional efforts to exclude it. The comparative-advantage principle would lead us to expect the UN to become involved especially in those regional cases where there was some disagreement within the regional institution on local efforts and when these efforts did not manage the conflict. In 6 of the 48 regional cases those conditions were met, but no appeal to the UN was made (see Table 6). Do they show the UN to have been somehow inadequate

TABLE 6

CASES NOT MANAGED BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: SOME REGIONAL DISAGREEMENT, NO UN INTERVENTION

Case	*Comment*
Jordan-Arab States, 1950	
Colombia-Peru, 1953–54	Peru rejected IAPC jurisdiction; case managed through direct negotiations and ICJ.
Nicaragua-Costa Rica, 1959	Delayed action by OAS; rebels surrendered.
Dominican Republic-Ecuador, 1960	
Algeria-Morocco, 1963	Arab League failed; OAU helped.
Greece-Denmark and others, 1968–71	

as an alternative? Three of them clearly do not. Although Peru declined the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) in the Haya de la Torre case, it was amenable to direct negotiations with Colombia and to submitting the issue to the International Court of Justice. OAS action in the Nicaraguan exiles case (1959) was dilatory enough, the rebels surrendered quickly enough, and Costa Rica was cooperative enough to make an appeal to the UN unnecessary. And although the Arab League failed to manage the Algeria-Morocco border conflict, the OAU successfully helped to do so. Possibly the remaining three cases were not taken to the UN because it did not

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present a viable alternative, but we can find no positive evidence that such was the case.

In sum, regional organizations have not prevented the UN from exercising jurisdiction over a security dispute. In several cases of potential preclusive competition between the UN and regional organizations, the ability of the UN to provide an alternative to regional action actually promoted conflict management. Apparently, the principle of comparative advantage has been fully operative, and is evidence of a high degree of compatibility between the UN and regional organizations.

The data also suggest that conflict management would not have been significantly enhanced if regional organizations had been denied a collective security role (at least not in terms of postwar international politics as we know them). Would a shift toward a strong regionalist or context-specialization model be useful? Such a change would be politically much more feasible than a withdrawal of mandates for regional collective security; the UN could simply refuse to intervene in regional disputes. Postwar experience, however, suggests that this shift would also be unlikely to facilitate conflict management. A fuller multivariate analysis of the factors associated with an organization's management impact shows that those aspects of the UN's response to a conflict that have been strongly associated with whether or not it manages the conflict differ from those of regional organizations. For this analysis a linear regression model was used, and three variables describing an organization's response to a conflict were added to the conflict-characteristics and management-impact variables. The "response" variables were coded for information about the power of actors exercising leadership on the case within the organization, the strongest action the organization took on it, and the degree of consensus that backed that action. As the *beta* scores in Table 7 indicate, the best predictor of management impact for the UN is the action that it undertook. For regional organizations, however, the best predictor is the degree of consensus that was reached.[27] The importance of regional organizations reaching a wide or very wide consensus is underscored in Table 8. The difference between the UN and regional organizations in this respect is

[27] This difference, of course, might have been due to the fact that quite different regression models are needed for UN and regional management—that is, that the two sets of organizations represent essentially different management systems. That possibility was checked using the Chow test, and it was found not to hold; it thus seems that we are dealing with a case of different emphases within essentially the same system. For the technique involved in this test, see Franklin M. Fisher, "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions: An Expository Note," *Econometrica*, XXXVIII (March 1970), 361-66.

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TABLE 7

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MANAGEMENT IMPACTS ON SELECTED CASES*

UNITED NATIONS		
Independent Variable	*Beta*	
Action taken	.51	Multiple R = .60
Leadership	—.33	Standard error = .95
		F (2, 40) = 10.99
		Number of observations = 43
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS		
Independent Variable	*Beta*	
Degree of consensus	.34	Multiple R = .47
Action taken	.29	Standard error = .89
		F (2, 38) = 5.52
		Number of observations = 41

* Cases were selected, as before, to accord with typical regional caseloads. The independent variables reported here were selected from a comprehensive multiple regression on the basis of *beta* weights and statistical significance. The point, as should be clear, is simply to indicate that consensus is important to regional efficacy; this is not an effort to model organizational impacts. Hence a fuller analysis of secondary effects, for example, might find some of the variables not reported to be important as well.

TABLE 8

DEGREE OF CONSENSUS REACHED IN CASES THAT WERE MANAGED (PERCENTAGES)

	Degree of Consensus				*Total cases*
Organization	*None*	*Narrow*	*Wide*	*Very wide*	*(N)*
UN	9.3	11.6	37.2	41.9	43
Regional	0.0	6.7	16.7	76.7	30
					73

gamma = .60
$p < .025$

sharpened by noting that the two regional cases managed with only a narrow consensus were both OAS cases in which the United States was directly involved and exercised strong leadership.[28] Except for these,

[28] These cases were the 1960–62 tensions between the Dominican Republic and the United States and Venezuela, and the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic.

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every case that was managed by regional action manifested wide and very wide levels of consensus.

Would that degree of consensus have been reached in the regional cases that were submitted to the UN if the UN had declined jurisdiction? Perhaps, but the data suggest not. There were five cases in which the UN and a regional organization considered the same issues simultaneously, and in which a wide or very wide consensus was reached in the regional forum.[29] In only one—the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala—was that level of agreement reached *before* the UN considered the case. At best, it seems, a shift toward a strong regional system would have but marginally improved the frequency of conflict management.[30]

V. Conclusions

The preceding analysis indicates that relations between the UN and regional organizations on issues of conflict management have developed according to the logic of "comparative advantage" embodied in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter; the operational Charter has confirmed the normative one. The UN has confronted a more heterogeneous task load than have regional organizations, and it has displayed a wider range of capabilities. It has not, however, specialized exclusively in doing what regional organizations could not; it has consistently been available as an alternative to regional forums. Empirically, this model seems by and large to have been a "good" one to have followed. The capabilities demonstrated by IO's suggested two possible alternatives—a UN-only model and a strong regionalist one; it does not seem likely that either would have led to significantly more conflict management.

Our scoring of the former appears at first to conflict with Nye's; he found "a general anti-Trujillo consensus" in this case (fn. 7), 143. His coding, however, seems to have focused very tightly on the tensions between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; ours takes the Venezuelan claims more as an opportunity for the U.S. (and a few others) to get the OAS involved in the internal Dominican situation. From this perspective we credit the OAS with helping to stop hostilities because Trujillo changed his policies, and with helping to abate the conflict, because it held back from the degree of intervention that the U.S. really wanted. Cf. Jerome Slater, *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1967), 183-216.

[29] Guatemala, 1954; Lebanon/Jordan, 1958; Kuwait, 1961; Haiti, 1963; Panama, 1964.

[30] Such a shift would not be likely to improve the *degree* of management impact on a case. The weak differences in organizational impact noted in Table 4 hold for the full universe of cases: the UN manages cases less frequently than regional organizations do, but its impact tends to be stronger. If impact is scaled from 1 to 4 (1 = no impact, 4 = settlement), the mean UN impact on the cases that it managed was 2.8, compared to 2.5 for regional organizations.

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By itself, of course, the foregoing analysis cannot prove any general conclusions about international organizations as a means of responding to problems of interdependence. But the findings do suggest some important considerations for further research. It seems clear that whether the UN or a regional organization becomes involved in a particular conflict depends mainly upon bargaining processes within the context of the specific dispute. States have been able to cooperate effectively at both systemic levels; whether the relevant regional organization or the UN was actually mobilized resulted from the actors' calculations of political advantage. An interaction between the "objective" and "subjective" aspects of interdependence is obviously involved, but efforts at conflict management, at least, seem to depend more on immediate political considerations and pressures than on "objective facts" of interdependence. The respective operational roles of the regional and universal IO's apparently have been determined by what actors perceive to be useful to their specific interests in the short term, and not by the more general and long-term problem of organizing a world political system.

If that inference is accepted, then how do we account for the congruence between behavior and the Charter provisions? Does it mean that the norms of the Charter have governed international politics? Or does it mean that the actors' short-term calculations of political advantage during the past 25 years have produced the same results in practice that similar calculations in an earlier context produced in principle? That is a crucial problem: the comparative-advantage model suggests that even when actors perceive a general need for greater organization in principle, those perceptions do not determine their behavior in the context of specific disputes. The problem of organizing collective security involves a continual regenerating and channeling of political will in favor of collective ordering. A certain congruence is therefore required between the immediate policy incentives inherent in a specific dispute and the anticipated direction of system development. In this case, development entails a pattern of change in those immediate incentives that accumulate across conflicts over time. Without knowing the reasons for the congruence between Charter and behavior, one cannot assess the degree to which IO supplies or represents at least incipient steering or directive capacities in the international system.[31]

[31] On the notion of "steering," see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press 1966), 169 ff. On the notion of "directive" capacities, see Harry Eckstein, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1142-61.

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The analysis provided in this paper does not suffice to solve the problem. But it does supply the basis for some suggestions and speculations. First, we cannot argue that Charter norms have governed international politics; both the diffuseness of these norms and the behavior of conflicting actors contradict such a position. Second, it is clear that these organizations have not become the focuses for development and institutionalization in world politics.[32] Indeed, there seems to be a general trend away from using them to manage conflict, at least during the last decade; as suggested by Table 9, world order stimuli and concerns seem

TABLE 9

RATE AND AVERAGE DEGREE OF IO MANAGEMENT IMPACTS IN EACH SYSTEM PERIOD

System Period	*% of caseload managed*	*Average degree of impact**	*Total cases (N)*
Unipolar (1945–47)	83.3	2.5	6
Bipolar (1948–55)	43.2	1.8	37
Tricentric (1956–62)	55.1	2.0	49
Multicentric (1963–71)	46.3	1.7	54
			146

* Degree of impact: 1 = failed; 2 = helped control/contain; 3 = helped settle.

increasingly to be located elsewhere than in these IO's.[33] This overall trend is additional confirmation of the finding that the Charter model holds, because that model regards the two sets of organizations as components of the same system, not as fundamentally different entities.

[32] The question of whether IO conflict management activities have had a cumulative impact on international politics is more fully examined in Butterworth, "Moderating Interdependence," Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley 1973).

[33] The years 1945–71 can be divided into four system periods defined by the degree of polycentrism that was apparent in UN voting on security issues: unipolar (1945–47); bipolar (1948–55); tricentric (1956–62); multicentric (1963–71). See Haas, "Collective Security" (fn. 7); cf. Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1965), 20-22. The rate of management impact and its degree both declined in the recent period but the total number of disputes increased, suggesting that increasing pluralism in the international system has been associated with an increasing practical irrelevance of these organizations to security problems.

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But it also suggests that there are tight limits on the ability of organizations like these to be agents of change with respect to problems of peace and security.

It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that the observed congruence between norms and behavior occurred in response to factors that were exogenous to these organizations *per se*. At least with respect to these issues, these organizations have been used to *respond* to problems posed by interdependence, not to anticipate issues and structure the system. Obviously, since they did not embody an initial operational commitment to restructure the system (e.g., a meaningful grant of supranational authority), these organizations could hardly have been used in some other fashion. Consequently, organizations like these, if they are to have any operational role at all, must be relevant over time to the interests of very diverse actors in many different contexts; they must be open to a heterogeneous and fluid environment. In practical terms, that means that they must appeal as relatively neutral and potentially useful resources to actors engaged in the bargaining process of international conflict. But to the extent that they satisfy this requirement and maintain relevance, it seems they must sacrifice their potential to become independent agents in directing international behavior.

That is not to say that such organizations cannot exert directing influences; the point is, rather, that direction and development must be obtained inductively through a series of conflict-management events. Under the arrangements analyzed in this paper, neither the UN nor regional organizations have been powerful agents for dramatic value changes in world politics. But the Charter model is a normatively open one, in the sense that it does not structurally impede whatever value consensus the international political context will support. Moreover, since it can draw upon value changes in several different contexts, it affords the possibility of a quicker development of order than models of either a strong regionalist or a UN-only cast might permit. By providing opportunities to appeal from one set of community standards to another, it can facilitate that development.[34]

The experience of Chapter VIII suggests that efforts to manage problems of interdependence depend primarily upon the "subjective" aspects of the system. If order is to be approached in an evolutionary and developmental fashion, the task of directing its progress should not be given to international organization. Nonetheless, IO can certainly encourage the development of order, particularly if alternative organi-

[34] Reference here is to the kind of process described by Claude (fn. 5), whereby the UN can be used to keep regional agencies "honest."

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zational forums with overlapping domains are established within a generally open normative structure. Although cumulative change will not be directed by such a structure, it will at least remain possible; and although arrangements of this sort will not provide the centers for development and institutionalization, they can certainly contribute to the conditions under which such changes can take place.

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BEYOND RATIONAL DETERRENCE:
The Struggle For New Conceptions

By JOHN STEINBRUNER

> . . . the truth that drives men mad must be sought for ere it's found, and it eludes the doltish or myopic hunter. But once 'tis caught and looked on . . . the captor's sole expedient is to force his will upon't ere it work his ruin! . . . One must needs make and seize his soul, and then cleave fast to 't, or go babbling in the corner; one must choose his gods and devils on the run, quill his own name upon the universe and declare, 'Tis I and the world stands such-a-way! One must *assert*, *assert*, *assert*, or go screaming mad. What other course remains?
>
> —*John Barth**

As major protagonist in a veritable epic of conflict, intrigue, and struggle for survival, John Barth's literary creation announces in the above words a method for coping and a philosophy for preserving sanity. The setting of the novel is the earliest days of the American colonies, but the theory propounded surely applies to modern times. Indeed, Henry Burlingame's outcry so illuminates one of the more subtle features of the great contemporary problem of survival—the control of nuclear energy—that it deserves serious reflection in that context.

For two decades and more, the threat of nuclear destruction has been carried in the dynamics of confrontation between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union. For that same period, some of the most active minds of our society have labored to impose some coherent theory on this threat which would render it comprehensible and manageable, which would provide a foothold for sanity. This effort has been substantially successful, as these things go. Nuclear strategy has been given a core logic revolving around the concept of deterrence. That logic has been related to the realities of technology and economics. A series of resulting concepts—assured destruction, counterforce, first strike, second strike, pre-emption, flexible response, stability, sufficiency, escalation, and so forth—have entered the public consciousness, have been intensely discussed in professional circles, and to some extent have affected the decisions of contemporary governments. Above all, though there has been serious and occasionally violent political conflict, nuclear war has not occurred.

* Henry Burlingame in *The Sot-Weed Factor* (New York: Bantam Books 1969) 373.

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As a result of this success, nuclear strategy has settled into a reasonably stable state and no longer seems to compel the intellectual effort it once did. The logic of deterrence has been established, and its most tractable derivations have been worked out. Though recognized as bald assumption and though plagued with internal paradox and unanswered questions, the theory has had no serious competition. Given this, most who concern themselves with the matter are willing to consider the foothold on sanity which deterrence strategy provides to be an adequate place to stand for the indefinite future. The miliary balance between the superpowers has evolved to a state of rough parity, at least moderately buttressed by recent agreements; besieged Western governments have many other problems to worry about. Though there are articulate dissenters, in the main the human spirit has adjusted to living against a background of potential terror, and general public opinion does not appear to be very alarmed by continuing weapons deployments. The entire topic has become established, familiar, middle-aged and—let us admit—rather boring.

Therein lies a major problem. Boredom, though it has its defenders, is surely premature. The enormity of potential disaster alone guarantees that, and the level of world conflict is such that the destructive power of deployed strategic forces cannot be taken casually. In principle, our society ought to spare no effort to drive understanding of the problem of nuclear defense to the very limits of human comprehension; but we are hardly doing that. Our knowledge is very uneven, and we have come to accept that. At great effort and expense we have developed at least partial understanding of the central technologies and their immediate implications—of nuclear warheads, aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missiles; of the physical effects of nuclear explosions; and of the basic economics of weapons production. We understand far less about the actual decision processes by means of which the weapons of the superpowers are designed, deployed, and controlled during moments of crisis—even though these decision processes are at the very core of the strategic problem.

This imbalance in understanding is not the result of simple oversight. In part it reflects the more advanced development of the natural sciences in our culture as a whole, and that itself presumably has something to do with the inherent structure and regularity of the physical world as opposed to social, political, and psychological events. But that is by no means the entire story. The imbalance also reflects the fact that technical matters and abstract economics are safely remote from the exercise of power. Knowledge can be developed in these areas

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without the threat of an immediate and direct impact on those who control the necessary resources. By comparison, the study of decision processes is far less neutral, and in all societies, including our own, it is far more constrained. In sum, rather than seriously promoting an ever developing, ever more penetrating analysis of the process of decision, we rely on a set of coherent but unavoidably simplistic assumptions which we now routinely assert much in the spirit of Barth's Henry Burlingame.

For all the importance of the topic, therefore, it is not easy to resist boredom, not easy to battle for new departures in strategic thinking. The odds are unfavorably stacked. Nonetheless, over the past decade conceptions of the decision process have developed which promise an alternative basis for analysis to that provided by rational formulations underlying the accepted theory of deterrence. These conceptions may already be used to introduce some new lines of argument into the continuing debate over strategy, force posture, and arms control. The new arguments are not likely to replace the more established analysis entirely—nor would that be desirable—but they do seem to offer healthy competition. Intellectual competition is a force against complacency and conceptual stagnation; it is a hedge against self-delusion and its consequences.

FAMILIAR ASSUMPTIONS

It is well known that the established strategy of deterrence in the United States is explicitly based upon the rational theory of decision. In its purest and most abstract conceptualization the strategic problem is presented as a game between two players each rationally calculating the expected pay-off of his actions across the range of possible consequences. The players are assumed to be fundamentally hostile toward each other, and therefore it is expected that each of them will act to minimize the damage that his opponent might do to him in the course of play. Deterrence consists in one player's threatening his opponent with such severe retaliation to attack (i.e., a large negative pay-off delivered with significant probability) that the rationally calculating opponent will always choose not to attack. Mutual deterrence exists when both players exercise such a threat against each other.

The use of rational decision theory to provide a basic conception of the strategic problem is natural, indeed virtually inevitable. That theory represents the clearest, most coherent, most developed conception of the decision process which is available at the moment. It is the theory with the most widely credited normative claim, and the one with the

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greatest intellectual acceptance within our culture.[1] Where else would we choose to place one of the most serious intellectual burdens of our time?

Unfortunately, however, rational decision theory remains highly abstract and remote from the actual events of human life. In order to apply the strategic logic derived from it to the actual problems of defense, it is necessary to adopt the truly heroic assumption that the behavior of very large modern governments—notably those of the United States and the Soviet Union—will approximate the behavior of rationally calculating individual players in the simple prototype game (or at least that it can be made to do so). No one is very comfortable with such an obviously questionable assumption, but in the absence of a compelling alternative it must be made. The core problem of nuclear strategy is thus defined as that of preventing war started by a deliberate, rationally calculated attack.

In tacit recognition of the extreme act of faith that is involved in such logic, force planners and political decision-makers in the United States have developed very conservative assumptions about what is required to achieve the conditions of deterrence. These decision-makers have insisted on stockpiling strategic forces in such numbers and with such technical capability that their ability to retaliate, after even the worst attack the enemy could conceivably undertake, cannot be seriously questioned. They insist, moreover, that the destruction that would

[1] Rational decision theory is fundamental to modern economic analysis and to the techniques of systems analysis which have been developed over the past 30 years. The influential work by Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum 1965), provides a textbook on the logic involved, as do Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961) and Thomas Schelling's *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960). Graham Allison, in *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company 1972), has documented the pervasive influence of rational assumptions while attacking their most simplistic embodiment in highly aggregated models of government behavior. This has stimulated a discussion regarding the degree to which political analysis should disaggregate governments—whether, for example, the Soviet Union is to be interpreted as a single, coherent entity or as a disaggregated collection of organizational units, different pressure groups, and differing individuals. It is now widely conceded that the degree of disaggregation does powerfully affect the character of political analysis, and that reasonable disaggregation is required to achieve adequate understanding of modern governments. Disaggregation does not change the fundamental character of rational logic, however. Even highly sophisticated models of bureaucratic and political behavior are generally built upon the assumption that constituent actors are driven by rational calculations of their institutional and personal interests.

The conceptions of the decision process under discussion in this paper have to do with basic theories that can be worked out at any level of aggregation. Very simple examples of rational analysis are used for illustrative purposes, but the same argument applies to the more sophisticated, more disaggregated forms.

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be visited on the opponent in retaliation approximate the maximum amount that could be achieved under any circumstances; and that that amount be estimated very cautiously—crediting only that damage which established knowledge renders both certain and calculable.[2] The planning calculations are made under such rigid criteria in order to make the desired conclusions compelling even for an opponent with only a very tenuous hold on rationality. The idea is to make the threat so stark and so obvious that it swamps all misperceptions arising, for example, from cultural differences, individual idiosyncracies, and the complexities of internal politics. This line of reasoning, in conjunction with the initial assumption that the strategic opponent is at least potentially hostile, has established conservative planning as a dominant principle of strategic decision making.

It is possible to rationalize the very large strategic forces deployed by the United States in terms of this logic of deterrence. The strategic forces which we have now programmed will have over 10,000 warheads in the latter part of this decade; these will represent the explosive power of 4000-5000 one-megaton bombs.[3] Conservative damage estimates indicate that one-tenth of this force actually exploded on urban-industrial targets in the Soviet Union would destroy *at least* 30 per cent of the population and 70 per cent of industrial capacity. Most observers feel that if the threat of destruction works at all, it will work at these levels.[4] Thus, if the United States force posture is interpreted in terms of strategic reason, it might be said that up to 90 per cent of these forces are deployed in service of the conservative planning principle as a hedge against errors in the rational decision process.[5] That translates into an average annual effort over the past decade of as much as 20 billion constant 1974 dollars, depending on the accounting assumptions applied.[6]

[2] Fred Iklé, in "Can Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 51 (January 1973), 267-85, discusses the conservative assumptions used in damage calculations.

[3] The aggregate measure in terms of equivalent megatonnage depends upon how the bomber force is counted. A frequently quoted public estimate can be found in the Brookings budget review: Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, *Setting National Priorities: The 1975 Budget* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution 1974), 111.

[4] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture*, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, pp. 8507 ff.

[5] 90% is obviously the high end of the range of possible estimates. It includes additional forces procured to insure that the residual force surviving a massive first strike —the most catastrophic failure of deterrence—would be of sufficient size to impose unacceptable damage.

[6] $20 billion is again the high end of the range of possible estimates. It is derived from calculations done by the Brookings Institution, which include a full accounting of

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The conservative planning principle, the extensive technical effort that stands behind it, and the continuing absence of general war have combined to bring a fundamental sense of confidence to nuclear strategy, and have enabled a broad consensus to form behind rational deterrence as the appropriate conceptual basis of defense policy. Over two decades and more, the central assumptions of this policy have been built into detailed force-planning calculations that structure decisions at virtually every level of the defense bureaucracy. In the process, these assumptions have gained the enormous policy momentum which only the set routine of very large organizations can impart. The intellectual and organizational position of the rational deterrence strategy could hardly be more firmly established.

That does not mean, however, that conceptual issues are all settled and that rational deterrence is merely a matter of implementing established logic. Quite the contrary. There are at least two internal paradoxes within the theory which have not found stable resolution. Each of these has called forth what might be called second-order applications of rational logic, and it is here that we encounter the sharpest issues of contemporary defense policy.

CONTINUING ANOMALIES

The unresolved problems of rational deterrence involve the issues of force size and design on one hand and force operations on the other. Though there tend to be significant interactions between these issues, the difficulties for rational theory are minimized if they are treated separately. The most recent development of strategic doctrine tends to emphasize this separation.

First, let us consider the problems of force size and design. If the conservative planning principle operates on both sides of the strategic confrontation, which is certainly the natural presumption, then—even under technologically stable conditions of mutual deterrence—there is no natural limit to strategic arms deployments. In fact, if both sides undertake a continuous search for qualitative improvements in their forces and otherwise hedge against the threat of the other (as again it is natural to expect), then a sequence of interactive deployments should occur which would drive both sides to higher levels of potential destruc-

direct costs and attribute a portion of administrative defense costs to the strategic forces. See Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles C. Schultze, and Nancy H. Teeter, *Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution 1973), 296. Official DoD budget figures, which do not include indirect costs and even exclude some categories of direct cost, have averaged under $10 billion per year for the strategic forces.

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tiveness. In brief, straightforward rational logic predicts some form of arms competition.

A number of specific models have been advanced to illustrate this effect mathematically. There has also been a reasonably extensive empirical discussion focused on the question as to whether or not the strategic deployments of the United States and the Soviet Union over the past thirty years actually reflect such a pattern.[7] Though the empirical discussion has been inconclusive, most strategic analysts have come to assume that there is an inherent tendency for the opposing strategic forces to interact upward. The prevention of that tendency has become a second-order strategic problem.

If force structure decisions are to be made under the principle of conservative planning, then the solution to increasing force deployments must involve a reasonably formal procedure by means of which both sides adopt symmetric constraints. The constraints, moreover, must be so specified and so protected that cheating is believably rendered difficult and unlikely. The United States has attempted, of course, to achieve such mutual constraints by engaging in formal strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The agreement of May 1972 represents a significant success, and the guidelines resulting from the Vladivostok summit conference represent a potentially significant further development. The fundamental problem nonetheless remains, for the mere fact of formal negotiations, of practical results, and of serious proposals for additional constraints does not contain the underlying dynamic. Both superpowers have continued very active force deployments following the 1972 treaty; the force ceilings announced in the Vladivostok guidelines leave ample scope for this process to continue. By what means, then, by what second-order strategy does one motivate the adversary to accept binding constraints?

An answer to this question, it appears, has been adduced by applying the central idea of the retaliatory threat to the ongoing negotiation process. Just as the rationally calculating adversary is to be deterred from attack by the threat of massive destruction in return, so the same

[7] Two recent articles by Albert Wohlstetter attack some of the more simplistic models of an arms race, and present data to indicate that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms competition, whatever its actual character, has not produced monotonic increases in some standard force measurements—e.g., budget levels, gross megatonnage, and equivalent megatonnage. See Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" *Foreign Policy* Nos. 15 and 16 (Summer and Fall 1974). When destructive capability is measured more directly, however, with qualitative improvements in accuracy and delivery-vehicle flexibility taken into account, it is clear that the capacity of both sides has increased monotonically; few would deny that there is some form of interaction between the opposing strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

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opponent is to be deterred from increasing his force deployments—and thereby motivated to accept agreement—by the threat of matching or even overmatching deployments. This secondary application of the logic is reflected in recent policy statements of the U.S. Government, which relate continuing strategic deployments by the United States directly to the Soviet Union's force deployments, and explicitly assert that "undesirable and unnecessary" deployments will be undertaken unless constraining, symmetrical agreements are reached. Lending substance to the threat is the fact that the current five-year defense program is quite aggressive, containing development programs for advanced designs of virtually every component of the strategic force plus such new strategic weapons as cruise missiles and terminally guided warheads. Though much of the basic policy is either being left to imagination or hidden in the classified record, it is fairly clear that more is involved here than is suggested by the ubiquitously used image of bargaining chips. The explicitly articulated connection between Soviet offensive missile deployment and programs to improve the performance of U.S. warheads against hard targets carries the implication that, in the absence of appropriate arms limitations, the United States will seek the capacity to destroy those parts of the Soviet force considered to be most objectionable.[8] The threat of retaliation, even preemption—in terms of weapons development and deployment—has become a major if not dominant element of the United States bargaining strategy.

The fact that the 1972 and 1974 agreements have followed the pursuit of this coercive bargaining strategy will undoubtedly strengthen its political status. As a conceptual matter, however, this secondary application of rational deterrence to the process of strategic bargaining is destined to be far more difficult and less widely accepted than primary deterrence. The threat is exercised not against the extreme and all but unprecedented action of a massive nuclear attack, but rather against the established, routine behavior of the opposing government. In order to accede to our demands the Soviets are not required to desist from doing something they have never done, but rather to contain the natural momentum of a very large research, development, and production process. They must stop an effort in which they have been engaged on a priority basis for over a decade. There is grave difficulty,

[8] The message is reasonably clearly conveyed in the 1974 Posture Statement, U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the FY 1975–79 Defense Program* [hereafter referred to as *Posture Statement*], March 4, 1974, p. 40 f.

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moreover, in controlling the threat. Even if the Soviets are motivated to accept truly binding constraints, the United States predictably will have trouble controlling the momentum of its own process of weapons acquisition. At the moment that process is not postured to operate on the contingent basis which the rational bargaining strategy requires.[9] In all, we must seriously contemplate the possible failure of the bargaining strategy and hence the possibility that the threat being used to control arms deployments will ultimately have precisely the opposite effect.

The second major internal problem is that rational deterrence strategy involves force operations—that is, the actual use of the strategic forces once they have been designed and procured. The established strategy of rational deterrence has long been plagued by the paradox that if deterrence should fail and war should begin (a possibility which cannot be entirely eliminated), then it would not be rational actually to carry out the threat of massive retaliation upon which deterrence is based. Once attacked, a rationally calculating player has nothing substantial to gain by massive retaliation. Even the inevitable desire for revenge must yield to more serious needs—notably the continuing necessity to exercise deterrence against any residual capacity of the opponent. Though it is assumed that strategic forces, in order to deter, must have a real *capacity* to retaliate massively, such retaliation is not at all what the rational calculator would undertake in the actual event of war. This twist to the logic is very bothersome under the principle of conservative planning. To the extent that carrying out the retaliatory threat is irrational, the entire strategy of deterrence is undermined, and conservative planning tends to magnify any such difficulty.

If simple, direct, and perfect rationality existed on both sides of the strategic confrontation, this paradox of the retaliatory threat would presumably lead to a pre-emptive counterforce attack by the first side truly understanding the conundrum. Adding irony to paradox, however, the presence of imperfection in the rational process prevents such a self-defeating conclusion. A realistic attacker could not be certain that his severely provoked victim could control the urge to retaliate; and as long as the capacity to retaliate exists, there is significant chance that it will be used. The threat that leaves something to chance

[9] This argument is developed in more detail in John Steinbruner and Barry Carter, "The Organizational Dimensions of the Strategic Posture: The Case for Reform," *Daedalus* (Summer 1975), 131-54; issued as Vol. 104, No. 3 of the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.*

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is sufficient to deter, Schelling persuasively argues, and that gives an adequate solution to the theoretical problem.[10]

This theoretical solution does entail some compromise of the conservative planning principle, however, and therefore does present some difficulty in actual strategic application. To be sure, few analysts believe this compromise threatens primary deterrence as long as there is symmetry in the assumptions being applied to both sides. A massive attack on urban-industrial targets still seems sufficiently likely to call forth a similar retaliatory response that mutual deterrence of such attacks is not seriously questioned. Conservative planning, nonetheless, does generate fears of assymetrical situations. Under conservative assumptions, limited attacks might not be deterred by the threat of disproportionate retaliatory response on urban-industrial targets.

This problem again requires a second-order application of rational theory supplemental to the basic strategy of rational deterrence. Such an application is under development, it appears, in the recently articulated doctrine of limited counterforce.[11]

For over a decade now the concept of counterforce response has been advanced as the basic answer to the paradox of the retaliatory threat. The doctrine requires that any actual retaliatory attack be conducted not against populated and industrial centers, as threatened in advance, but rather against the remaining military forces of the attacker—a response which delivers direct benefits and is therefore more credible. The well-rehearsed problem with this conception is that, under the conditions imposed by known technology, it tends to give strong impetus to additional arms deployments since it readily generates requirements for very large and/or extremely accurate strategic offensive forces which are specifically pegged to the opponent's deployments. The doctrine of limited counterforce offers a potential means of avoiding this defect by focusing exclusively on force operations, by tying the concept solely to the objective of deterrence, and by stressing the limited nature of the response envisaged.

In pure form, limited counterforce is a targeting policy that imposes no additional requirements on the size, design, or composition of the strategic forces. The forces required to implement the doctrine are automatically provided by the normal operation of conservative assumptions which produce forces far in excess of realistic requirements.

[10] Thomas C. Schelling (fn. 1).

[11] The term "limited counterforce" is applied to the currently articulated defense policy by Ted Greenwood and Michael Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 52 (July 1974), 761-80. The doctrine is officially articulated in the *Posture Statement* (fn. 8).

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Moreover, the doctrine entails no strategic objective beyond deterrence. Though the idea of counterforce has been associated in the past with additional objectives, such as limiting damage and achieving a military advantage, any meaningful contribution to such objectives does seem to require significant additional procurement, and thus does stimulate arms competition. By defining a retaliatory threat of sharply restricted character, limited counterforce allows proportionate response to low-level threats or attacks,[12] and thus presumably strengthens deterrence against such attacks. Since actual force-targeting plans have apparently not allowed for very limited retaliation against strictly military targets, the doctrine of limited counterforce promises a substantial improvement in the force posture and at least a partial answer to the inherent paradox of the retaliatory threat, without driving deployment levels upward.

As with the strategic bargaining strategy, however, limited counterforce is not destined to enjoy the broad support that the primary deterrence strategy has achieved. There are theoretical objections from those who feel that a doctrine which creates the capacity, organizational posture, and mental outlook required for a very limited, precisely controlled use of nuclear weapons will damage rather than bolster deterrence, will erode the stark barrier that guards the entrance to nuclear violence, and will increase rather than decrease the aggregate probability of war. There are practical objections as well from those who doubt whether the pure concept of limited counterforce can be implemented, whether even its conceptual evolution can be held to the rational interpretation just advanced. The United States has development programs for highly accurate warheads and a bargaining strategy that contemplates either qualitative or quantitative advances in the strategic forces in the absence of highly detailed, precisely symmetrical, and truly constraining agreements. It will be very difficult to avoid a connection between these programs and the counterforce doctrine—a connection made both in the mind of the adversary and in the domestic policies associated with weapons acquisition. If that natural connection is established, it will be extremely difficult to keep the counterforce doctrine strictly limited. At least in the current public record, the limits of the concept are not well enough defined to offer much resistance to the trend toward increasing strategic force capabilities.

[12] "Low" here is a relative term whose reference is the annihilating damage that modern nuclear arsenals could produce if fully utilized. It remains true that even a very limited nuclear attack would produce levels of damage properly judged enormous if compared to the standards of previous warfare. Nonetheless, the problem of deterrence persists as long as the strategic forces have not yet been used at full strength.

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Unfortunately, these secondary applications of rational logic—strategic bargaining and limited counterforce—are not merely matters of intellectual doubt and disagreement. The issues of strategic doctrine are strongly energized by the broader dynamics of weapons development and procurement. The United States and the Soviet Union over recent years have undertaken very extensive but asymmetrical developments of their strategic forces. The Soviet Union has increased the number of launchers and the overall throw-weight of its missile forces. The United States has increased the number of warheads that can be independently assigned to strategic targets. In addition, the United States has been making significant technical improvements in the overall accuracy of its missile forces and in the efficiency of weapons design.[13] Advances in both areas are expected of the Soviet forces as well, though probably on a schedule lagging significantly behind the American force. Even under the arms limitations now being projected to 1985 these trends can be expected to continue and to produce increasingly pessimistic calculations of the possible strategic exchange. In the United States at least, force planners are now seized with the possibility of the American land-based missile force becoming vulnerable to attack, and thus constituting both an unreliable component of the deterrent forces and a destabilizing one in crisis situations.

In sum, strong technical and organizational forces are pushing upward on the arms procurement cycle, and these forces threaten to carry strategic logic right along. The extent to which strategic policy can bring reasoned discipline to force deployments is a matter of considerable uncertainty, but strategic policy nonetheless represents a major point of human leverage which cannot be casually abandoned. The difficulties encountered by rational theory in application to second-order strategic problems are a matter of practical as well as theoretical concern.

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS

Rational decision theory, for all its sophistication, coherence, and utility, has always suffered from inherent implausibility. The calculations required of decision-makers in any extensive application of the

[13] The United States program and the relative force balances are discussed and estimated by Secretary Schlesinger in the 1974 *Posture Statement* (fn. 8). Increases in accuracy and in the explosive power which can be achieved by a weapon of given weight and size serve to increase the capability of conducting counterforce attacks against hardened land-based missile sites. Since both sides significantly rely on hardened land-based missiles for their retaliatory threat, such developments seem to jeopardize their primary deterrent posture—particularly under the principle of conservative planning.

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theory are readily demonstrated to be impossibly burdensome. One of the favorite examples is the game of chess, where the most direct rational solution would require an evaluation of the consequences of all possible moves and a selection of the best move at each point of choice. The number of possible move sequences is so enormous, however (larger by far than the number of atoms in the universe), that such a procedure is obviously impossible. In general, despite the traditional normative exhortation of rational theorists, it is clear that at best, real political decision-makers can achieve only the faintest approximation of the theory's requirements, and it is not likely that they do even that without unusual (and hence infrequent) effort.

Inspired by such arguments, some theorists have labored to explain how it is that decision-makers—having limited capacities and facing the staggering variety inherent in any serious decision problem—can nonetheless rapidly and reliably make basically successful decisions. All human beings in their daily lives constantly solve decision problems of great complexity; their very survival depends on it. If it is not plausible that they are constantly carrying out the calculations required by rational decision theory, then there must be another way of accomplishing equivalent results. By approaching the issue in this way, theorists in a number of related disciplines have gradually developed a coherent account of decision processes which are extremely simple but nonetheless very effective under the proper circumstances. This account differs sharply from central assumptions of rational decision theory and thus promises a competitive theoretical base for application to policy problems. It may be labeled "cybernetic theory of decision," to reflect the central role played by highly structured feedback cycles that confine the decision process within strict limits.[14] The limits have to do both with the information that the decision-maker attends to and with the range of response contemplated within any given time period.

Cybernetic decision theory is only very abstractly developed at the moment; its distinctiveness from rational theory is not widely acknowledged; and there is virtually no experience in applying it to serious problems of public policy. It thus competes under a severe handicap and we would be foolish to impose extravagant expectations upon it. Nonetheless the cybernetic theory does serve to illuminate some of the more troublesome underlying assumptions of rational theory, and it does inspire a set of practical propositions that challenge central tenets

[14] The logic of cybernetic decision theory and the distinction between that and the rational theory of decision is discussed in Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1974).

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of the rational deterrence strategy based on these underlying assumptions. This is a limited but important role.

What, then, are the distinctive characteristics of a cybernetic process? Perhaps the major point is that cybernetic theory defines the fundamental decision problem not as a matter of maximizing expected utility (or any loose approximation), but rather as a question of simplifying an incomprehensibly complex world. Because his central problem is that of achieving a workable simplification of his environment, the cybernetic decision-maker does not make probabilistic judgments and analytic evaluations of the consequences of his actions. He does not make elaborate outcome calculations at all. Rather, the cybernetic decision-maker performs a set of procedures under simulation of *very narrowly constrained* information input. The procedures do produce decisions that do in turn affect outcomes in the environment; in cases of successfully operating cybernetic processes the consequences return information on a feedback channel. The pure cybernetic decision-maker, however, can be and often is perfectly blind to all that. He perceives only the highly specific information input and the limited procedures he performs. Moreover, given a broad view of cybernetic logic set in contrast to specific assumptions of rational theory, it can be demonstrated that the cybernetic decision-maker does not resolve value conflicts; that is, that he does not seek to produce an optimally balanced return to competing objectives. Rather, the cybernetic decision-maker breaks such problems into separate decision processes and operates at any one time solely in terms of a single objective with a single expected outcome.[15]

In order to get some concrete sense of what these abstractions mean, let us consider that prototype strategic game known as "chicken." A famous form of that game consists in two players driving automobiles at 70 mph directly at each other down the center of an isolated road. An audience of peers looks on. The player who swerves off of the center line to avoid a head-on collision is labeled a chicken and suffers the contempt of his peers. Thomas Schelling has provided a solution to the game under rational assumptions.[16] He has pointed out that that player will win who first establishes an irreversible commitment to the center of the road—say, by throwing his steering wheel out of the window and climbing in the back seat. The other player then faces but two choices—a finite loss of honor or a certainty of death—and everyone knows how a rational calculator will solve that conflict of values.

[15] *Ibid.*, chaps. 3 and 4.

[16] Schelling (fn. 1).

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Under cybernetic assumptions the game readily generates a disaster. A pure prototype of the cybernetic decision-maker would assume from the start that the other player must yield to his resolve, and he would not observe his opponent's behavior at all as the cars approached each other. Rather, he would execute a pre-established program for driving down the center of the road and would notice only whether the line still ran between his wheels. There would be no resolution of the conflicting values—conscious or unconscious—until fate imposed one as an unintended result of his primitive calculations. The important point is that the cybernetic theory predicts tragedy not from any failure in rational calculation or execution, not from random error, but rather from the result of normally operating decision processes that are functional under most circumstances. It may be hard to imagine such a blind process actually operating in the starkly defined game of chicken, but real strategic confrontations usually occur under far more complex, more ambiguous situations. The cybernetic process is far more plausible under the decision-making burdens of complex environments.

The moral of the story is not that cybernetic processes necessarily produce strategic disaster, but rather that they work very differently from rational processes, and that under the same circumstances cybernetic and rational decision processes can produce very different outcomes.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

Strategic policy in the United States is sufficiently suffused with rational logic that there are many points at which the distinction between rational and cybernetic decision processes has interesting and potentially important implications. As illustrations we can consider the topics raised above—the principle of conservative planning, arms interactions, and force operations. Since these questions all revolve around difficulties in the rational deterrence strategy, they are of obvious significance.

Influential American strategists have long held to the opinion that stable deterrence is difficult to achieve, and that it depends very much on the fine details of the technical balance.[17] Under the principle of conservative planning, this line of argument has focused attention on the technical vulnerability of United States forces to a massive, calculated, optimally coordinated first strike. It has generally been assumed

[17] See Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-35, for an influential articulation of this argument.

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that the opponent's ability to conduct such an attack would be constrained (in the worst case) only by the number and technical characteristics of his forces.

If one uses cybernetic logic to understand the opponent, this argument comes under very serious doubt for a number of reasons. First, in even contemplating a first strike, a cybernetic decision process would not be very sensitive to fine details of the technical force balance. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons delivered in retaliation, even in modest numbers, is compelling enough to dominate the attention and behavior of cybernetic decision-makers under most circumstances, and even clearly demonstrable technical advantages would have very little effect on this basic result. To the extent that, in a cybernetic decision process, deterrence can be achieved at all by a retaliatory threat, it does not appear difficult to achieve under anything like the currently projected balance of technology and deployed weapons.

Second, the fully coordinated first strike that would minimize the victim's ability to retaliate would be *extremely* difficult to implement with even a strong advantage in strategic forces. Again, given anything like current force levels, it is very likely that a cybernetic decision process would itself impose the binding constraints—limiting the accuracy and the reliability of individual weapons and the overall coordination of a large force well below the best technically feasible levels, particularly under the conditions of extreme secrecy necessary to achieve strategic surprise. The simple reason is that such an attack succeeds or fails on the first attempt—allowing for little feedback and virtually no evolutionary learning process. Third, the circumstances under which a cybernetic process might not readily achieve deterrence by the retaliatory threat would not be much affected by the increased levels of threat or increased probabilities of response produced by conservative force planning. The power and significance of a cybernetic decision process lies in the fact that it frees the decision-maker from the potentially overwhelming burdens of elaborate outcome calculations. The cybernetic decision-maker in a crisis would not be sensitive to even quite broad differences in the level of retaliatory threat; he would utilize instead rather unrefined categorical judgments—either expecting retaliation or not expecting it, without giving much attention to distinguishing levels of retaliation. In general, under cybernetic assumptions the problem of a calculated, massive first strike looses its premier position as a strategic problem, and it appears unlikely that the principle of conservative planning and the large forces it generates actually do provide the protection they are meant to provide.

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But the doubts are more serious than that. The force posture logically generated by conservative planning—a posture with a great deal of excess retaliatory capacity in which forces are kept on high alert, particularly in times of crisis—is directly dangerous under cybernetic assumptions. These assumptions drive home the point that any large-scale decision process is inevitably disaggregated and that any coherent action depends upon the simultaneous operation of a number of routinized procedures. Each actor has a part to play, triggered by cues from other actors, almost none of whom have much discretionary power over their actions. The cybernetic theorist finds that the rigidities of such a process and the difficulties of controlling it are vastly underestimated in the established strategy. Though it is probably possible to achieve, by technical means, a high degree of centralized *negative* control—so that the strategic forces cannot operate without high-level authorization—the problems of positive control are much more formidable, particularly if the planners envisage flexibility in the use of forces. Under cybernetic assumptions the great problem of deterrence is that an attempt to use the strategic forces in any active way runs a grave risk of initiating an uncontrollable process leading to an imperfect implementation of an established war plan. Deterrence in a cybernetic process, in other words, is most likely to fail *not* as a result of a technical accident, an unauthorized action, or a cold-blooded calculation, but rather as an unintended and unexpected consequence of a limited strategic maneuver.[18] The chicken game described above is a simple prototype. Those who feel that that example is too bizarre to be helpful should find Barbara Tuchman's study of the outbreak of World War I ample stimulus to the imagination.[19] Under cybernetic assumptions the rigidities of the mobilization plans cannot simply be ascribed to stupidity on the part of their designers; they are inherent in the nature of large organizations, the complexity of the world, and the limits of the human mind.

The foregoing logic, then, brings doubt to bear on both of the secondary applications of the rational deterrence strategy—the limited counterforce doctrine and the theory of strategic bargaining.

The clearest and most immediate problem with the counterforce

[18] The word "escalation," which is often used to label this phenomenon, belongs to the rational tradition and in popular connotation does not convey the dynamic involved. Escalation frequently suggests a more or less consciously intended sequence of increasingly violent attacks meant to put pressure on the opponent for bargaining purposes. "Evolution" or even some appropriately grotesque construct such as "cybelation" would better suggest the unwitting process involved.

[19] *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan 1962).

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doctrine, under cybernetic assumptions, is the difficulty of setting limits. The rationally articulated idea of limited counterforce must be implemented by a sizable bureaucracy, contained largely within the United States Air Force, whose mission it is to identify strategic targets in the Soviet Union (and presumably elsewhere as well), and to make plans for attacking these targets. It is a demanding task full of technical complexity and its successful performance is a necessary condition for exercising any real strategic capability. Over the course of the nuclear era the United States has devoted large resources to the problem, and has created elaborate planning procedures that have been devoted primarily to the task of preparing for maximally damaging retaliatory attacks on the potential enemy. Though the entire area is shrouded (appropriately) in unusual secrecy, public knowledge suggests that the established target list has always been very large, that there is a great deal of redundancy in the targeting plans, and that regardless of governing doctrines, war plans have always included both civilian and military targets. That is, the United States has been planning truly massive responses.[20] The existence of a highly developed organization for exercising a massive retaliatory threat, supplied with large forces, will make it very difficult to redirect the effort to emphasize very small, precisely limited attacks. Perhaps the organization can be induced to create limited options, but it is quite another thing to make it behave in a limited way under fire or to accept the limitation on strategic forces ultimately implied.

Within the rational tradition, this problem of dealing with organizational inertia is treated as a detail of implementation, and is not usually raised at the level of fundamental policy formulation. So the United States Army and Tactical Air Forces, trained for the type of combat operations encountered in World War II and in Korea, were sent to Vietnam with the expectation that the adjustment to very different conditions would somehow be made. Under cybernetic assumptions the problem of adjustment appears to be much more fundamental; the effort required to accomplish it is judged to be much more extensive. The doctrine of limited counterforce appears to require such an adjustment.

Doubts may also be raised regarding perceptions of the opponent. As noted above, under established strategic assumptions the damage that the United States forces would do to the Soviet Union is conservatively estimated to protect against misperceptions that might weaken

[20] See, for example, Milton Leitenberg, "The Race to Oblivion," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, xxx (September 1974), 12 ff.

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deterrence. Under cybernetic assumptions, however, there is far greater worry about misperceptions in the other direction—the tendency to regard any nuclear attack as a mortal blow, however limited it might be. Cybernetic analysis seems to require a very expansive estimation of the damage to the enemy which limited counterforce attacks might produce, as well as a clear definition of a rather low secondary threshold of damage beyond which retaliation cannot be realistically considered to be limited because the opponent—with vast retaliatory power—would not see it so. (The primary threshold, of course, is the first use of nuclear weapons.) It is notoriously difficult to find a break in the continuum of violence once nuclear weapons are employed at all. Unless a clearly defined and widely acknowledged secondary threshold can be established at a very low level, however, limited counterforce does not appear to be a very workable doctrine under cybernetic assumptions. It seems more likely to provoke the enemy than to control him—like sticking needles in an enraged bull.

Finally there is the critical question as to whether the doctrine of limited counterforce, even if appropriately defined and implemented, would make the outbreak of war more likely. The application of cybernetic assumptions does not, of course, overcome the central problem that the most directly pertinent data cannot be gathered and that uncertainty on this question is therefore acute. If all else remains the same, however—the size of the strategic forces, the established assumptions of strategic logic, and particularly the theory of coercive bargaining—then cybernetic analysis yields a very strong suspicion that creating limited options will indeed make their use more likely. That argument does not translate by any means into endorsement of a targeting policy exclusively focused on urban-industrial retaliation, but it does identify a very serious problem that cannot be wished away.

Cybernetic analysis also presents doubts as to the validity of the bargaining strategy that appears to underlie the current United States approach to strategic arms limitation. If the U.S. is indeed relying on the threat of counter-deployments and ultimately even of missile silo-targeting to induce Soviet agreement to serious constraints on strategic forces, then the cybernetic theory of decision contains a sharp warning. The central point is that a cybernetic decision process does not directly balance conflicting objectives. When presented with actual conflicts between objectives, cybernetic decision-makers tend to perceive two problems and to oscillate between single-minded pursuit of each of the two conflicting objectives.[21] The bargaining strategy seems to depend on

[21] Steinbruner (fn. 14), chap. 4.

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a rational balancing of such conflicts, however, in that the essence of the threat is to attach a predictably negative consequence to an otherwise positively valued course of action in hopes of inducing the desired decision to stop procuring particular weapons. A threat exercised against a cybernetic decision-maker is likely to become a separate issue in itself and is likely to induce a counter-threat; it is not likely to produce the immediate response desired.

At the very least, cybernetic analysis suggests that there is a critical question of timing. It may be possible to induce a strategic opponent to accept the rational construction that the bargaining strategy requires, but cybernetic analysis suggests that that is not the natural pattern and is likely to require time and patience. To attempt to work the bargaining strategy either too quickly or too harshly is likely to overload the politics of the opponent.

The same analysis applies to the doctrine of limited counterforce. It remains implicit in the concept that limited retaliation would serve the purpose of coercing the opponent to accept some trade-off problem in the desired fashion before the cycle of violence reaches the levels of enormous destruction that nuclear weapons can produce. Cybernetic analysis raises the question whether the decision process on either side would work in the required fashion.

PRINCIPLES

What then is to be done? Cybernetic analysis suggests that decision processes on both sides of the strategic confrontation are coherent and basically functional, but far more primitive than normally assumed. To the extent that it is credited, that analysis bodes serious trouble for current strategic policies. We cannot leap directly to counsel a drastic change in the established strategy, however. Cybernetic analysis is neither sufficiently developed nor sufficiently accepted to carry that degree of responsibility or impact. In a more modest spirit, therefore, let us set forth some principles that can be applied to specific decisions of force posture, and that would give some effect to cybernetic arguments without presuming any radical shift in basic defense policy.

The major principle is that the United States should hedge against instabilities in the strategic balance primarily with a broad-ranging research and development effort, and *not* by means of offensive force deployments. Though the U.S. is undertaking a substantial R&D effort at the moment, the focus, the balance, and the organizational posture of that effort are not what the principle requires. The current research

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and development effort is too narrow, too much tied to anticipated procurement of specific weapons projects, and too dominantly focused on offensive capability. An R&D effort used as a strategic hedge would undertake more long-term developments independent of anticipated procurement, would develop competing technologies to the prototype stage, and would give greater emphasis than now is the case to defense—particularly the protection of strategic forces. The central purpose of such an effort would be a broad, protective accumulation both of basic knowledge and of developed technology, and this would provide a base for wide choice and rapid response should a truly serious challenge to the strategic balance actually develop. The R&D would be so organized that even very successful technical developments could be held short of deployment in the absence of gross strategic imbalances.

As a corollary to the strategy of hedging with developed technical capability and not with actual force deployments, the United States should be prepared to tolerate, if necessary, substantial disparities in static force characteristics as long as it maintains undeniable deterrent capability. The Vladivostok guidelines give the Soviet Union an inherent advantage in missile throw-weight which can ultimately be translated into an advantage in independently targetable warheads. Concern has arisen that this will render the American land-based missile force relatively more vulnerable to attack, and that this realization will lead to a political disadvantage in dealing with the Soviet Union and other nations on the many issues of the times. It would be desirable of course if force disparities of this sort could be avoided—either by unilateral forebearance or by additional agreements—but even if disparities should occur, the U.S. should not rush to match the Soviet forces as it has threatened to do. Such simplistic force matching is an inherent tendency of interacting cybernetic decision processes, and it is very much in the interest of the United States to control this phenomenon. The American ability to threaten massive retaliation and actually to conduct limited counterforce response is not very sensitive to substantial force disparities; the hypothetical political effects of these disparities range from very speculative to highly implausible. At very least, the United States should delay response to Soviet deployments rather than anticipating them, thus using the flexibility allowed by the impressive technical advantage in accuracy and multiple-targeting capability which has been achieved and will be maintained well into the next decade.

A third principle is that the United States should be extremely cau-

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tious about the interaction between technical capabilities and human decision processes. Since both formal knowledge and practical experience is far more developed on the technical side, there is continuous danger that technical analysis will dominate force planning and lead to very serious miscalculations. This problem is perhaps most acute in dealing with the issues of force targeting and the use of highly accurate missile delivery systems.

It is obvious that the rapidly developing technical ability of the U.S. to attack selected military targets with accurate, low-yield weapons offers significant strategic advantages in terms of the established strategy. This trend can be expected to make the doctrine of *limited* counterforce retaliation technically feasible, and thus to diminish a major anomaly of the rational deterrence posture. It cannot be emphasized too strongly, however, that the validity of the doctrine and the utility of the weapons designed to implement it critically depend upon the response of a human decision process. Limited counterforce attacks would cause pain and injury to an opponent, but they would not cripple him. They would leave him with substantial capacity to retaliate. If a strategy of threatening or actually conducting such attacks is to succeed in controlling the terror of nuclear war, then it must induce the opponent to accept some political accommodation. The United States must recognize that the question as to whether reasonable accommodation can be brought about by limited nuclear attack or the threat of it is a matter of the greatest uncertainty. The weight of historical experience seems to suggest the contrary: that violence once begun is not readily terminated. The third principle implies, then, that those arguing the merits of limited counterforce, the broad political effects of the strategic balance, and the necessity of additional force deployments for either purpose should bear the burden of proof. That requirement cannot be met by a simple appeal to the rational theory of deterrence or by unanalyzed judgments regarding the effects of coercive bargaining.

In aggregate, these principles lead to a working proposition; namely, that at the moment and for the foreseeable future the United States has already programmed for deployment all the strategic offensive capability which it is desirable to have. It must be conceded that the progress of formal strategic arms limitation is disappointing in many respects and that leeway exists for very provocative Soviet arms deployments. Precisely for these reasons, however, the U.S. must concern itself with the problems of achieving restraint and reason in its own force posture. The problems that should command priority attention involve the

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internal management of weapons systems—their design, development, procurement, and operation—and the integration of military capability with international political purposes. The nation's defense in the coming years will depend far more on these things than on additional deployment of strategic weapons.

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SOLDIERS AS TRADITIONALIZERS: Military Rule and the Re-Africanization of Africa

By ALI A. MAZRUI

AN earlier generation of political scientists working on Africa tended to draw conclusions from their work in West Africa about black Africa as a whole. Much of what occurred in West Africa was regarded as an indication of likely trends elsewhere in the continent. Such predictions were sometimes vindicated. The growth of modern nationalism in West Africa from the 1930's onward did spread to other parts of Africa. The emergence of one-party systems in West Africa found imitators within a few years in other African countries. Even the application of a particular analytic concept to a West African situation—like David E. Apter's analysis of Kwame Nkrumah as a "charismatic leader"—soon led to a dubious scramble to identify other "charismatic" figures in Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, and elsewhere.[1]

If on at least some matters West Africa once provided evidence of likely trends elsewhere in the continent, is it possible that East Africa's experience in other domains can now be similarly assessed as an indicator for the rest of the continent? Are there aspects of recent East African history which should raise questions about likely trends in other African regions?

What is at stake to some degree is the *methodology of hypothesizing*, perhaps as part of the methodology of research. Would it be fruitful to frame a hypothesis for testing in Gabon or Niger on the basic conclusions drawn from research in Uganda? As a *comparative Africanist*, I am of the opinion that comparative politics as a whole means nothing if it does not include readiness to use evidence from one part of Africa as potential material for formulating Africa-wide hypotheses. It will then be up to other researchers to test some of these hypotheses against empirical findings elsewhere in the continent.

The recent behavior and policies of a number of military regimes in

[1] Influential works of that period include James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (June 1954); Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1958); David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955); Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1960); and Martin Kilson, "Authoritarian and Single-Party Tendencies in African Politics," *World Politics*, XV (January 1963), 262-94.

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Africa have raised new questions about the role of the military in the dialectic between tradition and modernity. My own most concentrated research on this subject has focussed on Uganda, but the Ugandan experience raises wider questions which other researchers elsewhere may wish to pursue further. That is so particularly when we allow for the possibility that the Ugandan experience may be less unusual than the personality of Idi Amin may at first give us to understand.

If Field Marshal Idi Amin of Uganda is indeed as "atavistic" as he seems to be, can he also be a modernizer? Is the cultural nationalism of General Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire developmental or retrograde? Is General Bokassa of the Central African Republic an incongruous warrior in the wrong century? Is Colonel Qaddafy of Libya anachronistic? Before we grapple with these issues, let us return to an older generalization.

An Older Hypothesis: Soldiers as Modernizers

During the 1960's, social scientists increasingly expressed the belief that the armed forces were agents of modernization. An early convert to this view was Lucian W. Pye, who drew a legitimate distinction between the army as a modern organization and the army as a modernizing force. He conceded that the status of the army as a modern organization was clearer than its modernizing impact on the rest of the society. He saw the military establishment as something that came "as close as any human organization can to the ideal type of an industrialized and secularized enterprise." Most of the colonial armies were based on Western military technology, and had used the World War II type of army as their model, utilizing a form of organization peculiar to a highly industrialized civilization. The need for discipline within the armed forces, the necessity for them to relate means to ends, the need for technical skills and coordination of effort, all converted the military establishment into a modern organization.

The question that arose was whether it was also a modernizing agent, helping to change the rest of the society away from traditionalist preconceptions and toward a pattern of behavior more characteristic of modern societies. On balance, Pye was optimistic about the modernizing capabilities of the armed forces in developing countries.[2]

This approach to the study of the military was applied more directly to African situations by a number of scholars, and continued to influ-

[2] Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962), 80-89.

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ence scholarly assessments of the impact of the military on African societies right into the 1970's. Ernest W. Lefever put the point of view at its most extravagant when he asserted:

> African armies tend to be the most detribalized, westernized, modernized, integrated, and cohesive institutions in their respective States. The army is usually the most disciplined agency in the State. It often enjoys a greater sense of national identity than other institutions. In technical skills, including the capacity to coerce and to communicate, the army is the most effective agency in the country. . . . A more vivid symbol of sovereignty than the flag, the constitution, or the parliament, the army often evokes more popular sentiment than a political leader.[3]

But voices of dissent concerning the developmental capability of the armed forces have increasingly been heard. Sometimes these voices distinguish between modernization and political development. The same scholars might concede that the soldiers were indeed agents for modernization without necessarily accepting that they therefore contributed toward the political development of their societies. This Huntingtonian distinction between modernization and political development has been quite influential. Modernization has been viewed as the complex process of social and economic change caused by and manifested in the growth of new towns and cities, the spread of mass education, the extension of mass communication, and the process of industrialization. Political development, on the other hand, is seen as the process by which a society acquires an institutional capability to handle the political and social pressures that are generated by the process of modernization.

It is conceivable that the military can play a critical economic role which speeds up industrialization and accelerates urbanization. There have been military regimes which, because they were less socialist-oriented than the civilian governments they overthrew, and because they were more concerned with bread-and-butter issues than with long-term ideological formulations, have performed better, in economic terms, than their predecessors. The strengthening of new links with the Western world, greater encouragement of investment, and greater promotion of indigenous enterprise have in such cases helped to ac-

[3] Lefever, *Spear and Sceptre: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa* (Washington: The Brookings Institution 1970), 21. For a prophetically more cautious approach, see Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964). For further comparative purposes, see Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics*, XII (October 1960), 19-44; and Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963), esp. 251-80.

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celerate both urbanization and industrialization. In this special sense, such regimes may be deemed to have contributed to the modernization process. And yet, if part of the effect of these changes is to make the construction of viable and legitimate political institutions more difficult than ever, and to create the potentiality of social and economic restlessness on a wide scale, it could be inferred that the modernizing impact of the military is not necessarily in the direction of consolidating political development.

But even on the modernizing front, some scholars have questioned whether the military have indeed been more effective than their civilian counterparts in developing countries. In the words of Claude E. Welch:

> It is clear that the armed forces have not fulfilled the predictions of some social scientists, put forward during the early 1960's, that their organization, modernity and nationalism would make them the leaders of the modernization process in their countries. On the other hand, their performance as rulers in this regard has possibly not been much worse than that which might have been achieved by the available civilian alternatives.[4]

Across the Atlantic, J. M. Lee was skeptical even earlier about the modernizing effect of military rule. He did not see African armies as being necessarily motivated by a desire to provide efficient administration. "There is little evidence to indicate that African armies make better instruments of 'modernization' than their civil servant counterparts. Indeed, all the organizations of the State appear to face a common threat of problems."[5]

My purpose in this essay is to take the discussion even further. I propose neither to assert the modernizing impact of the armed forces, nor to contend that the armed forces are no different, from that point of view, from their civilian counterparts. There is a third area of investigation that needs to be undertaken with special regard to the African military. That area is defined by the following questions: Are African soldiers agents for retraditionalization? Are they carriers of

[4] See Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press 1974), 256. Welch has pointed out elsewhere that the "modern" organizational characteristics of the armed forces could readily break down after the army has captured power. In short, "coup leaders face the same difficulties over which their civilian predecessors stumbled —without necessarily benefiting from greater advantages." Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1970), 59.

[5] J. M. Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order* (London: Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies 1969), 184.

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values that may contribute to a partial resurrection of indigenous political cultures? Are African soliders agents for the grand process of the re-Africanization of Africa at a new level?

As I have indicated, most of my own field work has been in East Africa—sometimes as a participant observer in national politics—especially in Uganda. My findings indicate that there may indeed be a traditionalizing role for military rulers in Africa. This proposition is not inconsistent with the assertion that there may also be a concurrent and paradoxical modernizing role. In situations of cultural and institutional fluidity, the impact of the soldiers could be multivariant and might carry significant sociological contradictions. My position is that I do not know as yet whether or not African soldiers are better modernizers than African politicians; but there is increasing evidence to suggest that they may be greater traditionalizers than their old civilian counterparts. It is possible that the modernizing records of politicians and soldiers may be evenly balanced, while the contradictory but concurrent record of renewing faith in certain aspects of traditional culture remains one which gives greater weight to the performance of the men in uniform.

Western commentators who have often discerned a conservative streak in "the military mind" in their own societies have at times chosen to ignore it when analyzing the role of the armed forces in developing countries.

I shall first address myself to the theme of conservatism as it relates to the behavior of African soldiers in situations of culture conflicts and normative fluidity. Next, I shall examine the degree to which "retribalization" under military rule in African countries is an aspect of retraditionalization. I shall then relate the foregoing to the rural origins of African soldiers and the relevance of these origins to the resurrection of certain aspects of indigenous political cultures. Finally, I propose to relate this whole discussion to the distinction between political development and political decolonization and the manner in which they are affected by the dialectic between westernization and African cultural nationalism.

Political Conservatism and Social Tradition

What happens when a military establishment, based on Western organizational concepts and conditioned by a Western approach to military professionalism, seeks to operate in the culturally different conditions of African societies? Certainly the military profession in its mod-

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ern forms in African countries has overwhelmingly borne the stamp of the metropolitan power. In Uganda the organization of the armed forces was solidly patterned upon the British model. The whole military ritual, including the pattern of drill, the categories and terminology of ranks, and the very music of the armed forces, all remained defiantly British in tone and style. Occasions of military ceremony, ranging from the funeral of a former president to the celebration of independence, from the commemoration of a military event to preparation for combat, still retain their ancestral connection with the metropolitan power.

The upholding of these rituals and British traditions could be seen as a form of conservatism. But clearly, in relation to the values of African societies, such exercises in Anglocentric militarism are by definition a departure from the indigenous normative order rather than an exercise in its conservation.

It was Edward Shils who captured in an early essay an important distinction with regard to the new military establishment in the developing countries. The military establishment, to the extent to which it was derived from Western models, was by definition nontraditional. But that did not prevent the sympathies of soldiers from being in favor of local traditions. The military establishment may be a modern organization, but the attitude of the soldiers to the wider society is probably more deeply conditioned by traditionalist sympathies than by the modern characteristics of their particular profession. As Shils put it:

> Military organization has little to do with the structure of traditional society, from which it is set off by its technology, most of its ethos, its organization, and its training—all of which are either imported or follow foreign models. . . . Yet it probably remains a fact that the military have a feeling of sympathy for tradition, not only for their own military tradition but for the traditional style of society as well. Hierarchic dignity, respect for superiors, solicitude for subordinates, solidarity, and conventionality produce in professional soldiers an attachment to the same phenomena in civilian society. Their humble origins and their separation from urbane pleasures and indulgences sustain this sympathy.[6]

In a situation where the soldiers are recruited from among the least westernized of former colonial subjects—at times directly from the narrow world of villagers and their simple beliefs—this distinction between the military establishment as a modern organization and the individual

[6] Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in Johnson (fn. 2), 31. Also see Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago and New York: Aldine Atherton 1971).

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soldier as a traditionalist could have considerable dialectical implications.

Western analysts who have been concerned with "the military mind" have at times attributed the "scientificity" of military organization to the mind of the military man. In the formulation of Samuel Huntington, "Military and civilian writers generally seem to agree that the military mind is disciplined, rigid, logical, scientific. . . ."[7]

Even if it were true that the military mind in the West was "logical and scientific"—Huntington himself is not absolutely sure—the field is still open for a Field Marshal Idi Amin in Uganda or a General Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire to be "intuitive and even superstitious."

What is more likely is that the military establishments these leaders have inherited from the colonial experience may indeed be scientific with regard to technology and logical with regard to systems of coordination, while the individual men in uniform remain relatively steeped in primordial beliefs and traditionalist tendencies. The military as an organization might in part be a carrier of scientificity, while the soldiers remain carriers of more primordial habits.

For as long as an African army is subordinate to civilian authority, and is consulted mainly on issues concerning security and the interests of the military organization, the impact of the traditionalism of individual soldiers on policy making may be negligible. On the contrary, it may conceivably be the "scientificity" of the military organization that remains of most direct relevance to the society in a situation of civilian supremacy. The soldiers may be ordered to participate in nation-building and civic activities, and they may thus possibly have a demonstration effect in terms of coordination and discipline on at least sections of the wider society. What this means is that, in a situation where the soldiers have not as yet intervened and captured power, it is at most their "scientific and logical" ethos which reveals itself to the wider public.

But upon assumption of ultimate power, and the initiation of policy making on a wide range of issues, do the more primordial aspects of their normative orientation acquire both greater salience and a greater impact on policy? The record in Africa so far is mixed, but experience in Eastern Africa suggests a trend toward selective retraditionalization.

The foregoing is clearly related to the rural origins of most African soldiers, and it is to this aspect that we must now turn.

[7] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1967), 60.

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Turning Ploughshares into Swords

Other scholars as well as I have drawn attention to the tendency of armies in developing countries to recruit from some of the least privileged sectors of the population. As the colonial presence consolidated itself, and new classes and social ranks began to emerge, there was a decline in the prestige of martial qualities.

The old days when warriorhood was a high-status occupation in many East African societies have receded into history. In some indigenous political systems the warrior stage was inseparable from the status of adulthood. Some societies linked the status to circumcision ceremonies; others invoked alternative methods of initiation. The moment of initiation marked a boy's transition "from the culturally disvalued role of a boy . . . to the culturally valued role of the warrior."[8]

But three processes contributed to the decline of the warrior tradition under European colonial rule. One process was connected with the discouragement of that tradition by both colonial administrators and Christian missionaries in East Africa. The colonial administrators had a vested interest in discouraging warriorhood for obvious reasons: the desire to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force in their colonies and to protect the stability of the colonial order. The Christian missionaries discouraged warriorhood partly because of a presumed inconsistency with Christian love, and partly because it was associated with the "heathen cultures" which the Christian gospel was out to eliminate.

A second process that helped to reduce the prestige of the warrior tradition concerned the intellectualization of African political culture under the impact of a more literate civilization. In many East African societies, the coming of the written word, the establishment of missionary and state schools, and the rise of a white-collar class, all competed effectively against the old indigenous prestige of warriorhood, and pulled millions of young men toward classrooms, away from war dances in village compounds.

A third and related process concerned the economic diversification of East African societies. Many of these societies no longer felt that the ultimate economic roles for young people lay either in settled agriculture or in herding cattle. The additional opportunities of urban employment, work in the mines, jobs as domestic servants and farm

[8] Satish Saberwal, *The Traditional Political System of the Embu of Central Kenya* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House for Makerere Institute of Social Research 1970), 17.

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assistants, and the whole range of white-collar occupations were now available to those who had acquired some of the literary skills of the new metropolitan culture.

Against this background of new opportunities, the profession of a soldier, even in modern uniform and with guns rather than spears or bows and arrows, was now seldom at the top of the scale of preferences for ambitious young men. Those who could go to school and move on toward white-collar jobs normally preferred such prospects to being recruited into the army. The colonial armed forces therefore increasingly turned to the most disadvantaged sector of society for their soldiers.

There was a related factor which made colonial recruiting officers more inclined toward the least literate of their subjects for use in the armed forces. This was simply the conviction among many colonial administrators that illiterate or semi-literate East Africans made better soldiers than the better educated. The latter were sometimes distrusted as "cheeky" and not adequately inclined toward the level of obedience that the armed forces required. An illiterate tribesman could, it was assumed, be trusted to be more automatically obedient than the product of a secondary school.

The less educated Africans were in their general orientation and attitude more rural than the educated. Indeed, Western education in East African conditions was a process of psychological deruralization. The educated African became in a fundamental sense a rural misfit in his own village. His parents were often people who had made sacrifices to improve the career opportunities of their child. When he graduated from school, his parents did not expect him to continue living with them, tending the cattle, or cultivating the land. Many parents assumed that the whole purpose of education was occupational improvement. They were therefore inclined to regard any insistence on the part of their educated son to remain with them in their village as something approaching filial betrayal. If their son was going to remain in the rural areas, why had all those sacrifices been necessary? White-collar jobs in the villages were few and far between, and precisely because of that their son would become a misfit in rural society.

The illiterate or semi-literate village boy, on the other hand, retains a compatibility with his rural environment. And upon being recruited into the army, he takes into the armed forces many of the predispositions, attitudes, and even superstitions that are characteristic of the community from which he springs.

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It is true that once the young rustic is in the army, he becomes subject to certain westernizing influences. After all, as I have indicated, the army is still substantially organized on the basis of a Western model, utilizes Western military technology, and is partly influenced by Western military values. Lucian Pye compares the acculturative impact of military training with the acculturative influences involved in the urbanization process. On balance, Pye regards service in the army as a more potent influence for culture change within individuals than living in a city.

On this issue Pye is less than persuasive. The range of influences at work in urban centers, partly because of their very diffuseness, probably constitutes a more potent force for psychological reorientation than military training *per se*. That is so particularly when the urbanization process is combined with formal education in a Western type of school. The peasant boy who goes to the barracks and receives military training is primarily being inducted into new skills, and secondarily into new values. And even these new values are often limited to a small area of experience, the values of combat and military coordination, with a few derivative normative tendencies. Even after years of experience in the army, semi-literate or illiterate African soldiers are much further in their level of westernization from a secondary school graduate living in a city than Pye's assumptions imply. The urbanized secondary school graduate is simply more comprehensively, and perhaps even more deeply, acculturated than the peasant warrior in uniform in the barracks.[9]

As for secondary-school graduates who enter the armed forces and later receive additional training, these are on balance at a lower level of normative westernization than civilian university graduates in Africa.

Many of the first waves of African rulers were in some sense products of the intellectualization of political culture in the colonies. A few of these leaders, including such figures as Kwame Nkrumah and Milton Obote, were basically intellectuals in their capacity to be fascinated by ideas and in their ability to handle some of those ideas effectively. Some of the soldiers who have replaced them bear a more modest impact of Western intellectualization than they did.

From the point of view of the immediate risks to rational policy making and the utilization of careful intellectual criteria in determining policy choices, the fact that most military leaders are less intellectual than their civilian predecessors may have a political cost. On the other

[9] Pye (fn. 2), 81-83.

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hand, from the point of view of the long-term reduction of intellectual dependency in Africa and the partial resurrection of indigenous cultural ways, the soldiers may prove to be greater agents for the re-Africanization of Africa than their civilian predecessors.

Scholars like Aristide R. Zolberg have therefore been mistaken in their refusal to recognize any significant differences between military and civilian rulers in African conditions. "As a category, the military governors of Africa are unlikely to rule better, or more justly, or more effectively than their civilian predecessors. Beneath their uniforms, the Gowons, Lamizanas, Bokassas, and Mobutus are men with the same range of virtues and vices, wisdom and foolishness as the Balewas, Olympios, Yameogos, and Nkrumahs they replaced."[10]

In fact, the range of vices and virtues has not been identical. On balance, the level of political brutality and violent sanctions against offenders has been higher under military rule in countries like the Central African Republic, Uganda, and in a special sense even Nigeria. The invocation of physical force has tended to increase in such countries. It is therefore not clear why we should not regard it as a moral cost when men specialized in a profession of violence and combat assume supreme authority. On the other hand, the potential influence of the soldiers on the process of re-Africanizing African political culture might be regarded as a moral benefit. What is important is to stop the easy equation of relatively less educated soldiers with relatively westernized African intellectuals in power. Idi Amin of Uganda is simply not Milton Obote, nor is Achiempong of Ghana either Busia or Nkrumah.

In the struggle to give aspects of African culture greater respectability, young Africans themselves may have to start with the most ambitious of the tasks—the struggle to conquer African self-contempt. That in turn requires the growing toleration of some of the least respected, in Western terms, of those aspects of indigenous culture. If an East African intellectual can begin to concede dignity to the physical nakedness of the Karamajong men, or to the use of red ochre on the skin of the Masai, or to the invocation of supernatural forces to help determine an election, that African intellectual is on his way to transcending his own cultural self-contempt.

Some of the soldiers in power provide precisely that kind of challenge to the new generation of westernized and semi-westernized Africans.

Field Marshal Idi Amin has been a particularly severe test for large

[10] Zolberg, "The Military Decade in Africa," *World Politics*, XXV (January 1973), 319.

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numbers of African intellectuals. Many seem to have been more ashamed of Amin's "superstitions" than of his political brutality, more worried by Amin's distance from normal Western diplomatic style than by how many Ugandans he has detained or eliminated, and even more ashamed of Amin's "brazen polygamy" than of his political arbitrariness.

David Martin, in his book on President Amin, draws attention to the prevalent nature of witchcraft and sorcery among Africans in different parts of the continent. Martin also reminds us that it is not unusual to find "highly educated Africans visiting witch-doctors" in a bid to ensure promotion to better jobs. But, according to Martin, Amin has "taken his belief in occult powers to a ridiculous extent." He refers to a Zambian seer, Dr. Ngombe Francis, who claimed to have predicted the overthrow of President Milton Obote. After the coup, the Zambian prospered significantly and became Amin's soothsayer and prophet. There was also the Ghanaian mystic who professed to have power to raise people from the dead. The mystic was flown to Uganda, and Amin later asserted that he had had an opportunity to talk to a man who had indeed risen from the dead. As for Amin's innumerable dreams, these have ranged from a dream about when precisely he would die to his assertion that God had told him in a dream to expel the Asians from Uganda and launch a national economic war.

Martin, a westerner, regards Amin's beliefs in occult powers as "ridiculous." It would be illuminating, were it possible, to find out how many of the less educated and less westernized Ugandans share Martin's views on the matter. It is conceivable that every time Amin has proclaimed a major dream, it has at most been Ugandan intellectuals that have laughed secretly. Some of the other Ugandans might dispute the validity or authenticity of this or that particular dream, but probably the majority would not dispute the proposition that some dreams are intended to be guides for action, and that supernatural forces might at times be in communion with a leader.[11]

But is it good for political culture in East Africa to have such beliefs resurrected? Would it add to the viability of East African political systems to invoke occult powers for policy making?

As a westernized or semi-westernized African intellectual, I have strong reservations about some of Field Marshal Amin's political "superstitions." One may argue that such beliefs from Africa's indigenous heritage deserve to die quietly, just as similar beliefs have died in most

[11] Martin, *General Amin* (London: Faber and Faber 1974), 16.

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parts of Europe. And yet, the very "ridiculousness" of the nature of such beliefs to westernized African intellectuals provides a challenge to their own cultural self-contempt, and should at the least increase their sympathy and understanding for many of their rural compatriots.

John Plamenatz, the late political philosopher, once asserted, "The vices of the strong acquire some of the prestige of strength."[12] As the rustic soldiers acquire power, and demonstrate their political strength, perhaps some of the prestige of that strength will rub off on the peasant warriors' cultural "weaknesses."

The current generation of adult westernized African intellectuals may never be able to transcend their cultural self-contempt completely, but the next generation of educated Africans may acquire from their military rulers the capacity to understand and sympathize with certain aspects of the culture of the villages. Some of the beliefs in occult powers may die a natural death before long, but when African intellectuals have learned to respect these, they will have learned to respect other aspects of African culture as well.

Re-Africanization of Africa and Militarized Ethnicity

A related issue connected with the traditionalizing impact of the military on African societies concerns the whole issue of ethnic affiliation and loyalty. Does military rule aggravate or mitigate ethnic resurgence? How much "retribalization" takes place under the pressures of a politicized army? Again we must examine East Africa partly with a view to assessing similar trends elsewhere in the continent.

The colonial authorities in East Africa sometimes avoided certain communities in recruiting for the armed forces. The exclusion of such communities may have been motivated by considerations which ranged from the imperial calculation that some communities, when equipped with arms, might create problems for the colonial order, to a presumption that in certain communities the men did not have either the valor or the physique to make good soldiers.

Persistent in the imperial mentality was the simple assumption that martial prowess was ethnically distributed. Some tribes were simply better warriors than others.

In the course of World War II, a new attempt was made by the colonial powers in different parts of Africa to assess the martial qualities of different communities, partly with a view to determining priorities

[12] Plamenatz, *On Alien Rule and Self-Government* (London: Longmans, Green 1960).

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in recruitment for the imperial armies against Germany, Italy, and Japan. In East Africa some research was conducted in this direction. The Chief Native Commissioner of Kenya asked that a census be taken to determine "the soldierly qualities of the members of the various tribes composing the East African Force." The issue was referred to a conference of governors of the East African colony, and a questionnaire was worked out and sent to each commanding officer in 1941. "Each of the countries in East Africa was to furnish the Native Commissioner with names of tribes, giving provinces, districts. A similar survey, but a hasty one, had been carried out in 1932 'in order that opinions of K.A.R. Officers might be obtained with a view to deciding which tribes were likely to make the best soldiers.' "[13]

Tarsis Kabwegyere reminds us of the qualities which were looked for. They included adaptability, reaction to discipline, steadiness under bombing, stamina and staying power, powers of leadership, intelligence, esprit de corps, cleanliness and turnout, capacity for hard living, general health, ability to fraternize, and fighting qualities. There were in addition some special qualities and skills which were to be ascertained. Each ethnic group was assessed, and a system of scores for each was devised.[14]

But soldierly qualities had to be balanced against other considerations. Although in the early days of the colonial presence in Uganda, the Baganda were still regarded as a martial community, there was an understandable reluctance among colonial administrators to recruit disproportionately from the Baganda into the armed forces. The Baganda were already one of the best organized and most politically conscious communities of the country. The imperial power naturally hesitated on the issue of militarizing the Baganda by giving them a disproportionate presence in the imperial armed forces.

Both those who were excluded from the military and those who provided the bulk of the army were chosen substantially in terms of ethnic categories. This basis of recruitment was to have considerable repercussions in the relations between soldiers and civilians after independence.

The different communities and tribes themselves entertained stereotypes about each other, sometimes influenced by considerations about which community was capable of providing better soldiers. In Nigeria, the armed forces had recruited from both the north and the south; yet

[13] Cited by Tarsis B. Kabwegyere, *The Politics of State Formation: The Nature and Effects of Colonialism in Uganda* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau 1974), 115.
[14] *Ibid.*, 115-17.

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within the armed forces themselves ethnic stereotypes conditioned interaction between different sections and ranks in the army.

> Northern soldiers obeyed orders from Ibo officers, but there was a residual feeling in their minds that the Ibo were not really a martial race—they considered the Ibo people too articulate for warriors. "Maif ada ba zai yi surutu ba"—"The warrior is not talkative"—is a common Northern proverb; they regarded the martial qualities of the Easterners rather as the British other ranks regarded those of the Italian, or the Punjabi regarded those of the Bengali or the man from Madras.[15]

With this background of an ethnic basis for the recruitment of soldiers into the armed forces and the persistence of ethnic stereotypes, the composition of the military by the time of independence in many African countries carried all the potentialities of ethnic resurgence.

Some scholars have argued that colonialism did not simply create potential new national states; it also created the tribes themselves. Groups that never before considered themselves as a cohesive political community were converted into one by colonial methods of administration. Kabwegyere cites some examples, including that of the Acholi in Uganda who were later to be regarded as a particularly martial community and who provided a disproportionate number of soldiers for the Uganda Army in the days of Milton Obote.

> Present day Acholi is a result of an ordinance in 1937 which amalgamated both Chua to the East and Gulu to the West. . . . People in these two districts knew themselves more in terms of their clans, e.g., the Payira, Patiko, Padibe, etc., than in terms of a collective identity, the Acholi. The clans were the units for collective identity but not for collective action since clans were rarely occupants of a homogenous territory although they had a common culture . . . It was Barrell, the administrator in Gulu, who finally gave the amalgamated District the name Acholi. "I can think of no better name for the new District than the 'Acholi District'; there is no native name for the country as a whole. . . ."[16]

Administrative convenience in the colonial period thus helped to bring together clans that previously never engaged in collective action, or were subject to the same collective administrative authority, into a pattern of relationships which now created ethnic-wide political consciousness. The Acholi began to see themselves as an amalgamated community, although tensions between clans continued and divisions

[15] M. J. Dent, "The Military and Politics: A Study of the Relation between the Army and the Political Process in Nigeria," in Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, eds., *Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press 1971), 373.

[16] *Ibid.*, 43-45.

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between east Acholi and west Acholi have persisted. Idi Amin moved further toward dividing the east and the west once again, but what matters from the point of view of the colonial genesis of "tribalism" is the simple fact that a broad new Acholi political consciousness became superimposed over the narrower parochialisms of the sub-units of the Acholi.

By the time Obote was overthrown, the Acholi constituted the largest single group within the armed forces of Uganda, although in relation to the rest of the population they were clearly one of the smaller groups of Uganda. Between one-third and one-half of the Ugandan army consisted of Acholi. Their preponderance was an outcome partly of their categorization as a tribal unit in the colonial period, and partly of their presumed martial qualities.

Related to this second presumption was the simple fact of physical height. As an ethnic community, the Acholi and other northern tribes of Uganda had produced a disproportionate number of tall people. Since recruitment into the Uganda armed forces gave preference to candidates who were 5′ 8″ or over, the northern communities had the advantage because of their physical attributes. Among the northerners, the Acholi later expanded this edge through actual recruitment into the armed forces.

By the time Amin captured power from Obote, Amin was all too aware of the preponderance of the Acholi within the armed forces. Would they be loyal to the new regime under Amin, or would they maintain a prior loyalty to Milton Obote? Amin's reasoning in terms of which he determined potential allies was again couched in ethnic terms. He himself is a Kakwa, from a relatively small group in Uganda, which extends substantially across the border into the Sudan, with ethnic compatriots also across the border in Zaire.

In his early announcements as to why the coup took place, Amin asserted that the Acholi, in alliance with Obote's own tribe, the Langi, had plotted to disarm all other soldiers, and to assert a complete ethnic monopoly of military power in Uganda. Thus, tensions against these two communities started from the early days of Amin's assumption of power. Since then, thousands of Acholi and Langi have perished in the wake of Amin's political and military insecurity.

Almost continuously since he took over in 1971, issues of ethnicity have been profoundly interlinked with issues of domestic balance of power. In July 1974, the Acholi and the Langi were once again singled out by spokesmen of the Amin regime as plotters against the government. It was asserted that they were waiting for an invasion of pro-

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Obote refugees from Tanzania. The domestic Acholi and Langi would provide internal support while the refugees from across the border sought to undermine and then overthrow the government of Idi Amin. Many Acholi and Langi in Uganda decided to flee the country in the wake of these renewed accusations. Ethnicity in Uganda had again shown the ominous face of militarized revenge and brutality.

Among the Ugandans in exile in Tanzania, ethnic factors were also at play. Even when they plotted to invade the country and overthrow Idi Amin's government, the Ugandan exiles were sometimes torn by their own ethnic cleavages. The Langi were at times at variance with the Acholi; old traditions within each community affected their behavior. Just before they departed on their ill-starred venture against Amin in September 1972, the old soldiers in exile in Tanzania invoked an Acholi war dance and song, a ceremony of consolidating courage and inspiring confidence. Some of those who were to be joint fighters in the attempted invasions were irritated by the traditional Acholi war ceremonies in preparation for this collective enterprise. But the war dance and song, the invocation of Acholi martial symbolism, captured both the tensions of ethnicity and the resilience of indigenous traditions.[17]

But is the military situation more bedevilled by ethnic factors than a situation of civilian politics? The answer varies somewhat from one African country to another. To the extent that in most African countries recruitment into the armed forces has been more ethnically specialized than participation in civilian politics, the military situation has carried graver ethnic risks than the civilian political system. Certainly in Uganda, politics during the first eight years of independence was ethnically more representative than was access to military careers. Parliament, the Cabinet under Obote, and increasingly the civil service provided more of a cross-section of the different communities of Uganda than the armed forces ever did. The process of political mobility, in the sense of different regions and tribes having some access to effective political participation and representation at some level, was more real when political power depended on the interplay of civilian pressures than

[17] David Martin refers to the irritation of the younger exiles over the Acholi war dance and song in the preparation for the invasion of Uganda. Martin seems to suggest that it was the younger, modernized or westernized soldiers in exile who were particularly unhappy about such a ceremony. In fact, in addition to the reservations of the more modernized or westernized of the exiles, there were also reservations on the part of those who belonged to other ethnic communities. For Martin's allusion to this episode, consult *General Amin* (fn. 11), 189-90.

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when it came to depend upon the balance of ethnic factions within the armed forces.

In the latter situation, ethnic factors clearly present a greater potential explosiveness than in a situation of civilian contests of will. This is not to underestimate the tensions involved in politicized ethnicity. All I am trying to demonstrate is that militarized ethnicity, partly because of the selective nature of recruitment into the armed forces, has a higher potential for "retribalization" than polticized ethnicity.

Those who blame both tribalism and the creation of nation-states on colonialism do have a point; but what they often overlook is that tribalism may be an outcome of the creation of the nation-state. Regardless of whether British colonial authorities explicitly began to categorize the Acholi as one community, the Acholi would have begun to think of themselves as such as soon as they perceived the competition between various ethnic groups for the limited resources of a new territorial entity called Uganda. It was the exercise of bringing together divergent linguistic and cultural groups within the boundaries of a new state which generated new levels of ethnic consciousness. This ethnic consciousness was almost bound to be sharpened in the scramble for a share of what independent Uganda as a new political community had to offer to its constituent parts.

The attainment of independence did not redraw the boundaries of the new nation-state. The persistence of ethnic consciousness and ethnic identity therefore had to be related directly to the continuation of the national boundaries. In Uganda as elsewhere in Africa, it was not simply a case of the new nation-state lacking a transethnic identity and legitimacy of its own: It was a case of the very presence of such a nation-state lending legitimacy to the ethnic sub-units and strengthening parochial loyalties.

In some African countries under military rule, the extent of retribalization can for a while be disguised by the appearance of a firm political order with "iron discipline." But ethnic resurgence does take place as soon as the military grip begins to loosen, or when civilian rule is restored after a period of military control. Ghana under Kofi Busia witnessed a resurgence of ethnic particularism following the rule of the National Liberation Council. At best, a military regime succeeds in putting ethnic cleavages in a society in "cold storage." At worst, military rule, partly because of the pattern of recruitment into the armed forces and partly because of the nature of army rule itself, simply degenerates into eruptions of militarized ethnicity with periodic violent

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confrontations. This process of retribalization is indeed an aspect of retraditionalization, but with a heavy political cost.

The Cattle-Raid Complex under African Militarism

Why is the level of mutual brutalization in some African societies so high? Why does retribalization under military conditions carry such a heavy risk of killing and counter-killing? Again, East Africa's experience falls considerably short of being unique. Evidence of mutual brutalization is already available elsewhere in the continent.

One part of the answer is simply that the different ethnic groups in an African country are not always ready to regard each other as anything other than rival "nations" next door. An African country becomes a kind of international system in miniature, with ethnic groups behaving in part as if they were autonomous little states in their own right, competing for scarce resources. Unlike the broader international community, an African country normally does have a government in power; but even that power at the center is regarded as a scarce resource which the different contending parties seek to control, or at least to share. Those who actually do possess the scarce resource of central political power find themselves strongly tempted not to share it except on the basis of special alliances. Favoritism, ethnic nepotism, and ethnic competitiveness play their role in creating inequalities and disequilibrium in the distribution of political goals.

But the old warrior tradition also intrudes and conditions attitudes, especially in situations where soldiers attempt to monopolize the central institutions of power. In many East African societies, the old warrior tradition was based not simply on the ambition to maintain collective security, but also on the ambition to foster collective prosperity. The warrior was not simply a person who waited until his cattle or his women were attacked before using his military skills for defensive purposes. On the contrary, the warrior considered economic competition as being not primarily a rivalry between individuals or subgroups within the same society (as competition is taken to be in Western capitalist countries), but rather as a continuing dialectic of rivalry with alien or semi-alien societies nearby. Out of this concept emerged cattle raiding and similar forms of militarized economic acquisitiveness as an aspect of the warrior ethos.

> The experience of warriorhood during adolescence helped in transforming an Embu boy into an Embu man. . . . The tradition of raiding for live-stock was strong in the cluster of societies in the area, and the Embu

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> trained their young men both to protect their own herds from enemies and also to raid the neighboring peoples. . . . Raiding enemy tribes for live-stock (and women) and in the process achieving fame in fighting were dominant concerns of warriorhood in Embuland. The first raid was important for a young man, contributing to the legitimization of his new role.[18]

The idea by which members of a community found it legitimate, and indeed part of the duties of warriorhood, to take economic advantage of other ethnic communities was bound to affect the behavior of soldiers in uniform in the postcolonial era.

Many commentators on African behavior have too readily assumed that the reference point for African soldiers was always and inevitably the imperial model. But is the behavior of African privates in Nigeria or Uganda really like the behavior of British privates, or does it bear closer affinity to the behavior of traditional warriors? Is the soldier in Zaire more reminiscent of a Belgian soldier than of a precolonial Congo or Luba warrior?

Robert Price has invoked psychological categories to explain the apparent attempt by African soldiers to emulate the imperial military model. Price used reference-group theory to explain what he called "the emulation paradox." "An individual's reference groups are those social groups to which he psychologically relates himself, with which he identifies. To become a member of the group in a psychological sense implies the internalization of its central norms and values—for to be a member implies certain modes of thought and behavior."[19] Applying the theory to the Ghanaian military especially, Price argues that the training process undergone by the officer corps was "such as to produce reference-group identifications with the officer corps of the ex-colonial power and concomitant commitments to its set of traditions, symbols, and values."[20]

For a while it may have been true of the officer corps that the most immediate reference group was that of the former colonial power, but writers like Price may have underestimated the resilience of traditional norms among the great majority of African soldiers. Certainly many East African soldiers come from societies that still have initiation ceremonies based on ancestral warrior ideas, although they are no longer translated into actual practice. The socialization processes of

[18] Saberwal (fn. 8), 17, 29.

[19] Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case," *World Politics*, XXIII (April 1971), 403-4.

[20] *Ibid.*, 407.

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many of these societies continue to emphasize particular primordial concepts of courage, masculinity, and attitudes toward rival ethnic groups. There is comparable evidence elsewhere in Africa that among the attitudes that could be resurrected from the ancestral past is the "cattle-raiding complex"—the concept of militarized economic competition between collective social units.

> The extensive participation of Habe (non-Fulani Hausa) and Fulani in slave-raiding and war was achieved by mobilising contingents from the fiefs; and military action offered such troups rewards in the form of booty, appointments and promotion. The frequency and success of this military adventure may have persuaded many people to support the system of government. Since political and administrative office provided the principal means of enrichment and social mobility together, and had clear military commitments, the recruitment of officials for these expeditions presented no problems.[21]

In East Africa this "cattle-raiding complex" was exploited by the Europeans in the initial stages of their own conquest of the region. The British in Uganda, for example, economized on their own military expenses by recruiting African soldiers and letting them do some looting on the way for compensation.

> It was important to capture cattle, goats, etc. from the conquered people; this was food for the soldiers. . . . The great number of soldiers with the few British officers, moving with goats, cows, etc. must have been spectacular and frightening. The few officers could not control the multitude of soldiers especially when they were hungry. . . . Thus the soldiers were not only top-dog on the power of the gun dimension, they also had economic power. It is difficult to measure the social disequilibrium that was caused by relative deprivation among the people by the presence of the rich gunmen.[22]

This phenomenon of "rich gunmen" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries anticipated a major trend in the Africa of the 1960's and 1970's following the withdrawal of the European masters. The cattle-raid complex had first bedevilled relations between African ethnic groups, was later exploited by the imperial power, and has now begun to condition the appetites, acquisitiveness, and ethnic attitudes of African soldiers in power after independence.

What this means is that there are aspects of the re-Africanization of Africa that may not be especially functional or beneficial. That these aspects are retrograde from the point of view of justice and interethnic amity in African countries does not invalidate the proposition about

[21] M. G. Smith, *Government in Zazzu* (London: Oxford University Press 1960), 100.
[22] Kabwegyere (fn. 13), 73-74.

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the traditionalizing impact of the phenomenon of undereducated Africans wielding considerable power in political communities much larger in size than their original ancestral societies.

Decolonization and Cultural Nationalism

Although certain aspects of re-Africanization are immensely costly in human terms in the short run, the process of total retraditionalization may well be a fundamental aspect of decolonization. Much of the earlier literature on modernization in Africa too readily assumed that the road to political development was through westernization. Political development was envisaged in terms of building institutions comparable to those of Western systems, and consolidating values and styles derived from Western cultural experience.

But with the growth of a new rival literature based on the concept of *dependency*, the whole concept of development has been either rejected or drastically redefined. Where it has been redefined, development is now conceived in terms of a progressive reduction in dependency, a commitment to practical decolonization not only politically, but also economically and culturally.[23]

Although some writers have emphasized economic decolonization, I regard cultural decolonization to be more fundamental than many have assumed. Mental and intellectual dependency, a lack of readiness to break loose from the metropolitan power, and a compulsive urge to imitate and emulate what the West has produced are factors that have on the whole had grave economic and political consequences for societies which are still unwilling to take drastic decisions for their own transformation: they are also phenomena with deep cultural causes. The lack of political will for an economic transformation may in part be due to a state of mental and cultural dependency.

From this point of view, trends toward retraditionalizing Africa become an aspect of decolonization. Africa is never likely to move to what it was before the Europeans came. In hard assessment, it would be suicidal for Africa to attempt such a backward leap. But a partial retreat toward renewed respect for indigenous ways and the conquest of cultural self-contempt may be the minimal conditions for cultural decolonization.

[23] Some of the works by Samir Amin, Johan Galtung, Walter Rodney, and Colin Leys belong to this new genre of developmental literature. Perhaps the most sustained and most recent application of this radical perspective to an African country is Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (London: Heinemann Educational Publishers, and Berkeley: University of California Press 1975).

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Again, soldiers in power have often and sometimes naively taken some of the most drastic decisions toward decolonization in this domain. Mobutu Sese Seko's drive to resurrect African authenticity in Zaire is one case in point. The General has had tense confrontations, especially with the Catholic Church over aspects of the church's influence on the cultural ways of Zaireans.

Among the more dramatic symbolic moves made by Mobutu Sese Seko was the decision to compel all Zaireans to have indigenous names, rather than the European or Jewish names adopted at baptism. The General argued that a religion that aspires to be universalistic must be ready to recognize cultural pluralism in the world. Why should Christian names necessarily be of European or Jewish extraction? Why could not indigenous African names qualify for baptismal status in their own right? Why did God have to despise every aspect of indigenous African cultures, down to the names which parents chose for their children?

An order went forth requiring all citizens of Zaire to ensure that their passports had Zairean names. The President himself renounced his baptismal name of "Joseph." Many other Zaireans were deeply torn by this decree requiring them to give up European or Jewish names they had carried all their lives. Understandably, many regarded this as an intrusion into a deeply personal affair. And yet the cultural nationalism which made Mobutu require his compatriots to respect indigenous names, and the Catholic Church to be more respectful of local cultures, was pregnant with the symbolism of a cultural revival.

The authenticity drive in Qaddafy's Libya also included a preoccupation with passports. But in the case of Libya, the ambition was not simply to force the local citizens to do justice to their heritage, but also to demand cultural reciprocity from the international community at large. Visitors to Libya were required to have passports which included the use of Arabic. Why, after all, should the language of passports all over the world be so disproportionately based on the linguistic heritage of Western Europe? Why must Arabs and Africans be compelled to use French or English as one of the languages of their travel documents, while the French and the English made no reciprocal linguistic concession to the customs officers at Arab or African ports?

There are of course a large number of practical reasons why the world has had to bow to English and French as the most widespread of the languages of mankind. But there are also important issues of cultural reciprocity involved in that simple gesture by Colonel Qaddafy in Libya.

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In Uganda, some modifications in the marriage laws of the country, including greater recognition of polygamous relationships, have also been part of the stream of retraditionalization. So was President Amin's adoption of Kiswahili as a national language of Uganda, in spite of the fact that the language is less well known there than it is in either Tanzania or Kenya, and in spite of the immense educational difficulties which are involved in implementing this linguistic decision.

Even the ruthless expulsion of influential foreigners, with all the lack of humaneness involved, can be considered as part of the process of decolonization.

> "Colonel Qaddafy, deeply concerned about foreign penetration of the culture and economy of the country, decreed a host of steps; seizure of Italian and Jewish property without compensation; announcement that all business concerns, save oil companies, must be owned entirely by Libyan nationals; nationalization of banks and public transport; emphasis on Islamic standards."[24]

Qaddafy's expulsion of the Italians from Libya was followed by Idi Amin's expulsion of the Asians from Uganda. Both moves, with their relative insensitivity to the diplomatic and humanitarian implications of those measures, could only have been taken under a military regime. Certainly the British fear of Idi Amin at the time of the expulsion of the Asians emanated from the very fact that he was a soldier in charge of a rather undisciplined army and was capable of taking physical action against British Asians and even British Europeans in Uganda in a manner which would have been inconceivable under Milton Obote. The rugged and semi-literate nature of the military regime was a factor behind the expulsion of those influential aliens, and that expulsion in turn may be seen as part of the ruthless and painful process of decolonization.

The total picture in Eastern Africa is still incomplete with regard to the retraditionalizing role of African soldiers. The concurrent process of modernization must always be taken into account in evaluating these issues.

But a convergence of four factors should alert us to the current or potential re-Africanizing role of the armed forces in Africa. These factors include the rural and parochial origins of most of the recruits into the armed forces, the minimal acculturation of the soldiers as com-

[24] Claude E. Welch Jr., "Radical and Conservative Military Regimes: A Typology and Analysis of Post-Coup Governments in Tropical Africa," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 4–8, 1973, pp. 13-14. Since then, oil has also become increasingly subject to state ownership and control.

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pared with the better-educated civilian populations, the ethnic patterns of military recruitment with their potentialities of retribalization, and the partial revival of the warrior tradition.[25]

Conclusion

On the whole, the cultural influence of Europe has been of longer duration in West Africa than in places like Uganda, Zaire, and Kenya. In the field of both civilian and military education, that has meant a longer tradition of college, university, and Sandhurst training in Ghana and Nigeria than among Africans on the eastern seaboard.

If there is a process of westernization still going on in Africa, one would expect it to be more deeply entrenched in West Africa than in East Africa. Political scientists in the 1950's were therefore taking a justifiable gamble when they regarded the growth of Western-style nationalistic movements in West Africa as a harbinger of comparable movements elsewhere.

If there is now an inchoate but insistent reassertion of indigenous political values at the highest level of government, it is less likely to have started in sedate and highly anglicized Ghana than in tumultous Zaire, the Central African Republic, and among the Nilotic and Sudanic peoples of Uganda.

Let us now draw out the tentative hypotheses which lie in these observations. Everything else being equal, the process of "modernization" in the Western sense is likely to advance fastest in those societies which have experienced the deepest Western impact either in duration (Ghana and Southern Nigeria), or in terms of proximity to white settlers (Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa).

By contrast, the process of political retraditionalization is likely to originate in those societies which have had least time to adjust to the impact of the West. By "political retraditionalization" I mean concrete attempts to formulate policies either under the influence of indigenous

[25] See Mazrui, "The Resurrection of the Warrior Tradition in African Political Culture: From Shaka the Zulu to Amin the Kakwa," paper presented on the panel on Terrorism and Politics in Africa, Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association of the U.S.A., Syracuse, N.Y., October 31–November 3, 1973. A revised version has since appeared in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XIII, No. 1 (1975), 67-84. See also Mazrui, "Ethnic Stratification and the Military-Agrarian Complex: The Uganda Case," paper presented at the East African Universities Social Science Conference of Eastern Africa, University of Dar es Salaam, December 1973. A revised version has since appeared in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1975). See also Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1975), 30-52.

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mores or in pursuit of ends defined according to indigenous criteria. Zaire and Uganda are cases in point.

A third compound hypothesis is that military rule in Africa has consequences which are *both* modernizing and traditionalizing. Built into this compound hypothesis is the expectation that military rule in a place like Ghana (high acculturation) would reveal its traditionalizing role more slowly than military rule in the hands of the Kakwa and Lugbara in Uganda (low acculturation). But, since the bulk of the army of Ghana also consists of men of relatively low acculturation, each successive coup in a place like Ghana would bring into prominence more of the less westernized Ghanaian soldiers. The first Ghanaian coup was more "Sandhurst and British" than the second. The third, should it take place, would be less "British" still. The difference between Ghanaian soldiers in power and Ugandan and Zairean soldiers in power will probably narrow, without necessarily ending.

The fourth compound hypothesis concerns a comparison between civilian and military rulers in Africa. There is no evidence yet that soldiers are greater modernizers than the civilians they replaced. But the evidence from East Africa would seem to suggest that soldiers may be greater traditionalizers than the more westernized civilians they ousted. For better or for worse, that is certainly true of Idi Amin as compared with Milton Obote, and true of Mobutu Sese Seko as compared with such figures as Kasavubu and Moise Tshombe.

But how do these factors relate to the experience of a country like Ethiopia? The balance between the modernizing and the traditionalizing functions of soldiers has to be different in Ethiopia, partly because of the long ancestry of the traditional imperial system (while it lasted), and partly because of the brevity of Ethiopia's colonial experience under Italian occupation. There were aspects of the traditional imperial system in Ethiopia which were so anachronistic that almost any major military challenge to it in the second half of the twentieth century was bound to have a conspicuously modernizing aspect.

Yet even in Ethiopia it would be surprising if the performance of the army did not gradually manifest once again a compulsive urge to retraditionalize aspects of Ethiopian life. Without being directly ruled by the West for any length of time, Ethiopia under Haile Selassie had been partly absorbed into the Western world's strategic empire. The military presence of the United States in the country, and the increasing cultural orientation toward the West which the imperial elite manifested, had started a process of westernization at that level of Ethiopian society. If the Ethiopian soldiers were now to embark

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more earnestly on both decolonization and democratization, the former process might well include a theme of cultural nationalism and traditionalization. The process of democratization, on the other hand, would correlate closely with modernization in Ethiopia.

In this regard the experience of Libya may turn out to be a precedent for Ethiopia. The military overthrow of King Idris of Libya created a radical change in the country. Domestically the soldiers did inaugurate a process of at least structural and economic democratization, as educational opportunities were vastly expanded, foreign economic control was reduced, and the wealth of the country was used more extensively for the welfare of the masses and the development of the country.

But while the soldiers' impulse to *democratize* Libya after King Idris has initiated modernization, their urge to decolonize Libya has resulted in a new Islamic fundamentalism. Economic democratization in Libya has increased a consciousness of the future and the need to plan for it. Cultural decolonization, on the other hand, has awakened memories of the past and rekindled an interest in protecting its heritage. Both modernity and tradition have provided reasons and motivation for reform in Libya after the monarchy. Both might also instigate radical changes in postimperial Ethiopia.

Behind both examples lies the partially disguised but sociologically fundamental tendency of soldiers in Africa to respond to their rural, social, and cultural origins. Either intentionally or through the mysterious sense of direction of unconscious behavior, African soldiers are becoming media for the selective re-Africanization of the countries they rule.

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DERADICALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDER KENJI MIYAMOTO

By HONG N. KIM

I

UNQUESTIONABLY, one of the major developments in recent Japanese politics is the emergence of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) as the second-largest parliamentary opposition party. In the general elections of 1972, it captured 38 seats (40 when one includes a "progressive independent" and an Okinawan deputy who later joined the party) in the lower house of the Diet, polling nearly 5.5 million (or 10.5 per cent) of the total votes cast. (See Table I.) In the elections for the upper house of the Diet on July 7, 1974, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 20, polling over 6.4 million (or 12 per cent) of the total votes cast in the local constituencies and over 4.9 million (or 9.4 per cent) of the votes cast in the national constituency.[1]

The party's impressive electoral record in the recent parliamentary elections necessitates an explanation of the underlying causes, for the JCP's growth clearly deviates from some of the theories advanced by well-known scholars in the field of comparative politics. For example, the rapid expansion and steady growth of the JCP's organizational strength (the party membership) clearly deviates from the hypothesis formulated by Seymour Martin Lipset on the inverse correlation between economic growth (per capita income) and the strength of Communist parties.[2] The JCP's organizational strength increased sharply—instead of decreasing—during a period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity in Japan (1961–74). Nor does the JCP's steady increase in its electoral strength (from 1,157,000 in 1960 to 5,479,000 in 1972) conform to the "curvilinear theory" introduced more recently by Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, who hypothesized that the strength of Communist parties decreases sharply in highly industrialized and technologically advanced countries like Japan.[3] A

[1] *Asahi Shimbun*, July 9, 1974, evening ed.

[2] Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1959), 62.

[3] Benjamin and Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (March 1968), 110-21, esp. 117.

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plausible explanation for the JCP's deviation from these theories should be sought not in economic variables but in other factors.

It is my basic contention that the recent growth in the JCP's organizational strength and electoral successes should be ascribed to the overall deradicalization of the Japanese Communist movement which has taken place under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto since 1961. The term "deradicalization," as used in this study, means essentially making an "accommodation to the world as it stands,"[4] instead of seeking the "ideal order" through violent means. More specifically, it means the transformation of a revolutionary party into an electoral party that seeks power largely through the parliamentary process.

The findings of this study as a whole substantiate theories on deradicalization of the Marxist movement advanced earlier by Robert Michels and more recently by Robert C. Tucker. According to Tucker, deradicalization of the Marxist movement is caused largely by two important factors, namely, "leadership change and worldly success." Tucker has also hypothesized that there is "an inverse relation between a radical movement's organizational strength and the preservation of its radicalism."[5] A somewhat similar thesis was advanced by Robert Michels, in his study of the European Marxist parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[6] His findings also confirm Triska's and Finley's hypothesis that, as the Communist parties become electoral parties in the developed countries, "the competition [with other parties for votes] forces them to reduce greatly, both structurally and functionally, their differences from other parties. They therefore tend to be pragmatic, nonheretic, and nonideological, and their ties and interaction with the Communist system tend to slacken."[7]

II

As the deradicalization of the JCP is closely related to Miyamoto's leadership of the party, it is necessary to review briefly the developments leading to the establishment of the "Miyamoto system."

Immediately following the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the JCP was reorganized under the leadership of Kyūichi Tokuda and Sanzō Nosaka. Under Nosaka's famous "peaceful path to revolution" the JCP expanded its power base rapidly between 1946 and 1949. In

[4] For the definition of deradicalization, see Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61 (June 1967), 348.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Michels, *Political Parties* (New York: Dover Publications 1959), 370-73, esp. 373.
[7] Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan 1968), 191.

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1949, for instance, the party succeeded in electing 35 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling nearly three million votes (or 9.7 per cent of the total votes cast). The JCP's triumph of 1949 did not last long, however. With the adoption, in 1950–51, of a new strategy of militancy and outright violence under instructions from Moscow and Peking (commonly known as the 1951 "Thesis"), the JCP lost all of its 35 seats in the 1952 elections, and its popular vote plummeted to 897,000 in 1952.[8] (See Table II.)

Following orders from Moscow and Peking, the JCP had attempted to organize a guerilla force in Japan and to train its members in subversive activities and terrorism. However, the violent revolutionary strategy proved disastrous, for it provoked United States military authorities in Japan to retaliate with measures designed to curb the JCP's activities after June 1950. The Japanese Communists were purged from public office and many of them, including Tokuda, went underground or into exile in Communist China during the period of the Korean War, 1950–53. The sporadic terrorist activities of the JCP alienated it from the masses, and the party rapidly became a symbol of extremism. Not only did the JCP's electoral support dwindle: its membership shrank drastically, from 150,000 in 1949 to about 20,000 by 1955. (See Table III.)

In the wake of the disaster created by the "ultra-leftist adventurism" of 1951–55, Kenji Miyamoto was to emerge as a leader of the JCP to rebuild the party. To be sure, Miyamoto had impressive credentials as a party leader. He had been a member of the JCP's Politburo as early as 1933. After twelve years' imprisonment (1933–45), Miyamoto emerged from prison as one of the most respected leaders of the party.[9] He had been overshadowed, however, by the more "bossy" Kyūichi Tokuda (who died in China in 1953), and the popular Sanzō Nosaka, who had shaped the party line from 1946 to 1949.

Miyamoto challenged the leadership of the Mainstream faction in 1950, when the Cominform attacked Nosaka's peaceful approach to the revolution. Siding openly with the Cominform, Miyamoto's faction (i.e., the International faction) demanded "self-criticism" of the leadership of the Mainstream faction, as well as the acceptance of the Comin-

[8] Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1966), 72. See also Kōken Koyama, *Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō shi* (Tokyo: Yoshiga Shoten 1970), 60 and 151. In the 1953 general elections, the JCP's votes shrank further to 650,000. See Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Ikko-sha 1973), 190.

[9] *Ibid.*, 44-45. Graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in 1931, Miyamoto joined the JCP in the same year and became a member of the party's Politburo and Secretariat in 1933.

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form's directives, alienating him from the party leadership. When the Mainstream leaders went underground in 1950, Miyamoto founded a separate party organization.[10] However, this group was not recognized as a legitimate party organization by the Cominform, which increasingly intervened in the internal affairs of the JCP at this time. In 1951, Miyamoto's group was dissolved under pressure from Moscow and Peking, and Miyamoto was to remain largely inactive until 1954.[11]

By 1955, it became apparent to the JCP leaders that there was an urgent need for consolidation of their disrupted organization and also for a re-evaluation of the revolutionary strategy. Through a compromise worked out between Shigeo Shida, the strong man of the Mainstream faction, and Miyamoto, the two rival groups merged in the spring of 1955. Sanzō Nosaka became First Secretary of the party and headed a new leadership group which included Kenji Miyamoto and Shigeo Shida. The JCP also decided to do away with the defunct strategy of violent revolution and to map out a new strategy.

Miyamoto's emergence as the party's Secretary-General at the 7th Party Congress in 1958 may be attributed partly to his noninvolvement in the formulation of the party's militant strategy from 1951 to 1954, and partly to the fortuitous circumstances involving the downfall of Shigeo Shida who had been the real power in the JCP during 1951–55. The erstwhile leader of the Mainstream faction was expelled from the party as it became clear that he had misused party funds and abused his power.[12]

At the 7th Party Congress, Miyamoto was still overshadowed by the Party Chairman, Sanzō Nosaka, in terms of prestige and popularity. After that, he began to build up his power base within the party, but it was not until 1966 that he became the undisputed leader of the JCP. During the intervening eight years, Miyamoto had to wage a series of struggles against his opponents within the JCP and with their mentors in Moscow and Peking.

The first serious challenge to the Miyamoto leadership was posed by

[10] In September 1950, Miyamoto organized the National Unity Committee, which was dissolved the next month. As many of Miyamoto's followers were purged by the Mainstream faction instead of being allowed to rejoin the party, Miyamoto and other leaders of the International Faction established, in December 1950, another organization, the "JCP National Unity Conference," to fight the leaders of the Mainstream faction. Its followers numbered approximately 10,000. For details, see Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Sekka-sha 1969), 45-50. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 86-129.

[11] Iizuka (fn. 10), 54. See also Kōtaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppanbu 1972), 287-91.

[12] Shida disappeared in December 1955, after being investigated about his misuse of party funds during 1951-55. He was officially expelled from the party in 1956. See Koyama (fn. 8), 194-96.

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a group headed by Shōjiro Kasuga, a party veteran who was closely identified with Moscow. This group openly opposed a new party program that had been drafted and presented by Miyamoto. They argued against its adoption largely on the basis of the "structural reform theory,"[13] originally advanced by Togliatti in Italy, contending that Japan was an independent, "advanced capitalist country" which was ready to proceed to the "socialist revolution" like Italy and other Western European countries through peaceful parliamentary means. Since nearly one-third of the delegates were opposed to Miyamoto's draft program, a temporary action program was adopted, pending further discussion.

After the inconclusive 7th Party Congress, the new party leadership made the Kasuga group its central target and prepared itself for the final showdown, which took place in the spring of 1961. At the party's Central Committee meeting, Miyamoto succeeded in overcoming the Kasuga group's opposition and secured the committee's endorsement for the adoption of his draft program.[14] Shortly thereafter, the leaders of the Kasuga faction withdrew from the JCP.

At the 8th Party Congress, in July of 1961, the Kasuga group was officially ousted from the party, and there was little opposition to the new party program presented to the Congress by Miyamoto. With the departure of the Kasuga faction, Miyamoto's power position was immensely improved. Re-elected as the party's Secretary-General, Miyamoto gradually overshadowed the power of the Party Chairman, Sanzō Nosaka. According to the newly adopted party program, the JCP was to pursue the basic strategy of the parliamentary path to revolution instead of the strategy of violent revolution.[15] However, unlike Kasuga's proposal, the program did not preclude the possibility of violent revolution. Nor did it abandon the model of a two-stage revolution.

On the basis of the newly adopted party program, Miyamoto made strenuous efforts to rebuild the JCP after 1961. The task was complicated by the conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking, as the two Communist giants attempted to pull the JCP into their respective orbits as a part of their growing contest for the leadership of the world Communist movement.

Against the intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict, the JCP sought to steer a course of neutrality by playing down the ideological differences between the two camps. In 1961 it became obvious, however, that despite the

[13] Scalapino (fn. 8), 102-3. [14] *Ibid.*, 109.

[15] *Ibid.*, 113. For a Japanese text of the party program, see Asahi Shimbun sha, ed., *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha 1973), 296-310.

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JCP's superficially neutral and conciliatory attitudes toward both Moscow and Peking, it was leaning increasingly toward Peking. In 1962 and early 1963, criticisms of Khrushchev's ideological and policy positions began to emanate from Yoyogi (the location of the JCP's headquarters in Tokyo). By fall of 1963, they became more pronounced.[16]

The Soviet Union's signing of the partial nuclear test-ban treaty in July of 1963 marked the beginning of the JCP's more outspoken criticism of the Soviet position. In October 1963, for example, the JCP criticized the Soviet line as "modern revisionism," and hardened its opposition to Moscow. Against this background, talks were held in Moscow between the JCP delegation and Soviet leaders in March 1964 in a futile attempt to iron out the differences between the two parties. Yoyogi's rupture with Moscow came shortly thereafter, when the pro-Moscow Diet members of the JCP, Yoshio Shiga and Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled from the party after voting for the ratification of the nuclear test-ban treaty in violation of party discipline. Moscow denounced the JCP's action and, in an attempt to discredit the JCP leadership, revealed hitherto unpublished letters exchanged between Moscow and Yoyogi during 1963–64. Yoyogi responded to the Soviet action by purging most of the pro-Soviet members from the party by fall of 1964.[17] The purged members in turn, and with Moscow's blessing, organized a group called "The Voice of Japan." It was not until 1971 that relations between the two parties were "normalized" on the basis of "independence, equality and non-interference."[18] In the meantime, the JCP denounced the Soviet Union for its numerous sins and "big-power chauvinism," including the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

[16] See Koyama (fn. 8), 303-5. Within the JCP, there were three different factions, one supporting the Chinese Communist Party, another supporting the Soviet Union, and the third supporting a position of neutrality while leaning toward Peking.

[17] According to Koyama, several hundred party members left the JCP together with the pro-Soviet leaders (Shiga, Suzuki, Shigeo Kamiyama, etc.). See Koyama (fn. 8), 342-70. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 231-32.

[18] An attempt to normalize the JCP's relations with Moscow was made in the early part of 1968, when Miyamoto met in Tokyo with the Soviet delegation headed by Mikhail Suslov. A joint communiqué was issued on February 7, 1968, pledging both parties' efforts to normalize their relations on the basis of "autonomy, equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other party." The JCP demanded that Soviet leaders not support Yoshio Shiga. The JCP's relationship with Moscow deteriorated in summer of 1968, when the Japanese Communists denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, calling the Soviet Union the "aggressor." Yoyogi-Moscow relations improved somewhat after Miyamoto's meeting with Brezhnev at Moscow in September 1971, at which both leaders reaffirmed their adherence to the principle of "autonomy, equality, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." However, it is not as warm as it used to be in the 1950's. See *ibid.*, 125-31.

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Even more serious than the Soviet challenge to Miyamoto's leadership were the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party, starting in 1966, to impose its will upon the JCP. It was widely assumed at the time of the expulsion of the pro-Soviet elements from the JCP in 1964 that the party had drifted toward Peking's orbit.[19] However, Miyamoto apparently had reservations about embracing Peking's militant strategy —especially in the wake of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party after the abortive coup of September 30, 1965, which was believed to have been undertaken with Peking's blessings. As a result, when the Chinese Communists attempted to dictate militant policies to the JCP, a rupture between Yoyogi and Peking developed during Miyamoto's visit to Peking in March of 1966, largely due to the inability to find common ground with Mao on two basic issues:[20] (1) the problem of promoting Sino-Soviet cooperation in Vietnam; and (2) the proper revolutionary strategy to be adopted by the Japanese Communists. Mao ruled out the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union in Vietnam and did not endorse the JCP's parliamentary path to revolution, but advocated the development of armed struggles in Japan. When Miyamoto did not give in to the Chinese demands, Mao refused to issue the joint communiqué previously agreed upon by both sides. After this incident, according to Miyamoto, the Chinese Communists mobilized their resources to overthrow his leadership.

Upon his return from Peking, Miyamoto carried out purges against the pro-Peking elements. Before the opening of the 10th Party Congress in October in 1966, some 40 prominent pro-Peking members were expelled from the party, including Ryūji Nishizawa (the late Tokuda's son-in-law) and Kuraji Anzai (former chief of the party's personnel section). The pro-Peking elements in turn organized splinter groups, challenging the authority of Miyamoto's leadership. The Peking regime provided all-out support for these elements.[21] As the conflict between Yoyogi and Peking intensified, invectives flew from both directions: the JCP denounced the "Maoist Clique" for its "anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist behavior," including the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese

[19] J. A. A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Communist Party in the Sino-Soviet Dispute—From Neutrality to Alignment?" in D. B. Miller and T. H. Rigby, eds., *The Disintegrating Monolith* (Canberra: Australian National University Press 1965), 142-43. See also Robert A. Scalapino, "Japan," in Witold S. Sworakowski, ed., *World Communism: A Handbook 1918–1965* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1973), 245; Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The Strategic Triangle: Japan," in Leopold Labedz, ed., *International Communism After Khrushchev* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1965), 123-30.

[20] Iizuka (fn. 8), 116-24; Tawara (fn. 11), 242-46; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 213-17.

[21] *Ibid.*, 218-25.

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Communists retaliated by labeling the "Miyamoto revisionist clique" one of China's "four arch-enemies," after American "imperialism," Soviet "revisionism," and the Sato "reactionaries."[22] The JCP's conflict with Peking has not shown any sign of resolution since 1966.

With the elimination of the pro-Soviet and pro-Peking elements from the party, Miyamoto became the undisputed leader of the JCP. At the 10th Party Congress, he was not only re-elected Secretary-General, but his trusted lieutenants were placed in key positions at the top echelon of the party hierarchy. The Congress also reaffirmed the JCP's policy of "self-reliance and independence" in its dealings with other Communist parties abroad.

Miyamoto's bold policy of defiance toward Moscow and Peking in a sense reflected his growing confidence in the JCP's ability to stand on its own feet without requiring assistance from abroad. By the fall of 1966, the JCP's membership had increased spectacularly from somewhat over 30,000 in 1958 to over 250,000. The combined circulation of the party organ, *Akahata*, more than tripled, from 300,000 in 1961 to over one million in 1966. (See Table IV.)

The loss of a few thousand members therefore did not weaken the JCP's defiant attitudes and policies toward Peking and Moscow; these policies undoubtedly strengthened its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party.[23] With the severance of its ties with Moscow in 1964 and especially with Peking in 1966, the JCP veered away from the Chinese model of revolution, identifying itself more closely with the European Communist parties and advocating the parliamentary path to revolution.

III

One of the most important consequences of the JCP's severance of ties with Moscow and Peking was the liberation of the party from foreign domination. For the first time since the establishment of the party in 1922, the JCP's leadership became free to map out its own strategy, unhindered by Chinese or Soviet interference. It declared its intention to pursue an independent course of action by "creative application of Marxism-Leninism" to the political problems in Japan. Such an independent posture eventually led the Miyamoto leadership

[22] *Ibid.*; see also Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1972), 74. For more detailed information on Yoyogi-Peking relations from 1966 to 1973, see Richard F. Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* [hereafter referred to as *Yearbook*] (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1966 to 1974). Each volume carries a section on Japan.

[23] Tawara (fn. 11), 79, 246.

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to turn away further from the Chinese model of revolution and embrace the parliamentary path to revolution.

To be sure, the JCP had already experimented successfully with the parliamentary strategy under the leadership of Sanzō Nosaka during 1946–49; and following the disasters wrought by the violent revolutionary strategy of 1950–55, the Central Committee of the JCP had agreed, as early as June of 1956, to consider a new program for "peaceful parliamentary revolution," because the 1951 "Thesis" did not fit the situation in Japan.[24] It was not until 1961 that the JCP's decision to explore the possibility of seeking power by a parliamentary path was laid down officially in the new party program adopted by the 8th Party Congress. In this document,[25] the JCP acknowledged that Japan was a highly developed capitalist country, but dependent on the United States. Accordingly, the Japanese Communists must wage a struggle against the two principal enemies, "U.S. imperialism" and "Japanese monopoly capitalism," by carrying out a people's democratic revolution. With the completion of this phase of the revolution, it should proceed toward the "socialist revolution." The first phase of the revolution was to be carried out by a JCP-led multiclass "national democratic united front." As for revolutionary strategy and tactics, the party program stipulated that the Communist-led united front should seek to capture as many parliamentary seats as possible. "If a majority of seats could be won, then the parliament could be transformed from a tool of reaction to an instrument of the people."[26] As Scalapino has pointed out, "To commit the party to electoral contests, however, did not imply sanction for a 'parliamentary, peaceful revolution' "; it simply meant that "the parliamentary system should be used to further the course of the revolution."[27] To be sure, the JCP did not rule out the possibility of "non-peaceful" revolution, although the party played it down gradually after the 8th Party Congress. Undoubtedly, the 1961 "Thesis" was a product of compromise among the party leaders, for it retained the Chinese model of two-stage revolution while recognizing the possibility of the peaceful parliamentary approach to revolution.

The adoption of the 1961 "Thesis" notwithstanding, it was not until after the break with Peking in 1966 that the JCP became really serious about the "parliamentary path to revolution."[28] During the intervening

[24] As early as June 28-30, 1956, the Central Committee of the JCP acknowledged the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism" in Japan and decided to revise the 1951 "Thesis." For details, see Scalapino (fn. 8), 100. See also Koyama (fn. 8), 207.

[25] For a Japanese text of the party program, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 296-310.

[26] *Ibid.*, 308.

[27] Scalapino (fn. 8), 113.

[28] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 251.

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years (1961–66) the Chinese influence was still substantial within the JCP,[29] and the JCP was more concerned with the "struggles" against the United States.

After 1966, the JCP's justification for the "parliamentary path to revolution" took the form of rejecting the violent revolution advocated by the Chinese Communists on the grounds that (1) Japan is a highly "advanced capitalist country," comparable to the Western European countries; (2) accordingly, the peaceful transition to revolution is as feasible in Japan as in the Western European countries. According to Tetsuzo Fuwa, who has articulated the JCP's viewpoints on the parliamentary path to revolution, the Communist revolution in the highly industrialized countries should not have to be violent but could be peaceful and nonviolent.[30] The "peaceful transition to people's democracy" is possible in Japan, according to Fuwa, because Japan's liberal democratic political system provides such a possibility. Specifically, Fuwa points out that the Japanese Diet enjoys substantial constitutional powers within the Japanese state apparatus and plays a pivotal role in the operation of the Japanese government. Consequently, if a majority of the Diet seats could be captured, it would be possible for the JCP-led united front to form a new government, which could transform the existing Diet into a "People's Democratic Parliament." In Fuwa's theory of "people's parliamentarism," one can detect the basic ingredients of the doctrine of "peaceful transition" to revolution which has been widely advocated by the European and Soviet Communists since the late 1950's, if not earlier.[31] Fuwa's theory also echoes the struc-

[29] According to Hirotsu, altogether some 1,500 Japanese Communists went to China between 1953 and 1957; many of them returned home in the spring of 1958. These returnees from China came to form the nucleus of the pro-Chinese faction within the JCP. At the 8th Party Congress, the pro-Chinese faction "monopolized the important positions at the party centre," and "the strength of Secretary-General Miyamoto's faction, which was said to be neutral, declined." The pro-Chinese leaders were believed to have received abundant Chinese financial aid and to control the JCP's organization department, the financial committee, and the *Akahata* editorial board in the early part of the 1960's. See Hirotsu (fn. 19), 128-29; see also Stockwin (fn. 19).

[30] See Fuwa, *Jinmjn teki Gikaishugi* (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppan sha 1970). See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 153-56.

[31] According to Cyril E. Black, "in discussing the prospects for revolution in the years ahead, Soviet doctrine places almost exclusive emphasis on 'peaceful transition to socialism' which it defines as the '*transition of individual countries to socialism without an armed rising and civil war.*'" (Italics in original). The Soviet conception of "peaceful transition" is not, according to Black, necessarily peaceful in the same sense as the transfer of power in a democratic system is peaceful, "but may involve threat of violence and readiness to use violent methods in the event of unforeseen opposition." That is why Soviet writings distinguish the theory of "peaceful transition" from the heresy of the "revisionists" or "reformists," which denies the necessity for "class struggle" and precludes the "possibility of non-peaceful revolution." For details, see "The Anticipation of Communist Revolutions," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton,

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tural reform theory advocated earlier by the Kasuga group. However, a closer examination of Fuwa's theory reveals that it is different from Kasuga's in at least three respects. First, unlike the Kasuga group which classified Japan as a fully developed, independent, capitalist country ready for immediate socialist revolution, Fuwa still adheres to the basic dogma laid down in the 1961 party program that the first stage of the democratic revolution is not yet completed in Japan. Second, as a corollary, Fuwa maintains—unlike the Kasuga group which held that the JCP should focus its attention primarily on capitalism at home—that United States "imperialism" is the principal enemy of the JCP, and "Japanese monopoly capitalism" is its secondary enemy.[32] Finally, unlike the structural reform theory of the Kasuga group, Fuwa's theory of peaceful transition to revolution does not preclude the possibility of non-peaceful revolution.

Theoretical considerations aside, the Miyamoto leadership had other reasons to be willing to commit the JCP to parliamentary politics. With its streamlined party organization of over 250,000 members and a widely circulated party organ, the JCP had succeeded in electing 14 members to the lower house of the Diet, polling over 3.1 million votes in the December 1969 elections. These "worldly successes" reinforced the JCP leadership's commitment to parliamentary politics.

IV

In the aftermath of the JCP's decision to seek power through parliamentary means, it became unmistakably clear to the leadership that without an increase in the party's electoral strength it would be unrealistic to expect any success in the implementation of the "peaceful transition to revolution."[33] In order to increase the JCP's electoral strength, however, drastic changes were needed to improve the party's image with the voters, to streamline the party's operations for "electioneering,"

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eds., *Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1964), 438-39. See also Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Advanced Countries," *ibid.*, 407-9.

[32] According to a resolution adopted by the 11th Party Congress, held in July, 1970, the JCP maintained that "Under the San Francisco system [i.e., the system established by the San Francisco Peace Treaty] it continues to be a semi-occupied, semi-independent country chained to the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. It is, as the party program puts it, a country which is "virtually dependent, being semi-occupied by American imperialism." See Paul Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, XX (January-April 1971), 18. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 146-50.

[33] For a detailed analysis of the problem of adaptation for the deradicalized, non-ruling Communist parties, see Thomas H. Greene, "Non-Ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, VI (Winter 1973), 331-61.

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and to adjust the party's political style and behavior to that befitting an electoral party. As a result, deradicalization of the JCP has been effected in virtually every aspect of the party's activities in recent years.

First, under Miyamoto's leadership the JCP has made systematic efforts to divest itself of the taint of violence and to create a democratic new image; without this change it would have been difficult for the JCP to appeal for votes to a Japanese electorate which is largely conservative and hostile to communism—a force that has long been associated with violence, dictatorship, and subservience to Moscow and Peking. At the 11th Party Congress in 1970, for instance, the sessions of the Congress, with the exception of those related to finances and personnel, were open to the press and the public for the first time in history. Furthermore, the resolution adopted by the Congress pledged the party not to institute a one-party dictatorship even if the JCP came into power, but rather to permit the functioning of opposition parties "so long as they did not attempt to destroy the democratic system by violence."[34] In addition, the party rules were amended to define Marxism-Leninism as the party's "theoretical basis" instead of its "principle for action."[35] To allay the fears and suspicions of the non-Communist parties, the JCP has since 1970 been painstakingly toning down the traditional Communist doctrine on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

While the JCP's attempts at constructing a democratic image have been less than successful, its disclaimer of violence has become more credible to the public in recent years. During the height of the campus revolts in 1968 and 1969, the JCP-affiliated students frequently helped police to quell disorders staged by the more radical "anti-Yoyogi" *Zengakuren* elements.[36] The JCP also vehemently denounced the extremist groups, such as the *Sekigun* (Red Army) faction which hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea in 1970 and the *Rengo Sekigun* (United Red Army) faction which shocked the Japanese through atrocities committed against its own members in the form of torture and mass murders in early 1972.[37]

As a part of the overall campaign for the improvement of its image,

[34] Tawara (fn. 11), 51. See also *Yearbook 1971* (fn. 22), 598.

[35] For a detailed analysis of the revised party bylaws, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 162-68. For a complete text of the party rules, see *Akahata*, July 6, 1970.

[36] For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the JCP and radical extremist "anti-Yoyogi" elements, see Tawara (fn. 11), 127-38. See also Ichiro Sunada, "The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement," *Asian Survey*, IX (June 1969), 457-74.

[37] John K. Emmerson, "The Japanese Communist Party After Fifty Years," *Asian Survey*, XII (July 1972), 571-72.

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the JCP has also emphasized its claim to being an independent, national Japanese party. By denouncing the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 as well as Mao's Cultural Revolution in China, the JCP attempted to demonstrate its defiant attitudes toward Moscow and Peking. And by advocating the return of the Kurile Islands from the Soviet Union, and defending Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku Islands against Chinese claims, the JCP has projected a new image as a nationalistic Japanese party.[38]

Second, concurrent with its assiduous attempts to improve the JCP's image, the Miyamoto leadership has engaged in systematic efforts to deradicalize its political communications. The JCP's "soft line" was reflected particularly in the editorial policy of *Akahata*.[39] Until the mid-1960's, the party organ had been of little interest to non-Communist readers because of its heavy use of Communist jargon and radical editorials. In 1968, however, the JCP leadership drastically changed the format of the paper by diversifying its sources of information and introducing an entertainment section that features comics, interviews with show-business celebrities, chess and *go* games, and the like.[40] The deradicalization of *Akahata* has made it one of the most widely circulated party-operated newspapers in Japan. By 1974 it had a combined circulation of 3 million (650,000 in daily and 2,350,000 in Sunday editions). The JCP's success in expanding *Akahata*'s circulation not only strengthened the party's propaganda apparatus, but also increased its income by more than $10 million per annum since 1971, or 70 per cent.[41]

In 1971 the JCP leadership also introduced a systematic campaign to change some of the Communist jargon which conveyed radical or undemocratic connotations. The word "cell" (*saibō*) was replaced by "branch" (*shibu*). Miyamoto also announced his intention to substitute

[38] *Ibid.*, 575.

[39] For an excellent analysis of *Akahata*'s success, see Hisamatsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodan sha 1973).

[40] *Ibid.*, 89-106. According to *Asahi Shimbun*, more than 300 full-time employees are working for *Akahata* at the JCP headquarters in Tokyo. In addition, there are over 12,600 local correspondents (unpaid), and about 21,000 delivery workers who render services on a voluntary basis with little or no compensation. For details, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 71-72. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 209-11.

[41] According to the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP raised 4,341 million yen (or about $12 million) in 1971. Approximately 95% of the income was generated through the sales of publications. See George O. Totten, "The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party, Part II: Local Level Tactics," *Pacific Affairs*, XLVI (Fall 1973), 398-99. According to its report to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the JCP's income for the first half of 1972 was 2,195 million yen (or about $8 million), which exceeded the officially reported amount of the LDP's income for the same period. 74% of the reported income was generated from sales of *Akahata*. See Iizuka (fn. 8), 214-15.

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the less shocking "administration of the proletariat" (*puroretaria shikken*) for "dictatorship of the proletariat" (*puroretaria dokusai*), and went so far as to replace "violent revolution" (*bōryoku kakumei*) with the less provocative "revolution by coercive force" (*kyōseiryoku kakumei*).[42] Most of this new jargon was adopted officially by the 12th Party Congress in revising the JCP's bylaws. To be sure, despite Miyamoto's juggling with the Communist jargon, the JCP has not succeeded in its attempts to allay the non-Communist parties' persistent suspicion and fear as to its ultimate intentions. This failure can be attributed partly to its refusal to discard Communist dogma and partly to its unconventional manner of operation which is still shrouded in a veil of secrecy.[43]

Third, since 1966 there have been drastic changes in the JCP's approach to elections. As the JCP became serious about the parliamentary path to revolution, it began to focus more attention on the bread-and-butter issues that often determine the outcome of elections, rather than on the foreign policy issues. Thus, while down-grading the revolutionary theme in its policy statements, the party has focused its attention increasingly on the mundane but politically potent issues of pollution, taxation, inflation, and public health.[44] Furthermore, to garner votes the JCP and its front organizations have also made all-out efforts to organize grassroots activities, such as bowling, table-tennis games, and other sports and entertainments. They also maintain consulting facilities to advise and help the voters in their common daily problems by providing tax counseling, medical service, and the like.[45]

Akahata has been especially important in building channels of communication between the JCP and the alienated voters dwelling in urban areas. Frequently, the Japanese Communists have combined solicitation for subscriptions to *Akahata* with the canvassing of voters.[46] No sooner does a voter subscribe to the newspaper than he begins to be fed the

[42] *Ibid.*, 169-76.

[43] Unlike the lively conventions of the non-Communist parties, for instance, the JCP conventions are staged so as not to permit any serious debate among the delegates. Every aspect of the proceedings is tightly controlled by the party leadership, whose proposals are ritualistically endorsed by the delegates. For the highly unconventional atmosphere of the 12th Party Congress, held in November 1973, see Taro Akasaka, "Kumori Garasu no Kyōsantō Daikai," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 52 (January 1974), 184-88; Takuro Suzuki, "Kyōsantō 12-kai Daikai o Kaibō suru," *Jiyū*, XVI (January 1974), 81-90.

[44] For a summary of the JCP's most recently announced policy program, May 1974, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 21, 1974.

[45] For an excellent analysis of the JCP's grassroots activities, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 97-137. See also Totten (fn. 41), 384-406; Karl Dixon, "The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs*, XLV (Fall 1972), 387-402.

[46] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 61-62, 74. See also Nagada (fn. 39), 26-28.

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party's viewpoints on policy matters as well as favorable information regarding its candidates for public office.

Parallel with the stepped-up activities geared to electioneering, the JCP has also introduced changes in its approach to the nominations of party candidates. The party's nomination of candidates in national elections is now more frequently given to party members who have "voter appeal." Accordingly, physicians, lawyers, and other professionals with moderate and respectable images tend to receive the endorsement of the party more frequently than others.[47] Emphasis has also been placed on projecting a youthful, dynamic image of the party in nominating candidates for public office.

Once elected, the Communist representatives endeavor to be responsive to the individual complaints of their constituents, and to try to establish their reputations as effective representatives. Furthermore, there has been a significant change in the voting behavior of Communist members of the Diet. (See Table VI.) Instead of opposing government bills for the sake of opposition, the Communist deputies have frequently voted for the measures proposed by the government party. During the special session of the Diet in 1971, for instance, the Communist deputies voted more frequently for government-proposed bills than against them (i.e., seven times for to five times against); in 1972 they even voted for the government-proposed measures for the control of Molotov cocktails (privately manufactured bottle grenades).[48]

These efforts have not only changed the stereotype image of the JCP,[49] but have made the party more attractive to voters dissatisfied with the government party. As a result, JCP representation has steadily increased in the various legislative assemblies. In the Diet, the JCP's representation increased from 4 seats in 1960 to 59 in 1974 in both houses. The Communists have also increased their legislative seats in various

[47] Of 38 Communists elected to the lower house in December 1972, 12 were lawyers, 2 were medical doctors, 6 were teachers, and 4 were leaders of Communist-controlled local businessmen's associations. The remaining 14 were either labor union leaders or party "bureaucrats." For the backgrounds of the 38 deputies, see *ibid.*, 70-73. See also Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 146-47.

[48] For a detailed analysis of the JCP deputies' voting record from 1967 to 1972, see Tawara (fn. 11), 63-65.

[49] According to a recent opinion survey conducted by *Asahi Shimbun*, 19% of the people surveyed indicated a generally favorable image of the party (e.g., "doing a good job"), while 32% of the respondents indicated unfavorable images of the JCP (e.g., "too extreme," "dictatorial," etc.). The results of the survey indicated that the image of the JCP is improving: expressions of a favorable image of the JCP increased from 15% in 1972 to 19% in 1973, while expressions of an unfavorable image decreased from 41% in 1972 to 32% in 1973. For the results of the opinion survey conducted on April 6-7, 1973, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 311-14.

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local-level assemblies in recent years. The JCP now holds over 2,600 of a total of 73,497 seats in prefectural, municipal, town, and village assemblies.[50]

The Communists' electoral success has been most remarkable in the highly industrialized urban centers of the crowded Pacific coastal belt where nearly two-thirds of the Japanese population is located. This success can be ascribed not only to the effective mobilization of the party's organizational and propaganda apparatus in elections, but also to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's inability to cope effectively with urban problems, such as traffic congestion, housing and land shortages, and photochemical pollution, which became serious by the end of the 1960's. The LDP, essentially a rural and semi-rural political party, has not been able to respond effectively to the demands of the urban population for solutions to these problems.[51] As a result, its decline has become quite pronounced in the urban centers. By spring of 1975, for instance, nine metropolitan and prefectural governments, including Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto in the Pacific coastal belt, came to be headed by "progressive" governors; 127 out of 666 city governments in such populous urban centers as Nagoya, Kōbe, and Yokohama are now administered by "progressive" mayors.[52] In many of these local elections, the JCP joined the other opposition parties to form a progressive coalition against the LDP.

Consequently, a substantial shift in the power relations between the LDP and the JCP has taken place in the urban districts in recent years. In the 1972 general elections, for instance, despite the fact that the LDP won a comfortable majority (271 out of 491 seats), the LDP's share of parliamentary seats dropped from 44 to 36 in the 10 largest urban areas, which had a combined total of 110 seats. In the same elections, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 27, while the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) increased its share from 13 to 23 seats.[53] The fact that the JCP became the third-largest parliamentary party in the 1972 elections clearly indicates its astuteness in utilizing the voters' growing discontent with the LDP's inability to cope with the deteriorating urban prob-

[50] *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 465.

[51] Isamu Togawa, *Jimintō no Kiki* (Tokyo: Gakugei Shorin 1973), 142-58. See also Hajime Ishii, *Jimintō yo Doko e Iku* (Tokyo: Nihon Seisansei Honbu 1974); and Yomiuri Shimbun sha, ed., *Jimintō Kiki Kokufuku e no Teigen* (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha 1974).

[52] For the results of recent gubernatorial elections held in April 1975, see *Asahi Shimbun*, April 14, 1975. For the results of municipal elections held in the same month, see *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 29, 1975.

[53] Ishii (fn. 51), 9.

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lems.[54] Since the 1972 elections, the JCP has also effectively made use of the voters' discontent with the rampant inflation. As Japan relies more heavily than any other major industrial power on overseas sources of raw materials and foreign markets, she is more severely affected by the world's current economic ills, especially inflation. Japan has one of the worst rates of inflation of the industrialized countries (25 per cent in 1974), deriving in part from former Prime Minister Tanaka's grandiose program to "remodel" the Japanese archipelago. As originally conceived, the program sought to provide a comprehensive solution to Japan's urban and industrial problems by dispersing industrial plants to Japan's hinterlands, building model cities, and establishing social infrastructures that had been neglected in the race to increase economic productivity (or "GNP-ism"). However, the program set off a wave of speculation in land values. According to a Japanese government source, land prices rose an average of 79.5 per cent between January 1972 and January 1974.[55] The spiraling land values in turn precipitated price increases in other sectors. By the time the oil crisis of 1973 hit Japan, inflation had gotten out of hand and living costs had sharply increased. Japan's economic growth rate, which since 1955 had never been lower than 5 per cent[56] dropped to near zero in 1974. The speculative price manipulations of commodities by big business firms, which created frequent shortages and price hikes, were also distasteful to Japanese consumers. Against this background the JCP scored impressive electoral gains in the 1974 *Sangiin* (House of Councillors) elections; with 130 of 252 seats up for election, the JCP increased its seats from 11 to 20.[57] In these elections, the JCP not only criticized the ruling LDP's economic and urban policies, but also provided assurances that the JCP would probe into the sources of economic and urban problems once its candidates had been elected to the legislature. In short, the JCP's recent electoral successes can be attributed largely to the deradicalization of the party which has enabled it to adapt effectively to the challenges of the

[54] Togawa (fn. 51), 142-45. See also Hajime Shinohara, "Bunkyokuka suru Seiji Ishiki," *Asahi Jānaru*, December 22, 1972. For the urban voters' "greater pessimism about political processes," see Bradley M. Richardson, "Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 433-52, esp. 441-45.

[55] For an estimate by the Japanese Ministry of Construction, see *Japan Times Weekly*, December 7, 1974.

[56] Terutomo Ozawa, *Japan's Technological Challenge to the West: Motivation and Accomplishment* (Cambridge: MIT Press 1974), 23.

[57] For an excellent analysis of the 1974 *Sangiin* elections, see Hans Baerwald, "The *Tanabata* House of Councillors Election in Japan," *Asian Survey*, XIV (October 1974), 900-906.

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electoral politics, and to some degree to the worsening urban and environmental problems which are the result of Japan's rapid economic growth in the 1960's.

In the wake of its continuing electoral successes, the JCP is stepping up its campaign, not only for an increase in its parliamentary seats, but also for the establishment of a "Democratic Coalition Government," in cooperation with other opposition parties, particularly with the Japan Socialist Party. According to a resolution adopted by the 11th Party Congress in 1971, the JCP claims to be an "independent, democratic political party, pursuing its ends by parliamentary means" for the "historic duty to establish during the 1970's democratic coalition government" on the basis of "an anti-imperialist united front dedicated to peace, neutrality and democracy."[58] The objective is to win control of the Diet in cooperation with other "democratic forces," such as the JSP, and to form a broad coalition government under the leadership of the JCP. These points were stressed even further at the party's 12th Party Congress, held in November of 1973, which adopted a resolution on "the Program of the Democratic Coalition Government."[59]

According to the JCP's 1973 documents, the party is willing to form such a Democratic Coalition Government with the other opposition parties on the basis of commonly acceptable policy programs, which should include: (1) termination of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; (2) protection of people's livelihood; and (3) preservation of the democratic parliamentary system of government.[60] The JCP has also indicated its flexibility on matters of economic policy by proposing nationalization only of "energy-related industries" (such as electricity, gas, coal, and nuclear power) during the interim period of the coalition government.[61]

In an obvious effort to alleviate the fears of the non-Communist opposition parties, the JCP also declared its willingness to return governmental powers to the Liberal Democratic Party, should the coalition government lose elections to the LDP in the future.[62] In that case, the resulting change of government would be "natural," and the JCP would return to the status of an opposition party, striving for the goal of building a new majority for a coalition government. The JCP also renewed the pledge it originally made in 1970 that under a JCP-

[58] *Yearbook 1971* (fn. 22), 598; see also Tawara (fn. 11), 51.
[59] For the text of the resolution, see Takeshige Kunimasa, *Kakushin Rengō Seiken* (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shoho 1974), 218-47.
[60] *Ibid.*, 219; see also *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 475.
[61] *Ibid.*; see also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 237-38.
[62] *Yearbook 1974* (fn. 22), 475.

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dominated government opposition parties would be free to compete for power, since the JCP would allow a multiparty system. Despite continuous overtures made by the JCP, however, the JSP has been less than willing to form a united front with the JCP. Its historical experience in this field has not been a pleasant one, in that the JCP has always utilized the united front at the expense of the Socialists' influence over the masses. Moreover, the JSP's internal political situation does not allow embracing Communist overtures for the sake of a united front.[63] Its right wing is strongly anti-Communist and is opposed to joining a united front with the JCP. The left wing of the JSP is also apprehensive about the danger of losing its influence by forming a united front with the JCP, which is better organized and has greater financial resources. Thus, there is little likelihood of the JSP's forming a united front with the JCP in the near future. At best, the JCP could expect its temporary cooperation for a limited purpose, such as a joint effort to elect a mutually acceptable mayor or governor at the local level.[64]

Prospects for the formation of a united front with other opposition parties are even worse. The anti-Communist Democratic Socialist Party is adamant in opposing a united front with the Communists, a sentiment which is reciprocated by the JCP. The Komeito has serious reservations about the JCP and continues to distrust the Communists in spite of its own policy shifts toward the left of center.[65] In the aftermath of the 1974 upper-house elections, there has been a noticeable trend among the non-Communist opposition parties to work for an anti-LDP, anti-JCP united front among themselves.

The trend is likely to continue, not only because of an irreconcilable ideological chasm, but also because of fundamental differences in approach to a coalition government. For instance, the non-Communist parties are quite apprehensive about the JCP's announced intention to transform the Democratic Coalition Government into a "People's Democratic Dictatorship."[66] Such a scenario is clearly unacceptable to

[63] Paul F. Langer, *Communism in Japan* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press 1972), 55. See also Kunimasa (fn. 59), 92-100.

[64] *Ibid.*, 121-35. See also Iizuka (fn. 8), 90-114.

[65] Kunimasa (fn. 59), 100-105; Hiroshi Kiuchi, *Kōmeitō to Sōkā Gakkai* (Tokyo: Godo Shuppan sha 1974), 187-205.

[66] For the JCP's three-stage scenario, see Iizuka (fn. 8), 84; Kōtaro Tawara, "Junan Rosen ni okeru Gensoku no Kakunin," *Jiyū*, XVI (January 1974), 91-100. The deradicalization of the party notwithstanding, the JCP does not deny the fact that its ultimate goal is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship; nor does it deny its intention to strive for the realization of that goal. Thus, in spite of the JCP's moderate program for a Democratic Coalition Government, JCP leaders have made it clear that when Japan "enters socialism," the JCP will introduce sweeping changes, including the total nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, abolishment of the Emperor

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those non-Communist opposition parties that are firmly committed to the preservation of the existing framework of parliamentary democracy in Japan. Furthermore, the non-Communist opposition parties are deeply disturbed by the JCP's professed intentions to seek constitutional amendments (including the revision of Article IX of the Constitution, the renunciation of the war clause) and the abolishment of the Emperor system. The non-Communist opposition parties are united in their stand against any proposal for the revision of the existing Constitution,[67] especially Article IX; the conservative voters are hostile to any suggestion for the abolishment of the imperial throne. Furthermore, the non-Communist opposition parties are deeply apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the JCP, because the JCP has not renounced its subscription to Marxism-Leninism, nor has it denied its intention to strive for the realization of the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the future. Unless these problems and differences between the JCP and the other opposition parties can be resolved, it is unrealistic to expect the development of a meaningful partnership.

In practice, therefore, a JCP-led Democratic Coalition Government remains essentially a political slogan without any prospect of realization in the 1970's. The LDP will in all probability remain the government party throughout the decade. Even if it should lose its majority in the lower house of the Diet, it will have little difficulty in establishing a coalition government with the moderate DSP or the Komeito.

V

A few basic conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis regarding the JCP's behavior and orientation since 1961.

First, it is quite clear that the JCP has undergone a process of deradicalization since 1961 under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto. This deradicalization became necessary because of the dismal failure of the violent revolutionary strategy from 1950 to 1955, which had crippled the party apparatus. Since 1961, the deradicalization of the JCP has taken the form of an increasing commitment to the parliamentary path

system, and an overhaul of the existing Self-Defense Forces by way of constitutional amendments. For details of the JCP inner circle's thinking on the subject, see Kōichiro Ueda and others, "Nihon Kyōsantō wa Nani o Kangaedede Iruka," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 51 (March 1973), 92-135. The article is based on over nine hours of interviews with the JCP's top policy planners, conducted by the staff of *Bungei Shunjū*. For a critical evaluation of this article, see Tsuneari Fukuda and others, "Rakkanteki na amarini Rakkanteki na," *ibid.*, 136-46.

[67] For the opposition parties' critical attitudes toward the JCP on constitutional questions, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 20-24.

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to revolution. As the JCP has succeeded in its drive for the expansion of its organizational strength and its electoral support, it has further changed its policy orientation by gearing its activities to electioneering. The continuing process of deradicalization conforms in general to Tucker's and Michels' thesis on the inverse relationship between organizational strength (worldly success) and the deradicalization of the Communist movement. In general, the JCP's behavior since 1961 also conforms to Triska's and Finley's hypothesis on the behavior of deradicalized Communist parties in industrialized countries.

Second, the steady expansion and growth of the JCP's organizational strength during the period of unprecedented economic growth and prosperity in Japan (1961–74) clearly deviates from Benjamin's and Kautsky's "curvilinear theory" of economic development and the strength of Communist parties. Nor does it conform to the hypothesis advanced earlier by Lipset concerning the inverse correlation between economic growth (i.e., per capita income) and the strength of the Communist parties. A plausible explanation for the JCP's deviation from these hypotheses may be found in the deradicalization of the party since 1961.

Third, the JCP's subscription to the parliamentary path to revolution is likely to be retained by the party in the future. It is clear that the JCP is not only subscribing to the parliamentary path to revolution, but that it is also increasingly following the strategy of the Western European Communist parties, especially the French and Italian, with which the JCP has been increasing its contacts in recent years.[68] There are growing indications that the Japanese Communists now believe that their party shares more common strategic problems with these European Communist parties than with the Communist parties of Asia, for the very simple reason that Japan, like France and Italy, is a highly industrialized, democratic society, where a "peaceful transition to

[68] Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 249-52; Iizuka (fn. 8), 158-61; Tawara (fn. 11), 190-92. In the autumn of 1968, a JCP delegation headed by Satomi Hakamata was dispatched to Paris and Rome for the purpose of exchanging views on the parliamentary path to revolution with Italian and French Communist leaders. See Iizuka (fn. 10), 135. In 1972, the JCP was host to an international conference of representatives of Communist parties of Western nations (France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, West Germany, and Australia). According to Miyamoto, the purpose of the conference was to "exchange reports on the outstanding features of the situation and party struggles in the advanced capitalist countries, and to learn from each other through exchanges of experience." Among various subjects discussed at the conference were problems of structural reform; the prospects of "peaceful revolution," with emphasis on the changes in the international situation since Lenin's time; and how to encourage the emergence of a socialist society out of the democratic capitalist society. For details, see *Yearbook 1973* (fn. 22), 487; Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 250.

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socialism" is possible. So long as the Japanese Communists maintain that outlook, it is reasonable to assume that they will continue to follow the parliamentary path to revolution.

Fourth, despite the JCP's subscription to the parliamentary path to revolution, the party has not renounced its ultimate goal of establishing a Communist dictatorship in Japan. Not only does the party still subscribe to Marxism-Leninism, but it also does not deny its ultimate goal or even the possibility of non-peaceful revolution. The JCP's stubborn refusal to preclude the possibility of violent revolution, plus its professed intention to bring about a Communist system through prescribed stages, indicates its faithful adherence to the revolutionary doctrine (known as the theory of "peaceful transition to socialism") advocated and supported by the Communists in Western Europe and Soviet Russia. That is why the party is still on the blacklist of the Japanese police authorities under the purview of the Subversive Activities Control Act. However, the process of deradicalization has already brought about substantial changes in every aspect of the party's operation, and could affect its goal orientation in the future. At least such a possibility was hypothesized by Michels in connection with the European Marxist parties, when he pointed out that, in the course of deradicalization, the "revolutionary" party could become a "revisionist" party without admitting it.[69]

Finally, it should be pointed out that the JCP's parliamentary path to power is by no means assured of unlimited success in the future. Despite the deradicalization of the party's policy orientation, the JCP has not yet succeeded in overcoming the persistent suspicion of the non-Communists, many of whom are still quite apprehensive about the ultimate intentions of the JCP.[70] As long as the JCP subscribes to Marxism-Leninism, no matter how eloquently it may explain its peaceful intentions, the fears of the non-Communists will persist. Furthermore, since it is operating essentially within a conservative milieu, its

[69] Michels (fn. 6), 370-73. See also Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: Norton 1969), 185-93; Leopold Labedz, "The End of An Epoch," *International Communism After Khrushchev* (fn. 19), 15. In discussing the deradicalization of the Italian Communist Party, Labedz points out, "In time, however, the change of means may affect the ends, and tactical requirements may affect the structure of the party."

[70] For the LDP's skepticism toward the JCP's "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government," see *Sankei Shimbun*, December 2, 1973; for the apprehension of the non-Communist opposition parties toward the possibility of the JCP's usurpation of the power in the event a coalition government is formed, see Kunimasa (fn. 59), 80-108, esp. 87-88; for a critical evaluation of the JCP's "Program of the Democratic Coalition Government" by a group of Japanese scholars, see "Minshu Rengō Seifu Kōryō Hihan," *Bungei Shunjū*, Vol. 52 (June 1974), 92-145.

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increase in electoral gains will become slower and will eventually level off. As there are no immediate prospects for a rapid increase in the party's influence over youth, labor, and the farmers, the only promising source of votes is likely to remain in the alienated urban areas and protest votes.[71] The competition for these votes is already fierce among the opposition parties, especially between the JCP and the Komeito.[72] That is why many Japanese studies in this field forecast the leveling-off of the JCP's representation at about 10-12 per cent of the seats in the Diet once that level has been reached in the late 1970's.[73]

Unless the JCP can deradicalize itself further so as to make it acceptable to the non-Communist opposition parties, it seems quite unlikely that it will be able to get into a coalition government, even if the LDP should lose its control of the majority in both houses of the Diet. The most likely prospect, therefore, is that the JCP will remain essentially a medium-sized parliamentary opposition party in the manner of its counterparts in Western Europe.

[71] According to Tawara, the JCP's electoral successes can be attributed to its ability to "create a new community" for the uprooted urban dwellers by providing them with a new "value system." Since many urban voters have become uprooted from their traditional communities, and since many of them are clearly in need of a new community in their affluent yet alienated urban life, the parties that cater to the needs of these voters (i.e., the JCP and the Komeito) will continue to succeed in urban politics in the future. See Tawara (fn. 11), 199-212.

[72] According to Togawa, the JCP and the Komeito are getting votes from the same socioeconomic groups in the urban areas. Consequently, fierce competition and conflict between the two parties are inevitable. See Togawa (fn. 51), 149-51.

[73] For a summary of the forecasts made by Japanese scholars and political commentators on this subject, see Asahi Shimbun sha (fn. 15), 261-64. See also Tsuneo Watanabe, "Jimintō Kuzureru no Hi," *Chūo Kōron* No. 1038 (September 1973), 324, and his *Hokaku Renritsu Seiken ron* (Tokyo: Daiyamond sha 1974), 116.

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Appendix

Table I

Results of the 1972 Lower House Election

	No. of Seats won	*Pre-election Strength*	*No. of Votes*	*% of Total Vote*	*% in 1969**
LDP	271	297	24,563,078	46.85	47.63
JSP	118	87	11,478,600	21.90	21.44
JCP	38	14	5,496,697	10.49	6.81
Komeito	29	47	4,436,631	8.46	10.91
DSP	19	29	3,659,922	6.98	7.74
Other groups	2	0	143,019	0.27	0.17
Independents	14	3	2,645,530	5.05	5.30
Total	491	477 (14 vacancies)	52,423,477	100.00	100.00

Sources: Asahi Shimbun sha, *Asahi Nenkan 1973* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha 1973), 247.

* *Mainichi Nenkan 1970*, p. 83.

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TABLE II

THE JCP VOTE IN ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1946–1972

Election	*Total JCP Vote (rounded)*	*% of Total Vote*	*Number of Candidates Elected*
22nd (4/1946)	2,136,000	3.8	5
23rd (4/1947)	1,003,000	3.7	4
24th (1/1949)	2,985,000	9.8	35
25th (10/1952)	897,000	2.5	0
26th (4/1953)	656,000	1.9	1
27th (2/1955)	733,000	2.0	2
28th (5/1958)	1,012,000	2.6	1
29th (11/1960)	1,157,000	2.9	3
30th (11/1963)	1,646,000	4.0	5
31st (1/1967)	2,191,000	4.8	5
32nd (12/1969)	3,199,000	6.8	14
33rd (12/1972)	5,478,000	10.5	38

Source: *Asahi Nenkan 1973*, p. 247.

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TABLE III

JCP MEMBERSHIP, 1945–1974
(estimated figures)

Year	*Total Membership*
1945*	1,000
1949	150,000
1955	20,000
1958	35,000
1961	80,000
1964	150,000
1966	270,000
1970	300,000
1972	300,000
1974** (Feb.)	340,000

Sources: Shigetaro Iizuka, *Miyamoto Kenji no Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Ikko sha 1973), 189-91.

* The 1945 figure is based on Shigetaro Iizuka, *Nihon Kyōsantō* (Tokyo: Sekka sha 1969), 142.

** The 1974 figure is based on *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 1974.

TABLE IV

CIRCULATION OF *Akahata*, 1960–1974

Year	*Daily Edition*	*Sunday Edition*	*Total*
1960	58,000	70,000	128,000
1961	100,000	200,000	300,000
1962	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1963	150,000	500,000	650,000
1964	200,000	600,000	800,000
1965	200,000	900,000	1,100,000
1966	200,000	1,000,000	1,200,000
1967	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1968	300,000	1,000,000	1,300,000
1969	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1970	400,000	1,500,000	1,900,000
1971	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1972	550,000	1,950,000	2,500,000
1973*	600,000	2,200,000	2,800,000
1974**	650,000	2,350,000	3,000,000

Sources: Hisamitsu Nagada, *Akahata Senryaku* (Tokyo: Kodan sha 1973), 30.

* The 1973 figure is based on *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 1974.

** The 1974 figure is based on *Asahi Nenkan 1975*, p. 151.

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TABLE V

VOTING RECORDS OF JCP DIET MEMBERS, 1967–1971

Diet	*Duration*	*Number of Government Bills Enacted*	*JCP Members' Voting Records*					
			For	%	*Against*	%	*Abstain*	%
55th	2/1967–7/1967	131	34	26	86	67	11	8
56th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
57th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
58th	12/1967–6/1968	90	29	32	52	58	9	10
59th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
60th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
61st	12/1968–8/1969	63	18	28.5	41	65	4	6
62nd	11/1969–12/1969	26	10	38	15	58	1	3
63rd	1/1970–5/1970	98	38	39	52	53	8	8
64th	11/1970–12/1970	27	12	44	5	18.5	10	37
65th	12/1970–5/1971	93	50	54	34	36.5	9	10
66th		n.a.	n.a.		n.a.		n.a.	
67th	10/1971–12/1971	14	7	50	5	36	2	14

Source: Kotaro Tawara, *Hadaka no Nihon Kyosanto* (Tokyo: Nisshin Hodo Shuppan-bu 1972), 64.

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Research Note

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Doctrines and Postures

By COLIN S. GRAY

The Political Context

> [T]echnological advances may lead to better weapons, but these innovations are exploited effectively only insofar as suitable doctrines are devised to govern their strategic and tactical employment.
>
> —*I. B. Holley*[1]

THE above judgment rests upon the implicit assumption that political objectives do not severely constrain doctrinal choice. Theater nuclear weapons (TNW) comprise a region of debate wherein technology, doctrine, and political judgment all interact. Given that TNW doctrinal contenders do not agree on the purposes that should govern TNW deployment, it is scarcely surprising that their preferred doctrines and servant technologies should appear as alternatives. The clarity of doctrinal and postural choice is by no means matched by a parallel clarity as to the range of choice of political assumptions. Hence, although each camp in the debate may admire the elegance of the solutions proposed by others, each remains unmoved in its own arguments because the solutions of others are held to be addressed to the wrong problems. Without necessarily endorsing an either/or approach, it is useful to recognize explicitly that TNW are understood to help solve one (or both) of the following problems:

(1) The defense of Western Europe against a range of hypothetical military and political dangers; and
(2) The provision of credible linkage between the NATO forces deployed in Europe and the strategic forces of the United States.

A somewhat cynical comment upon the above problems could proceed to the effect that once technologies are available, one can always divine problems to which they allegedly relate. The fact is that TNW

[1] "The Evolution of Operations Research and its Impact on the Military Establishment: the Air Force Experience," in Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., *Science, Technology and Warfare. Proceedings of the Third Military History Symposium*, U.S. Air Force Academy (Washington 1969), 89.

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exist and are in place in and around NATO Europe at the level of 7,000-plus warheads.[2] If they did not exist, it is far from certain that NATO would, today, seek to develop and deploy them. Inter-allied expectations, or the bequest of the past to the present and future, ensure that the posture of "no TNW" is precluded *a priori* from NATO's TNW postural menu. Just as the military and administrative structure of NATO was and remains the product of the initial period of Korean rearmament (1950–1952), so a very substantial TNW deployment in Europe was and remains the product of the period of the adjustment of Korean rearmament goals to "long haul" financial reality (1953–1954). NATO is accustomed to enjoying whatever benefits accrue from a TNW posture. While TNW are necessary—because NATO-European members of the alliance have come to expect the United States, almost unaided, to provide such a posture—it is less certain that NATO needs or can afford a clear TNW doctrine.

Unambiguous and rigorously argued TNW doctrines have an uncomfortable tendency to state bluntly what NATO members would really prefer to leave shrouded in discreet silence, if not mystery. To be precise, all TNW doctrinal alternatives are retailed as prospective solutions to one or both of the problems mentioned above. Unfortunately, the doctrinal-postural preferences, respectively, of North Americans and Europeans tend unerringly to reflect the very particular interests of the contending advocates. To Americans, a good TNW solution to the alleviation or solution of problem (1)—how do we *defend* NATO-Europe—would preclude the need for providing any very credible linkage between Central Europe and the American homeland. To Europeans, the provision of credible links between local defense and central strategic forces would preclude the need to provide very seriously for the physical defense of Western Europe. So, any TNW doctrine, to qualify for more than passing political attention, must accommodate the tension between two sets of very vital interests.

The basic political test for any TNW doctrine lies in the requirements that it provide for sufficient battlefield and near-battlefield use so as to persuade Americans that a theater nuclear war might (just) remain limited to that theater; and that it provide for sufficient off-battlefield use for the purpose (explicitly, at least) of effecting deterrence-through-the-fear-of-further-escalation, so that Europeans are (reasonably) confident that no theater nuclear war could remain limited to that theater. Restated very directly, Europeans do not wish to be *defended* by exten-

[2] For details of deployment, see *Arms Control Today*, IV (April 1974), 4.

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sive TNW use, and Americans do not wish their territory to face an immediate nuclear risk in the event of any clash of arms involving NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. This fundamental difference of interests is quite incapable of analytical resolution. Also, it explains why NATO's TNW doctrine-posture is and must always be "in the middle" of the doctrinal-postural range—eschewing extremes that are unduly responsive to the political desires of North Americans *or* of Europeans. Postures "in the middle" necessarily proffer half-hearted options for direct battlefield use and no more thoroughgoing options intended to guarantee "linkage."

Doctrine generally is judged to be a necessary feature of the military landscape. Weapons cannot be retailed convincingly to skeptical legislators in the absence of doctrine; use-oriented organizations understandably feel the need for tolerably unambiguous guidance. In lieu of authoritative central direction, separate baronies will assert their parochial credos. Also, doctrinal speculation and assertion cannot easily be eschewed: strategists, following their professional calling, will insist upon designing new and refurbished packages of ideas pertaining to the use of weapons. Finally, posture without doctrine is widely felt to be a logical absurdity. In fact, the functions of doctrine and its relations to technological innovation, policy change, and the internal discipline of organizations are largely unexplored fields of enquiry. In the context of NATO's TNW posture, *the* requirement of doctrine is that it should be so designed that all of the major interests within the alliance deem it acceptable.

Ipso facto, the heavily political (inter-allied relations) character of NATO's TNW doctrine ensures the exclusion of radical flights of analytical fancy. In a very real sense, NATO's doctrine rationalizes the TNW posture in terms acceptable to most. Whatever the attractions of a particular TNW doctrine may be held to be vis-à-vis postulated external threats, the doctrine must first pass tests of political acceptability within the alliance. In such a situation, the best doctrine tends to be the least doctrine; in other words, "we agree that we will do what seems to be most appropriate at the time." NATO governments may not know on what scale, when in a conflict, with what yields, and at what targets TNW would be delivered—but neither do Soviet leaders. NATO politicians would seem to agree that they wish to preserve their freedom of choice; that means that TNW must not be employed in prompt and automatic response to a border crossing, nor must NATO be tied by declarations of "no first use" or of "unilateral use only on NATO territory."

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It is probably true that the fine print of NATO TNW doctrine, as of United States strategic doctrine, is really profoundly unimportant for the deterrent effect of the postures thus rationalized. Soviet reasoning may well proceed as follows: war in Europe means war with the United States——war with the United States means nuclear war——nuclear war (with a superpower, at least) cannot be "won"——therefore war in Europe must be avoided. In line with this reasoning, NATO might just as well select its TNW doctrine by throwing dice: the deterrent effect would be the same. Nonetheless, even if many strategic analysts and politicians suspect that the detail of doctrine and posture is unimportant, there are sensible reasons for denying the logical implications of such a suspicion. First, it could be wrong. It is unwise to assume away deterrence problems. The invention and solution of nonexistent problems may be a vice of the professional strategist, but this vice is one that prudent governments must support. There are some dangers in the "overdesign" of doctrine or posture, but these dangers are probably less serious in consequence than those attending "underdesign" would be.

Second, given that it is a political requirement in NATO that there be a TNW posture, surely it is sensible to construct a congruent use doctrine that is viable in a military way? A doctrineless posture may suffice to deter the initiation of a war, but if war should nonetheless occur, it would be very difficult instantly to improvise use concepts for TNW intended to facilitate its early termination. In the event, all doctrine might be vanity, but this strong possibility does not excuse NATO governments from the peacetime effort required to provide a doctrine and posture that would maximize the prospects of favorably influencing the course of hostilities.

The TNW debate of recent years has been conducted very largely in terms of alternative doctrines and postures. This package approach is useful in that particular ideas are set in their context, with the logical implications duly drawn. Also, it constitutes a path of constructive debate: contenders in the debate have positive alternatives to offer in place of the current NATO posture which they criticize. Unfortunately, the "postural alternatives" approach to TNW enquiry is ill-suited to the appreciation of *common* lines of reasoning, and in practice it often seems to diminish effective communication. Unacceptable recommendations can preclude sympathetic attention to the lines of argument followed to those recommendations. Accepting the cost of this approach, the discussion below outlines what may be termed "the range of postural choice." Prompted by new conventional and nuclear weap-

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ons technologies, and by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's clearly stated expressions of dissatisfaction with the current TNW posture in and for NATO-Europe (with urgency added by the terms of the Nunn Amendment),[3] interesting ideas concerning TNW postures are not in short supply. The four postures selected for consideration here reflect my judgment as to inherent interest and political feasibility.

Postures and Doctrines[4]

Each of the four postures outlined below rests upon both explicit and implicit technical, political, and military operational judgments. This article is intended to serve as a brief guide to the contending ideas that constitute the currency of the TNW debate. Readers must not forget that nuclear weapons have never been used on the battlefield, that procedures for inter- (and intra-) allied consultation on TNW use have never been tested in reality, and that the testing of new conventional weapons in action in Indochina and, by proxy, in the Middle East is an exercise from which lessons are to be drawn only with extreme caution.[5] Precision-guided munitions (PGM's) that worked well by daylight in Sinai should be expected to be less useful on a foggy night in urban West Germany. Defense analysts have an uncanny habit of uncovering those technical and political "facts" that tend to support their postural preferences. TNW debaters come essentially in three varieties that are not totally exclusive. These are (a) those who believe, though tend not to say, that *any* TNW posture deters, so the relevant criterion for postural choice is inter-allied acceptability; (b) those who believe that TNW are really only useful for linkage (to strategic forces) purposes: the defensive instrument in Europe is NATO's conventional-force posture; and (c) those who believe that TNW have a

[3] The Nunn Amendment to the Military Authorization Bill for FY 1975, PL93-365, August 5, 1974, required, *inter alia*, that the Secretary of Defense "study the overall concept for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe" and "how the use of such weapons relates to deterrence and to a strong conventional defense." Secretary Schlesinger was to report "on the results of the above study on or before April 1, 1975." See James R. Schlesinger, *The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe: A Report to the United States Congress in Compliance with Public Law 93-365*, 1975.

[4] An alternative menu of TNW postures is on offer in Jeffrey Record, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives* (Washington: Brookings Institution 1974), chap. 7.

[5] In peacetime the military utility of new technologies is almost invariably misjudged. See Gray, "New Weapons and the Resort to Force," *International Journal*, xxx (Spring 1975), 238-58; Donald C. Watt, *Too Serious a Business: European armed forces and the approach to the Second World War* (London: Temple Smith; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1975), chap. 3.

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crucial military-operational role; TNW should deter by promising territorial denial. In terms of the four postures discussed below, Posture I (*Current NATO*) appeals to those who are persuaded that postural detail is really irrelevant; Postures II and III (*Revised NATO* and *The Covering Force*) are the products of those who believe that TNW should be approached strictly as defensive and escalatory supports to the cutting edge of the conventional forces of the alliance; and Posture IV (*Battlefield Use*) is the product of those analysts who wish to allocate primary military-operational functions to TNW.

POSTURE I: CURRENT NATO[6]

A. Ideas and Means. TNW essentially are a deterrent backstop to conventional defense. NATO's General Strike Plan (GSP) for theater-based and theater-dedicated nuclear forces calls for progression through selective use to general nuclear response. (The GSP, or targeting plan, relates only to fixed targets—not to anticipated targets of opportunity.)[7] Initial TNW use, which is all that has been agreed to in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), would almost certainly be locally restricted in Central Europe, would be light in character—and would be intended not so much to reverse the tide of battle as to convey the message that a major threshold on the scale of violence had been entered (conceiving of a threshold as an area, rather than a line). For reasons both of political calculation (NATO-European preferences) and military necessity, follow-on selective TNW use would be directed primarily at interdiction targets deep in Warsaw Pact territory. NATO's conventional forces are no mere tripwire for a decision to use TNW. Since the Warsaw Pact members would have to launch a major attack to penetrate NATO's forward defenses, the use of TNW would not be implausible (a very large conventional war would be in progress). Moreover, emphasis on conventional weapons ensures that NATO would have the forces needed both to exploit the opportunities that might be created by TNW use and to sustain the very heavy casualties that would result from Soviet TNW strikes (or misdirected NATO strikes).

[6] Although I have very definite views on the characteristics of desirable TNW posture and doctrine (see fn. 16), the characterization of each posture and the framing of the advantages and disadvantages are intended to be preference-neutral. Without conscious partiality, the most telling arguments for and against each option have been selected.

[7] On the GSP, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, *U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons, Staff Report*, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 19-22.

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The posture comprises approximately 7,000-plus warheads, deployed in peacetime in (just) over a hundred storage sites (many of which are located at or near NATO airfields).[8] Means of delivery include: nuclear-capable artillery (1,010 pieces); 108 *Pershing* surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's); 175 *Sergeant* and *Honest John* SSM's, currently being replaced by *Lance* SSM's (72 at present); F-4, F-111, A-6, and A-7A/B/E aircraft (684 U.S. plus 612 nuclear-capable aircraft of NATO allies); and 300 atomic demolition munitions (ADM's), 720 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, and 380 nuclear-capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. Some F-4 and F-111 aircraft and some *Pershing*s are maintained on quick reaction alert (QRA).

B. Advantages. Current NATO posture—and doctrine (in a very tenuous sense)—exists. The political costs of the present posture are really very small. Until recently, strongly expressed dissatisfaction emanated only from the extreme political left in Europe (who wanted *no* posture), and from professional defense analysts and promoters of new technology. The congressional criticisms that surfaced in the Nunn Amendment rest upon an approach to TNW problems that is fully compatible with the inclinations of senior defense policy-makers in the United States. Defenders of the current posture are very willing to admit that it can and should be improved, while they are also aware of the political constraints imposed by the many constituencies that must be tolerably satisfied with any postural revisions. A TNW posture is not awarded points for elegance or internal consistency; its function is to deter—by means of an implicit promise of an uncertain combination of territorial denial and punishment (promoting escalatory fears of greater punishment to follow). Whatever the weaknesses of the current TNW posture may be, no one can say that it does not work.

All policy change tends to be costly. Thoroughgoing postural-doctrinal revision—as opposed to piecemeal fence mending—would generate needless anxieties in NATO-Europe and might easily lead to major misperceptions on the part of Soviet leaders.[9] Earnest pursuit of *the best* (by whose definition?) TNW posture probably would cause such dissension within the alliance that the net result would be even less satisfactory than is the current posture. For all its ambiguities, which promote a healthy deterrent effect and reflect accurately the

[8] *Ibid.*, 14.

[9] The scale of effort required before a major innovation in strategy can be adopted by NATO is convincingly portrayed in R. C. Richardson, "Can NATO Fashion A New Strategy?" *Orbis*, XVII (Summer 1973), 415-38.

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different allied interests that must be reconciled, the current posture has the advantage of familiarity. Major political change takes many years to implement and requires a considerable shake-down period of adjustment.

C. Disadvantages. Most military postures look adequate in peacetime. The Current NATO posture is excessive in scale for any of the stated political or military purposes for which it is maintained. However, the scale and almost *ad hoc* character of the posture is perhaps justifiable, given its vulnerability to nuclear and conventional PGM strikes and (in many instances) to being overrun rapidly. Nuclear ammunition sites invite pre-emptive attack; similarly, most of the TNW delivery vehicles offer a very large first-strike bonus to the attacker. Save for *Lance* (which is in very short supply), NATO's SSM's are movable rather than mobile, and the QRA (and many other) aircraft should not be expected to survive a dedicated assault upon airfields. Given NATO's determination to delay TNW use for as long as possible, major elements of the TNW posture must survive the first days of a war intact. Under the present conditions, they cannot be expected to. Unfortunately, NATO's postural sins are symbiotic in character and hence synergistic in effect. NATO is opposing a Soviet *blitzkrieg* capability (and doctrine) with inadequate conventional defenses.[10] This means that any TNW intended to have a direct and immediate effect upon the battlefield will have to be fired at West German territory and in a context marked by a gross inadequacy in NATO counterattack forces. NATO's TNW inventory, though certainly varied, provides—in self-deterring measure—a range of warhead yields that is excessively on the high side, with an undue focus upon blast damage for calculated and designed kill effect.[11] Lacking the yields, and indeed the doctrine, appropriate to battlefield use on NATO territory—close to engaged forces and to streams of refugees—NATO is likely to find itself compelled to resort to deep interdiction or "deterrent shock" effect strikes. The dial-a-yield variants available for such use are illustrated by the example of the *Pershing* SSM. This so-called TNW delivery system has a range of 60-450 miles, and yield

[10] See Steven Canby, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology, Adelphi Papers* No. 109 (London 1974/75).

[11] The lethal radius of blast (itself a calculation that is challengeable on technical grounds, with its ready assumption of a regularity of effect) is smaller than is that of prompt and delayed radiation. See W. S. Bennett, R. P. Gard, and G. C. Reinhardt, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Objectives and Constraints*, LA-5712-MS, Informal Report (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1974), 4-6.

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options with outer limits of 60 and 400 kilotons. With this kind of a TNW instrument, it is little wonder that NATO hopes to be able to delay TNW use.[12]

POSTURE II: REVISED NATO

A. Ideas and Means. Without rewriting TNW doctrine, NATO could and probably will effect substantial revisions in posture. The attractions of the Revised NATO posture are that it requires only incremental change, and that all politically significant views within the alliance find that their favorite doctrinal sons remain untouched. As outlined by Dr. Schlesinger, most recently in his *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*,[13] NATO's TNW posture should be able to survive surprise conventional or nuclear attack, should lend itself to much improved central command and control, and should be married to survivable target acquisition technologies. This leaner, more attack-proof posture should serve to deter TNW use by members of the Warsaw Pact, should be appropriate for employment at the low end of the scale of limited strategic options, should be effective for direct battlefield application to effect a favorable "tactical discontinuity," and should be well able to provide the means for an effective campaign of nuclear interdiction behind the forward edge of the battle area.

In terms of military detail, the Revised NATO posture would feature a general reduction in warhead yield options, a relative shift from tactical air to SSM-TNW delivery, a very considerable hardening of peace- and crisis-time TNW storage facilities, and almost certainly a substantial reduction in the number of warheads.

B. Advantages. The Revised NATO posture would meet all the principal technical objections of informed critics of the Current NATO posture, while avoiding the major pitfalls that beset all radical alternative postures and doctrines. Lower weapon yields, enhanced survivability, and a doctrine for use that sought very explicitly to keep unwanted collateral damage to an absolute minimum would give NATO

[12] *Pershing*, admittedly, is an extreme case. However, while granting that such TNW-capable systems as the TV-guided *Walleye* glide bomb and the 105mm and 203mm artillery tubes are in the sub- and low-kilotonic ranges, the free-fall nuclear bombs available for NATO's tactical aviation are almost all of obsolescent design and relatively high yield (certainly in excess of the 14KT "nominal" yield that destroyed Hiroshima). See U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Applications, *Military Applications of Nuclear Technology*, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 7-17.

[13] Washington 1975, pp. III-2-3.

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a more useful military TNW instrument, should reduce self-deterrence, yet would not commit the alliance to very early TNW use. Given a robust conventional defense, the Revised NATO posture would allow the alliance to keep its options open. In terms of inter-allied politics, a clear doctrinal commitment to "conventional defense first," married to a TNW posture comprising delivery vehicles of both short and relatively long range, should suffice to persuade hyper-sensitive Europeans (and interested Russians) that the new posture did not imply a diminished American commitment to European defense.

C. Disadvantages. Although vigorous attention to the survivability of the TNW posture is noncontroversial, the reduction in weapon yields—in the context of technologies for precision delivery and real-time target acquisition—would be likely to persuade Americans that, in the event of war, they should refrain from effecting those interdiction missions that NATO-Europeans tend to favor because of their putative deterrent effect. In other words, Europeans are likely to believe that NATO should not acquire the means for effectively waging a TNW battle restricted to Central Europe.

The Revised NATO posture would satisfy none of the major doctrinal camps. Those hostile to the breath of a "battlefield use" orientation would consider postural revision without significant doctrinal change as an example of "the camel's nose" tactic. NATO could seem to be acquiring the means to wage a tactical nuclear war. But, from the point of view of advocates of TNW battlefield use, Revised NATO looks like a pale and fatal compromise. Postural modernization would be welcomed, but the modernization would not proceed far enough for NATO to acquire a really effective range of TNW for battlefield use. NATO's doctrine of late resort to TNW must mean that their employment could not serve any rational military or political end. A timorous doctrine would fatally inhibit the effectiveness even of a markedly improved TNW posture. Finally, a TNW posture better attuned to likely battlefield needs could persuade the Soviet Union that NATO intended to fire TNW early. Hence, Soviet interest in promoting a non-nuclear phase in a conflict in Europe might be drastically reduced.[14]

[14] The degree of Soviet interest in non-nuclear operations in Europe is an issue that is much in dispute at present. It is a fact that thoroughgoing modernization of the ground and tactical air forces has begun to accord the Soviet Union a major non-nuclear *blitzkrieg* capability. For a careful analysis, see John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 120 (March 1975), 65-69.

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POSTURE III: THE COVERING FORCE[15]

A. Ideas and Means. Without precluding the possibility of direct battlefield use, NATO would seek to effect a "tactical discontinuity" by means of a substantial campaign of shallow nuclear interdiction. Warsaw Pact forces in West and possibly East Germany would be isolated from their sources of logistic and reinforcement succor. Utilizing PGM systems, with conventional and nuclear warheads—as the target required—NATO's short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM's), supported by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), would neutralize traffic bottlenecks (such as the major rail and road bridges over the Oder) and would crater the runways of Warsaw Pact airfields.

B. Advantages. The Covering Force posture offers a direct battlefield effect: TNW use would not be primarily symbolic, and the problems of target acquisition that must reduce the effectiveness of TNW fire against targets moving across country at, say, 15-20 m.p.h. would not exist. Interdiction, even if on the shallow side (that is, certainly not reaching into the Soviet Union and probably not even directed against Polish territory), should provide enough "linkage" to secure NATO-European compliance. Also, interdiction promises to be sufficiently crippling in a military sense so as to satisfy the (primarily) American requirement that TNW have a useful *military* role. Other advantages include the facts that heavy NATO TNW fire would not be directed at NATO territory, that careful yield selection and precise delivery on fixed target systems should not produce so much collateral damage that NATO would be self-deterred, while healthy fears of escalation would be stimulated in Soviet minds as NATO TNW struck into Warsaw Pact territory.

C. Disadvantages. Since NATO would not release TNW until considerable ground had been lost—meaning that there must, by then, be a considerable momentum to a Warsaw Pact advance—the necessarily delayed effect (on the forward edge of the battle area) of an interdiction campaign must mean that NATO would have yet more ground to recover (while the strangulation effect of the interdicting TNW strikes took its hold). Interdiction strikes, save possibly of the shallowest character, could well have the result of removing whatever TNW targeting self-restraints the Soviet leaders had initially adopted. Very low warhead yields and "no towns" targeting rules might not be recog-

[15] The principal document advocating this concept is Laurence Martin, "Theatre Nuclear Weapons and Europe," *Survival,* XVI (November/December 1974), 268-76.

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nized in Moscow as signals of restrained intent. Also, it is very far from certain that a campaign of interdiction, even nuclear interdiction, would succeed. For the very short duration of the campaign that they planned to wage, Warsaw Pact forces would probably have "up front" all the logistic means that were essential, or they might plan to overrun and capture some vital stocks (of petroleum, oil, and lubricants, for instance) from NATO. Finally, NATO-Europeans tend to suspect that an American president would hesitate and deliberate at length before he would sanction the use of American strategic forces in a context wherein neither those forces nor the American homeland had been directly attacked.

POSTURE IV: BATTLEFIELD USE[16]

A. Ideas and Means. TNW of low and very low yield would be used for the defense of the West German border. "Deep" interdiction strikes would be eschewed—save in the event of such strikes by Soviet TNW. The purpose behind a Battlefield Use posture and doctrine would be the local defense (by denial) of NATO-European territory, without recourse to punishing TNW strikes intended to produce fear of escalation—*unless* local defense failed, or the Soviet Union demonstrated no significant degree of targeting self-restraint. This posture rests upon the axiom that there is no substitute for an effective local defense, and upon the assumption that only prompt and fairly heavy TNW use will provide the concentration (in time, space, and energy released) of firepower that could stop a Warsaw Pact invasion. Advocates of Battlefield Use do not deny the political nonviability of their proposals, but they argue that they have a duty to tell politicians what the probable consequences of a doctrine of late use of fairly high-yield TNW would be. The political attractions of this doctrine should be that, through the promise of an effective close-to-the-border defense, Soviet leaders would be deterred by the realization that a *blitzkrieg* could not succeed; while a competent border defense should indicate that NATO would not need to escalate a conflict in order to seek to induce Warsaw Pact forces to withdraw from occupied territory.

The primary means of implementation for the Battlefield Use posture would be short-range SSM's, deployed in very large numbers and

[16] Variants of this orientation include W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval, and R. G. Shreffler, *United States National Security Policy and Nuclear Weapons*, LA-5785-MS (Los Alamos: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1974); Gray, "Deterrence and Defence in Europe: Revising NATO's Theatre Nuclear Posture," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 119 (December 1974), 3-11.

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fitted with terminally guided sub- (and low-) kilotonic TNW. In peacetime, the nuclear warheads would be very well dispersed and protected in blast-proof deep holes. Since this posture and doctrine requires early release and heavy use of TNW, appropriately relaxed command and control arrangements would have to be devised.

B. Advantages. Presuming that NATO's TNW did wreak the scale of damage upon Warsaw Pact forces anticipated by Battlefield Use advocates (and this is the subject of a very lively technical debate), NATO would have secured the means to deny local gains to the Soviet Union. Long-range delivery systems, theater-based and strategic, would be employed only in response to Soviet initiatives at those levels. The burden of escalation would have been shifted to Moscow. At the same time, NATO's TNW doctrine and posture would make it very clear that no war of strictly limited liability could be waged. Europe would not have been made safe for limited nuclear war. Battlefield Use would be intended to provide an effective defense at the lowest feasible cost (including the risk of a wider war). The very local use of very low-yield TNW could hardly be confused in Moscow with a "general nuclear response." Pre-emptive instabilities, uncertainty over the timing and precise criteria for TNW release, and the military schizophrenia imposed by the need for dual-capable forces would all be effectively removed. Soviet leaders could no longer calculate (gamble) that they might succeed in waging a short, sharp, conventional-only campaign. Military action against NATO-Europe would mean nuclear war—waged, on the NATO side at least, with a postural instrument carefully designed to secure maximum local military effect with minimum collateral damage.[17]

C. Disadvantages. A doctrine of inflexible early use of TNW would be unacceptable to Americans and to Europeans. Whatever the military arguments may be, no government would commit itself to the firing of TNW (even of very low yield) immediately in the wake of a border crossing. Europeans would be particularly unhappy at the prospect of NATO directing most of its TNW fire at NATO-European territory. Predictions of low collateral damage might not be proved correct, while Soviet TNW use—sanctioned by NATO's TNW use—could be expected to be heavy, and directed with little attention to the

[17] A great deal of study has been devoted of recent years to the problems of reducing the unwanted collateral damage that would attend TNW use. For example, see M. A. Brookman, *Reduction of Collateral Damage for Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Volume 1: Executive Summary* (Menlo Park, Cal.: Stanford Research Institute 1974).

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niceties of precise targeting. Furthermore, despite claims that Battlefield Use TNW employment would be responsive to intra-war deterrent needs, so as to deny the Soviet Union a TNW free-fire option against NATO-Europe, Europeans might suspect that a posture and doctrine of dedicated battlefield relevance would really be intended to help preserve a nuclear sanctuary status for superpower homelands. If the United States (under the guise of NATO) acquires the means to fight a nuclear war restricted to Central and Western Europe, such a war might be waged to the detriment of NATO-European interests, if the alternative before Washington were escalatory resort to strategic forces. In the event of war, regardless of the good intentions expressed in peacetime, an American president might very well prefer to fight a tactical nuclear war to *the last NATO-European* rather than place *his domestic constituency at immediate nuclear risk.*

The above reasoning is not beyond the appreciation of sophisticated Soviet leaders. Hence, a Battlefield Use orientation could seriously weaken deterrence. Since heavy attrition must be expected, such a NATO posture would pose very grave problems for the local success of a *blitzkrieg* by Warsaw Pact forces; but the danger of escalation attending such an adventure might be perceived as having been greatly reduced. Finally, many analysts contend that very early and heavy use of TNW would be quite unnecessary. Also, it is by no means certain that there must be a fatal shortfall in NATO's conventional stopping power, or that very low-yield TNW could substitute effectively for such a deficiency—if indeed such a deficiency existed. Adoption of a doctrine of immediate recourse to TNW would constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would guarantee NATO's failure to secure enough conventional firepower for a relaxation of the defensive demands placed upon the TNW posture.

Conclusion

As of 1975, NATO has a considerable distance to travel before Posture II is attained. The idea of The Covering Force (Posture III) has found considerable favor in Washington, since it lends itself to relatively secure central command and control (provided communication problems with nuclear submarines can be solved), and it clearly implies *late* as opposed to *early* resort to TNW. Despite the political hopelessness of their cause, the advocates of a Battlefield-Use orientation have succeeded in pointing to many of the unresolved—and really unresolvable—problems that beset any doctrine of delayed and fairly

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light use of TNW. The major problem is that the later TNW are used, the less useful their military effect will be. This means that, to succeed, relatively late nuclear use must affect the will of Soviet decision-makers to continue a war, since it cannot hope to rescue NATO's ground forces at that juncture. Also, analysts of Battlefield Use have sought explicitly to answer the question, "how should we fight a tactical nuclear war?" Even many of those opposed to early and heavy Battlefield Use admit that this is a vital question that should not be bypassed by means of vague reference to an expected deterrent effect. If neither the carefully tailored means of TNW nor the detailed doctrine for TNW use in war are to hand, can TNW function effectively as a deterrent?

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Erratum[1]

In a recent article in this journal, I reported a failure to replicate the positive correlations Bruce Russett found between inequality of land tenure and political instability.[2] Unfortunately, two of the instability indicators I used were untransformed counts (Deaths from domestic political violence, 1948-67 and 1961-65), whereas Russett had employed the logarithm of a similar measure. Taking logarithms is advisable when using counts in order to reduce skewness.[3] Correlations between inequality and the logarithms (to the base ten) of the Deaths variables (plus one, as the log of zero is undefined) are greater than those I reported, though not so strong as Russett found. For 1961-65, the correlation is .29; for 1948-67, .20. The former is significant at the .05 level; the latter is not. When the Gini coefficients are weighted by the percentage of each nation's labor force in agriculture in 1960,[4] the correlations with the logged Deaths variables were .63 and .61—both highly significant. These figures especially support Russett's conclusions.

Transforming the violence indicators generally produced stronger regression equations, but the predicted curvilinear association with inequality did not appear. Besides the several problems noted in my article, I have found several other technical shortcomings in the cross-national regressions. Rather than attempt to correct them, I think it best to follow Hibbs's lead and await the gathering of more complete data on inequality before undertaking a thorough and sophisticated cross-national analysis, such as the one he has provided for other variables.[5]

Jack H. Nagel

[1] This research was supported by the National Science Foundation, grant No. SOC-75-08511.

[2] Nagel, "Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis," *World Politics*, xxvi (July 1974), 469.

[3] Edward R. Tufte, *Data Analysis for Politics and Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1974), 108ff.

[4] In my article, I mistakenly reported this year as 1965 (p. 467, fn. 42).

[5] Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley 1973), 196-97.

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

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

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